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CIlAPI'm I 
JAPAl>l ENVISIONS A W01~W Pl1PIRE IIi THE FAR E!\ST 
Respondbillty tor t..':le war between Japan and the United St..'\tes has 
been a topic much discussed since the dq that Pearl Harbor receim t.he shat-
tering blows of the Jap:mese. The a.ttack was one of the most hum1l..i.'lting a.nd 
devastating catc.strophios ever end,;.lred by our proud and t'dghty ootion.1 In 
making an an.a].ys1a o~ the responsibility for this wcl-r, one finds a great di .. 
vergence of opinion among writers. Some claim t1:18:1;, Japan, ambitious for 
blam.e on President t.'rr.tnY..lin Delano lloosevelt ar..d tlle statesmen who wore di-
'J ! "-
rooting our nation.:" The defeat at HO.l!ro.ii was, at the outset, bl .. 'lln.ed. uoon 
Japan, beea'tWe she hud l,";tU'·lChed the attack at the moment th..'lt our Amorlc.;m 
Governrtl.ent ,laS trying to find. a road to peaoe.3 In a specilll mGssago to the 
~ !2::!! Tim¥, Bertr£all D. Hulsn said that 5ecret.'tl"y' of St::!t,6, Cordell Hull, 
accused Ja.pcm of making n lttreacberous a:1d utterl.v unprovoked attack" 4 upon 
."' 1 UI~:ted St.e.tes D<:r~a.rtment of state, Inve~;;tiqn 9.f the Pe.u:1 
ilarbor Attackl Report of the Joint Conm.ttee OIl the !iivestlgation""Ol the }'earl Hur~ A:t.tack, Seventy-ninth Congress, 2nd. Sess., Document no. 21.~4, 
¥lash1ngton, 1946. 65. ( Ui.ter references will be listed U.S. Deplt. P«U'l 
Harb<>r. ) , . " 
I" 
2 George Norgon.stern, Pearl H::~rbor, The St2!Z of the Socret liar. 
Iiew York, 1947, 310. . - .... - - - .. -~ 
J ~ York 'rimae" December 8, 191tl, pt. 1, p. 1. 
4 Ibid. 
-
1 
2 
~ 5 
the United States am of ha:rins been "infamously £alse and fraudulent" by 
getting ready for the invasion, While her diplcmats were conducting negotta ... 
tionl to maintalo peace.6 \ ' 
'\\ Tha.t the Japaneee attack on Pearl Harbor was a. treacherou.G surprise, 
wa.s the story given CN.t tar Geveral 1'JAll'S by Was!:d.naton. ~cana had not 
yet learned that members ot our Armed rOTCM had cracked the secret code, 
months before Pearl. Harbor) and th.!lt the Congreumen Who read the oode knew 
nearl;y as muoh about Japanese plans as the Tokyo war councll.7 But the Pres-
ident, and the Wash1ngton o.tf1cials wished to give the publli the :t.4ea that a 
Japan.ellJe attack was not expected. 8 il' 
", Writing 10 ~bt, Charles Cal.lan tansUl expressed. the opi.n1on 
that we could not make a comprCl'ld.ao lldtb dictators, who disreg~ed a.ll tho 
rulu o£ civU1aed nations. It _s futile to hope that Japan would maintain 
peace with u.s, it we eonsid8l"eci bct'r' conduct since 1931. The attack on Pearl 
fLlU>bor had been dramatized by the Japaneee many timu in hs" 'Wl'J.r a.p.i:nst 
Ch1na. Japan bad puraued a pol.107 of eruel and heartless destruction, and 
the banbing of Pearl Harbor was only one item in a lor...g llit ot useless 
i 
sla.Ulhter and erime .. 9 ,," 
$ !l?,g, 
6 Ibid. 
-
7 Margenstern, 310-312. 
8 Ibid. 
-
9 Charles Callan Tanalll, "The United States and Ja.pan, Th~t-, 
New York, XVII, rlo~ 64, March, 1942,'lO4. 
J 
'On the other hand, Walter MUlis thinks that the question, w~ilo vlllS 
responsible for the Pearl Ho.l'bor disaster'i", can. never have a tinal anSlleI'. So 
ml'lY ft?ctoTS, both good and bad, enter into tho question, $0 m..;;.ny motives are 
IIIcxtricably'mi.''lgled, th..'1t the moral issue of responsibility must depend on 
t,h,e standard \'111.ioh a purticul.::,r person applies to it,. lUllis :finds it dU:f'i-
cult not to bJ..1JIle Admiral Kimmel and .. General Short because, baing the cor.rmand .. 
1ng officers at Ha\iaii, they shoald have been prepared for <it militi..:1rY surprise. 
though their equipment wUS not complete and their charts undependable, yet 
they were responsible fer brint'ing the ship into port ililespi t,c the dungers they 
encountered. lD . 
In wi t1:!1.. this thesis, no attempt l>rill be !Iltlde to determine '~ho was 
responsible for the gren.t tragedy of Poe.rl Harbor, r01' writm.'s in general hold 
so man;y divergent Ol,Wons that the question may never have n cott$Ct answer. 
~ievertheless, an af£ort will be put forth to present the vie~is 0f the more ra ... 
ri!30 to power" Americt.l.n toreig~: ~)oliey in thr: Far ~st, President Roosevelt's 
senrch for tl1e rO:1d to p~ce, and finally, the revi.sionist theories concerning 
?o:lrl Ha:i.bor, which developed attar the Pearl Harbor Investigation, cwill be 
discussed in the various cl:<:.q;:l'ters.i , ... 
\ I' For more thOl'l a century, J.::p:], ~1 hn.d boen roald.nr:; e11croo.chinnnts on the 
mninh:.nd of Ch1na., a::ld on the isli::i.nds near her shores" until at length, she 
-4 
'" ;lold a gX'Olt IDLtr:itiml? empire with reprosontatives sitting at tho council 
tables of the nations.11 As £<~ "back as 1815, the Ju~~nese took control or 
the Ryu Kyu Islands south of Kyushu. 'I'hc Kings of th,ese iah'lds hadt £ or se-
veral hundred years, paid tribute, at one time to China, at another to Japan. 
However J -che Japunese su.mmaril:r put an end "':'0 this custom by Mold.ng tho king ... 
/ At this t.ime, by a trthlty of amity vith Korea, J"lpan gained contr'='Jl of three 
important ports.12 Dut it was not long be£rJre trouble arOSG between the Ko-
reans and the Ja"tx2.nese, culminating in the Sino-Ja.:;anese ~iar of 189::., 'l'he fo1 ... 
lowing yeo.:r, Japan took j'ormosa, ard declared her purpose ot control.l1ng parta 
of China. l ) 
\\' The issues involving the United Str.ltcs and Ja;,>atl vill be better un-
derstocd, if sane m.ention of .tun.er1ca.' s early dealings with Je.pan is made. At 
the begintlin(t o,f tho twentieth century, tho United. St~1tes in1tiated its 'Open 
Door' policy, and two years later the .4.nglo-Japaneae alliance ~las fOI'!:'le<i. Not 
long after this, Japan st.:'rt,oo on her c<'J,.reer of ~:d.re building. P"ablic opin .... 
ion f'avored JalJiln in those days. It vus fitting that she should free ::;orth 
Chirla frora B:ussia's gr,:.~sp, so when Jap.an made a u;.t.rp:r:5.se at·l~n.ck em Port Arthur 
the jl.m.erica::J. press praised the Japaneae.14 ! f\ 
11 Ian. Horrisan, ~ Jupa:oaelge ~, Ne"\1l' lork,1943, 24 .. 213. 
12 Ibid., 2h. 
-1.3 U.S. Dep't., ~e:,rl Harbor, 1. 
'" Ihargi."1g victorious at Port Arthur, Japan secured, by the Treaty of 
portsmouth, the Liaotil..D.g :;>eninaula, and tr.e southern balf' of Sakhalin, an 111 
as a loo.r;e of Kwantung, and possession of the South Vuanchurian Railway, wh1eh 
1r:a.8 shortly linlted to Korea by il Japanese brll."1Ch lintJ, vi.:t Antung.15 
ncse Eastern RaUway rema,ineci lIDder Russian oootro1.16 
'»:lw:1:n o. Detschauer bel1evea that no one could question Japan t s 
seizure of Sakhalin and the Kwant'U.'Ylg Leased T$ttltory'. Justice seemed to be 
on her side, tor she h£ld 1<ron thi.s territory !rem China :in 1895, only to have 
to surrender it a :few months IlJ.ter 'to Gftrmany, Fr;mce, a."1.d Russia who unscru-
puloua.ly divided it among thenwelns, thl'oo years later, Russia taking the 
Kwantung Te:rritorjl" tor hcrsolf.l"( i ~i} 
America. had brlef.'ll' pursued a policy of empire building when she 
took the l:1b11ippines in 1898, but a few y(';;.'...rs luter, she returned to her be-
lie£ in the right of ann. tion to detendne its own st;atu:a, and began to oppose 
imperia.l.1mit in Asia, pI'ofessing her bellef in the territorial intogrit,y o:f 
China a..'1d the "Open Doorn pollcy, d~nding eqwll economic oppor'tuni;';;r Jor all 
If) 
foreign b-Ilsiness concerns <T::'GTa'l;..1ngthere. 0 :! ,j" 
15 lilt was a.t Yalta tlll.lt ROOSevEllt and Cburchill conceded Stalin's 
demands in the l"ar East, including the recovery of Southern Sakh.'llin and the 
Kurile Islands and tho acquisition of' tl position in J.ia .. '1.Churia, that ~ms ta.",-
tamol.mt. to full cntral of tba.t ancient Chinese prcvince. u Sumner \velles, 
~ Decisio~1 £!l! Dobi~, ~ €!r..editJ 191. 
16 T. A. Bisson, America. t s !!!: ~stern I"'c1icl, Ne'(~ York, 1945 J 17. 
17 FJiwin O. H.eiaehalJ.er, The United st,.tos and J:lD:~n, Cambridge, 
21-;~2. 
18 Biasoo, 17. 
p 
-~-----------------------------------------------------------, 
6 
Pre;:ldtmt Theodol'e Roosevelt, 'Who acted as mediator in the peace 
settlement at PortalOUth (190$) bad made prior arrangements with Japan eon ... 
cern1ns ManchUria.. Japan and. Russia were obltga ted by the trea.ty "not to 
obStruct artS' general ~ eOOlmOO to all countries, which Cbba mq take 
for the deVelopment of the canmerce and :5.nd.ustr.r of l~. II 19· . r' 
IYen thrugh Japan 'became the doldn.mt power in the Far &at br th1a 
/ treaty, still .be was not satistied, becaWJe she bad reoe1VQ1 l'., WfIl1'd.t7. 
Since Roosevelt had helped to &l'TtIl'lgs the tenas, the Ja.panese bla:l.ud the Am __ • 
1Can people, and as a result riots broke out in Ja.panese c1t1ee. Which ~ 
gered American lite and pt'operty_ It vas not until Russia and Japo.n, on ~ 
30, 1907, eonoluded public and secret tr_t1es, wbich marked 01£ their respec-
tive spb.ere$ or 1.ntl..uenee in 'Manchuria and Mongolia, that \he ~t real-
ized. hie· scheme tor 1t\:a1anced an~" had failed. 20 'l'he follCAdrJ.a '1fJIiIZ. 
on Nov_her )0, Roosevelt concluded the Boot .. tlakah1ra Agreement J 1Ib1ch "P"f'e 
Japan a tree band. in l1anchuria.," to. return fO'l' a promis. of non-aggre.si.on in 
. 21 
the Philipp:t:n... The President va., no doUbt, Clad to make tbl..J pact, .s it 
was a means of COJlcU1atinB the .1-'1'4n8.8, who were causiDe him. ser10u coneern 
22 
over the htmigra.tion quw.J.on, at that time. He vas part1cular1;r disturbed 
over the d1spu.te with Japa.n, in regard to immigration into Cal1fo.t"niD.. After 
Taft had ~ President~ B.oosevelt wrote to hhl. stat1ng "that the Admin.i.a-
19 Tana1ll" £!.c3 Door, 5. 
ao !!!14., h. 
21 ll>1d.., 5 .. 
22 Ibid 
-
,-----------------------------------------------, 
7 
tration shoul4 take no step$ that would. malee Japan teel that we are 'a. men-
2.3 
ace to their interests I in Korth China. 
'f Looldng At the Japanese side of the question, B.eischauer expresses 
the idea that there seems to be no eXC'WS0 tor the EI:'cl1ah-spea.ld.ng peoplea 
claiming as the:f:r> r1ght most of the parts of the world which bave a desirable 
cl1mate, and at the same ti."ne ezc1udina the Japanese hm the un:1nbab1ted or 
sparsel;r settled l.a.nds of tho tropica, tdm;pq becawJe the latter 'begc1 migra-
ting at a later period. The Japanese, becauae of wu.ft1e1ent ten1.tOl7 on 
the Island, dream of a new haue in th$ great tmClD:Plored regions south ot them, 
particularlT I in New Guinta. and Borneo. 2h 
Colonel Bo'uIsa believed that 'the Unit_States ohould not thwart 
Japan'se:rpans101'l into ASiatic ten:i.tory near her h<:deland, othe~ we 
might bave to f~ with b.ar at .. later date. 2S I :) ,}<' 
• B,y 1910, Japan had annexecl 101"ea. regardlua of the fact that she 
26 
had pr~ll' guaranteed to the Koreans, frMdcm, aM the right to propert1'. 
Bu1des this, during ~1orld \/ar I~ tald.ng ad"tantage of the w:i.deaprea.d disorder 
in the world, .he presented her wen-known Twenty-one Ilemands to Chins.. 27 
When America entered the cQl'1fiict in 1917, Japan bee&nlG our alq. 
23 Ibid. 
-
24 Rei.eMuer, 6$ ... 66. 
25 Tanaill, ~ ~, S.3. 
26 U.S. Dep't., Pearl Harbor, 1. 
27 Ibid. 
-
P~----------------------------------------l 
~ 
8 
the toJJ.owinl yee;r I She· was aaked to participate in an 1nt~'lX" ... Allied pl4n to 
aid in the evacuation of Ozechoslovakian torees .from Siberia., and to iU<~rd 
the m1l1 tary supplies there. Fifty thousand Czech soldiers, who had desert-
ed the AUs-trie.n arm1ea to fight for the Allies I were caught by tho revolution 
28 
wbUe be.1ng. tran~ across Siberia to Vlad1vostok. The Un1ted statea 
Bent 7,000 troopa, and Japan, which was more than happy to be recognized as 
an ally of the Great Powers, sent on equal num.ber. Moreover. seizing tho 
opportunity to tak:$ Ea$tern Siberia, at this time, she sent 70,000 troops 
into the area, but her attenpt at conquest tfaS untJUCCuai.'\1l.., The.American 
force underGe.neral \If:!] J 1a S. Graves atayed in Siberia ne"wly two years.. Its 
sole aceompli8biuent was the prevant10n of the rutbl$sS rule of Red Russia in 
tho maritime prov.1ncas of Sibe:>ia.29 
.1' At the Peace ConterenCfJ at Versa.l.ll.e$, (1919), Japan paid little at-
tention to European a.ffa1rs.f devoting herself to thotJe of the Far East.30 
President Woodrow lV1J.soD, neverthelus, strongly opposed. Japan's position in 
Shantuns.. &Cl.;.UJrJ,ng t:J.rr3" la1ow'l.edge of the Ie.naing-Ishii Agl'eement .. · Tansill 
sev-ere17 cnticizG8 the President.s action in these words: "W1l8on's a.ction 
therefore, and bis $ubs~t den1al or arrt lal.olIledge of the seeret treaties 
~ust have convinced Japanese statesmen that he vas 1mplcenting the maxims of 
~b1a.vell1 •. "31 
28 :tl:lW. 
29 TaJlS1ll,. Back ~J' S;3.. 
~ Ibid.,. $2. 
Bctct. 
-
,---------------------------------------------, 
-
9 
i Ths"lansing ... Ish1i Af,reement $pec1£1call.y stated that "territorial 
propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently, 
t..be ()oVer'l:lmant of the untted states recognizes that Japan has special inter-
ests in China. part1culArl,y in the part to which her possessions are conti ... 
guous ... 32 These tfepec1a.l 1ntereatatl are explained b3' A:lihitney <h":1swold in 
the tollowingworasJ 
Established dipl.allatic usage has endowed. the phrase uspeeio.l int ..... 
ests" with political as well as eeoncmic OOMOtat1ons •••• The sit-
uation in world politics at the .t1:ae the ~t vas be1ng negoti. 
ated was aucb as to suggest that IAmsing realised the political char ... 
acter of his concession and concealed it. The tact is, Lunsine knew 
ot the existence o,t the secret treELti.,w.1th which his phrase was 
pale in oanpsrison and ~ch l"endered fantastic the expectations 
:1mpl1eit in the l'eat of the agreement •••• Qivt:m Lansing's knowledge 
of the Allied c<:!ll'tllitments to Japan., even the phrase "spiilcUil interests" 
implied at least tentative recognition o£ them. 33,/ r) "I' 
\ 
,r During the decade £ollow1ng the Treaty ot Versailles, the American 
people generously contributed to, the econanic restoration or F..Urope. Publio 
opinion was enthusiaStic over the conclusion o£ the Kellogg-Briand Pact which 
condemned :recourse to war tor the Iflttl1ng or world r I%'oblem.s, bel1ev.L"lg o~ 
too gladly that thil would end val". It praised the work of the government in 
turth~ the plans tor disarm.ament inBt1tuted at the Wllshinaton Conference 
of 1921-1922.34 
32 Ibid. 
-
" A. Whitney Qrizwold, The Far ~t«m PoliS£ of the United States .. 
New York, 1938, 219. - - ... .- - - ... 
34 t~'Uliam L. langer and S. Everett Gleason, !2! Challge !2 !!!-
lation.. ti .. York, 1952.. 1.5. 
, 
-
10 
'" To set.tle t,he l'''ar F..:astcT{: Questton .. the United states, the Ik'itish 
COl1r,:omiealth of Ha tions, Jap..1.u and FrG.l1ce prr)mised to respect the richts of.' 
one nnot:ter in the isl.,.'lnd possesstcns of the Pacific .. and. to consult one an ... 
other in case a:t:r3' other nation attempted aggression there. 35 The Nine-Power 
'treaty signed by all the major nations who had interests in Chine,. was also a. 
result of -ehe Conference. The sig:t'U:l.tories pl'a1lised to mtd.ntai..'1J the ()pen Door 
policy in China, to re.frain from inter!ering with her administration of govern-
nent and to recoanize her territori,';,l integrity.36 
Sta.tes Govern.-nent to protect Chins. from. being forcibl;y deprived 01' her tnrri-
tox'Y and to ensure peace in that country. They were also designed to take care 
of the special interests of the United States under the system 01' unequa.l 
trEUlties. As they were applied, the second design cancelled the £1rst. J? 
In a letter to Senator Borah, February 2), 1932, Henry L. Sti.'II'!son, 
!Secretary of state, discusses the Nina Power Trea.ty, expi a1n1ng its connection 
"lith the Open Door policy • .38 He wrote; 
This troaty, as you of course knO¥-l, torf)s the legal basis upon 
llIhich now rusts th,,,: 'open door' poliC"J' tOh'Urd Chinn. That policy • 
. 35 'I'unslll, Da.,c}£ l?R0r., h59. 
37 Helen Heart}, H~..:::.2!: f:!: 11Jl ... el':i:c::~: ~~, Boston, 1948, 217. 
38 St:l..mson, The l"ar Eastern Cris:i.D, 1(,6-167. 
~--------------------------~ I""'" 
II 
enunc1:.lted ~J John Hay :in 1899, brought to an e..'1d the struggle among 
various powers for s~ spheros of i."ltereat in China w:h1ch was 
threaton:ing the dismemb«rmtmt of that empire. To accomplish thi.s 
Hr. llay invoked two principles (1) equality of c('JI}%J1el"c1a.l opportunity 
among all mtiOl1$ in dealinc: ",nth Clrl.rl.;J., a..'ld (2) as necessary to that 
equality the preservatil)n of China fa temt{)rial a..1'ld admin1strat1w 
intogrity. These pri:noiples were not new in the foreign poliey of 
Ji."llorica. They had been the principles upon which it restod in its 
dea.1i1.1gs with other nations for ma..V yerJ."S. In the case of China the;r 
'tvore invoked to save a situation, which not only' throotened the future 
developme'lt and sovereignty of that great Asi.:'lt1c pilloplo, but also 
tl1l"eD.tened toc:reate d.a.ngerous and incre.,"UJing rivalries b&tweoo other 
nations of th(!' world. "'Jar bad o.lready taken place bGtwe.en Japan and 
Chim.. At the close of that W'l:4.r three other nt::ttions intervened to 
prevent Japan tran obtai.'I1ing some of the results of toot wnr claimed 
uJ her.39 
In another part of the ].etta", Stimao;"). suya: 
This treaty represented Q curelully developed and nmtwod. inter. 
ootiono.l policy intended." on the one hand. to asO'W:'e aU the contrac-
ting parties their rights e.nd tn'tarests in and with ~<l:rd to Ch.ina 
anrl on the other hand, to assure to the poople of Chi."1a the tullest 
opportu..l'l1ty to develop without molest;:(tioo." their tiovereignty and in-
dependence acctU"ding to the tI1Ot\tU:":l "Ina ~htened sta.ndards believed 
to obta.in among the peoples of the ~h. 40 ! .. " 
1, t! I The "Open Door" po11.cy was not £Ol'1nc~ st&.t€d untU 1922, when the 
"ep:resentat.ivea of tho natioI1ti who n,1,d interests in tho Pacifio held a confer ... 
~ce at which theuOpen Door n poller.,. wns cry:!rta.lli~ed. illto tho Nine f'owCtr 
i'reaty wbich defined the principles UpOl'l. whIch the treaty ~stt,>d. ttl 
Uotwi thst..~nlding the fact that JapctO had 5igned the Nine PO"#'er Treaty 
~nd hud accept.ed the agreements made at the j,{1.shingtozl Contereneo of 1921 ... 1922, 
~e find her meddling in Chinese affairs 500.'1 aft.cr Go,,:eral Ta.nLlka ts cnbL'1ct 
39 Ibid., 168. 
-
40 Ibid., 
-
167. 
41 Ibid. 
III 
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came iIltc, POW::' in 1927. },l.2 In O"pen viola tiou of }l4lr premises at thCl t~aehing­
ton Conference, J~Jpan took tJV(!Jr V.u.mchuria a.."'ld ::;c;,t u;p the pUp"i)et reg:1.me of Han ... 
chukUo. This action was also a disregard of the Kellogg ... Driand Pact of 1928, 
which renounced wnr as an inat.ru.l::len t o£ Il:1 t,ional policy. 43 
A clash between Jap;11lM0 and ChinesE) soldiers in the South Manchur:k'1 
F.aUway zone, WllS the occasion of' the Hanehurian Incident. The Chinese Hank 
Govcrn.'fl1ont called the incident naggress1on. 1I The Jnp:mese soldiers, on the 
a,rrtJ other mtianals 1rTOu.1d do 1.'11 si.-nil..~ cirC'UL.1St.:lnces, terming it police actio 
to prevent disorder, and eJCplaining that the action 'Wr.s pul"Cly loca.l, a.nd that 
thought to be those ot young Nanhal Chang l~h, gOVL.""'IlOr of' l-Ja.'1.chu.r:.t.a., bad 
attempted to destroy part of the ndlroo.d, which belonged to Jap::n.h4 
The intervention of J.~pan in H.,,'1!"..churia on Septen.ber IB, 1931, was 
the begin.'ling or the destruction of world security.45 The agreeIllenta of tho 1ft 
wont deeper a::d deeper int.o Ch:tna, subjecting that country to political and 
42 u.s. Deptt .. , Poorl H&rbor, 2. 
43 Ibid. 
-
44 UHer @h:1na'iJ richest province, Hanchuria, which contains seven 
ty per cent of her industrial strength lrr,JS controlled b'y J;'l.panese trO!~: 1932 to 
19L~5" ;:'L'1d is nOli in largo part controlled. by the Soviet Union and t.~'le Chinese 
Soviet ,~ff!I. Her might lies Ll1 the intelligence, endurance IiUXl ll1Jmbers of her 
people. She may recover Na::lchuria and. she :may become a great industrinl na ti 
She is not noW'." Bul.l1tt, 110. 
45 Hears, 21:;0 
pi 
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econonic con~lS which gave Japan the advantage in every instance.46 In the 
opinion of Hears, the Western Powers l1lU.St accept part of the blame for the 
IvIanchurian incident, which resulted £rom 0. very c~lex: set of conditions in 
Clrl..M. l'leatarn penetration tw.S the cau.~e of many revolutions in Ch:i..nc'l, and as 
time elr.tpaed the situation beca.ll~ti) more chaotic, thus furnisbing the Japanese 
with a pretext to protect their property. 47 
: Under-8ecretnry liellee not_ the long' range viaion of his su.?erior 
officeX' in· the St.:1.t.e Department 1n regard to Japan' s 1n:vasion of China. Those 
Secretary of st."lte stim.son was the one figure in the Hoover Cab-
inet who saW clear~ Wi.'. t effect the J:;'1,Xlneft inws1Cin would inevi-
tably mVEl upon the pe..."lce of the rtlst of the ~forld. In Febru.ar;y, 
1932, he urged the British sovernment to join with tho United'. Statu 
in view of the ,failure of the League to cope with tho 81 tuat.ion in 
invoking the Uina.-Power Tre;J.tyof 1922. He felt tmt concerted 
pressure upon Jap,an by It,U the signt:ttories of that tret'tty was the 
one poas1ble means of p.ch1evi..1:lg .any practical results. P.s is well 
known, the British goV'crnment through Sir Jolm Sim.;:m, th311 SeeretaI"'J 
of SU:.te tor Foreign At.t'a.1rs, taCitly maW. it clear that it tias not 
disposed to tc1.ke the acti<.ln suggested. The British government per-
mitted it to be u-'1dC'"stood .. that in 308 much as she wne I). member ot 
the Council of the League, and the t.e.aeue was already' attempting to 
deal ,lith the situaticln, she would weakG'fl the effectiveness and pres-
tige of t.he Loague 1£ she wore to join with this government by invok-
ing either the !ii.."le-Powel" Treaty or tbe Kellogg-BruUld Pact. This at-
titude did much to croo.'t$ in this OOU:ltry hostility tOW:2.rd British 
poliey, and IWlIlY oth0l"Wise objootive pm:-aons p1rlCoo the hla1'l'.a for tho 
almost u' ;l~.mi ted evils arising out of J{lpo.n J S suocessful aggrcSSiOflo ' 
in !'Umchuria s!?.warely upon the doorstep of the 13.'t:-itish Governmont. Ie) 
46 U .5. Dep ft., PC:l.rl Harbor.t 2. 
• ..... ..... .,111 
h7 HOtll'S, 207. -208. 
h8 Sumner ~felles, fj_':iJne for Decision, Neu York, 1944, 280. 
Ch1na., uho was not able to resist the 1-1anohu:ria.t'1 attack,appealed 
to the LSt.").gue of Uations on September 21, 19)1.49 The Chinese claimed that the 
Japanese" anxious to conquer a..."l<i annex Manchuria, hr.d tl:ler',.selws blown up t.he 
Irailroad• The Ur.J.ted Stat&s preas aided. with the Chinese:. The European gev-
eJ,"'.llritoota, however, were reluctant to decide the issue until all the faots eon-
cerning 'che incident ';Iere thQ'r'01lghly 'i:nVestig:.:;, tad .. 50 The LeJ.gue discussed th0 
questio.'1., and in l)eeeraber .. 19)1, appoint«! a en mm1ssioo to stud;r the matter. 
Sir Ha.nl'jT IqI:.tonj a British Earl" headed the investigation. 51 The United Sta-
states opposed the l·1a.nehurian InCident, condemning it as An act of aggresnion 
on tho part. of the J<''l.pD.nese, and on Jall'W1l"'1 7 J 1932, the Sacret,~;,ry of St.1.te is ... 
sued the Stimson Doctrine, stating Americata official position concerning Jap.-
anese aggression. 52 It C!)l'ltainod, no nel>l principle in foreicrn policy, but sim-
pl.;:r rep~t·,'<i the stataments made to both Ch.i."'Ml and Japan after the In.tte.r i'k'ld. 
>3 pl"'esentoo. hsr Twa..1'lty-one D«(k'lnds, in 1915. 
Lord Iqtton d.ecL'u·oo the Japanese Govrommant in Hanehukuo to be a 
pu;p~)et l~eg1me" and thought it ought to be repl':lceeJ b'.r til. Chinese auto....'10111OtfS 
govorl'll'OOnt. When the lr,.rttoo Camis;Gionts report of: the Hanch.urian situation 
$0 Hoora, 213 - 215. 
51 Bs.1n, 14'1. 
52 l'ie<:trS, 215 
53 Sumner Welles, Tille :f'~ ~i,si0n... He'd" York, 1944, 280. 
was adopted It.; the laague of Nations, the Japanes& delego.te walked out of the 
MSGnbly on. Feb::uary 24, 19.3.3, and the !ollow1~ month 1l<.lt1f1ed the ~ 
'" 
the.t she wilO wi:thdrawing f'ro.-n. l1leIllbership.S4 It 'iias a.t this time that Sadao 
Ara.ki, who believed in excludil1Z f~ere .trom the haaeland, and in an 1:,m... 
perial policy abroad, announced oval' the radio. 
Mvolou.s thinking is du.e .to foreign tho'Ug'ht ..... Jap<:'n l'l'lust 
no longer let the impudence of the wb1te peoples go unpunished. It 
is the duty oJ: Japan .. • '" to cause China to respect t.he Japi1nese" 
to expel Chinese 1nflUEJnC$, .from fWlchuria, and to follow the way of 
imperial. destiny. 55 1 , \\t 
"" 1 \\' iThe Le~e of !'iat.icfI..s achieved one practi~ result through the 
Iqtton Coninisslon, namely, it made clear to all the world the true oircum-
stances concerning the !';.al'1chur;tan. Incident. Likew.i.se.t Pre$ident Hoover and 
Secretary ot sta:t.e, stiruJon, in r~i.."lC to recognize Japan's .PUp'.[let state 
served a usafr.Jl purpose" at a time lihen public morale was e:x:tre:m.e11 low. 56 
. Conce:rnil"ag the w1t·hdmwal of Japa.'1 .fror:. the League of l1ati{')nG, I!%'. 
Kok1 Hirota, 'Ria 1~'\je~118 l1inister of S'k~tt\': fctr Foreisn ,Affairs said in a 
speech delivered in the Uq'.l$(l o! Peer-e" and also in the nou.SIl ot Repl"$sen'l;&.. 
tives of the lm!J'0I'i/U Diet" on January 2J.; 19.34: 
The Japtlnetl1e OOyer.t'lMellt. were obliged to sorve notice ot withdraw-
al from the ~;:).gue of Nations en the 27tb or March" 193.3, because the 
Manchurian !ncidmt and the questions regarding the State of 11anchukt!o 
r:'l, ~- S 1'\-"'t ~ 1 u_ .... 1 2 ;H+ D •• ~p ., .. $ll" ~-oor, • 
55 bank P. ~, Olristina. Pb.elpa Harr1s and Ohara, c. Ba71 
lq, Th1a ~ .2! Conflict" RMsed, N_ York, ItSo, 4J0-.43h. 
;;6 \ieUe$, 260 .. 
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showed tbQ.t there was no agreement between Jap.:>,n and the Leagu.$ on 
the ~"ldame.ntal prlneiplea of preserving peace in the Far East. $7 
In 'the same adt1rea., Hirota reminded. t.be members ot the Imper1al 
Diet O! the word. which the ]bperor used in his rescript which Was issued to 
the Japanese people. Theae are Hirota'. verde f 
Now that Hanchukuo hae been to'W1d.ed, 0U:r lhp1re deed it essent1al 
to respect the independence of the new Stute a."'ld to encourage its heal-
thy developaen.t in ard.- that the aou.ree. of evil in the Jar .. t 'tffIJ.Y 
be eradicated and an enduring pea.:::e the:reby' established. • • • However, 
the aavancement of tnt«rl'lS;t1onal peace i8what,. as ev .. ore, We detlire, 
and OUr attitude 'toward enterprises of peace aball auste1n no cbarl£e. 
By ¢tting the League and embarking on a· 0011rH of its own, Our 1iapire. 
does not,mean that it will stand aloof in the ktorene Orient, nor that 
it will ue1ate ltselt thereh.Y ~ the fraternit7 of nations. It:La 
our desire to pranote Mutual confidence between OUr 1h.p1re a1Xl all the 
other IX'W'-' and t.o make known t.be justice ot ita ca.use t~tthe 
world. 58 , ' 
', .. 
, The rtllSignation of their nation trom the League, causGd wmn:y and 
disturbance to the common people of Japan, who had gloried in the taot that, 
their country' was ~ a.s a Western Power. The business community' feared 
that the League would impose a. blockade, t:1!' a. boycott to torce JapaMse and. 
out of }lanchuria. By propaganda, the lhperor bad tried to give h1$ people .. 
fee~g that a state of crisis exi8ted. In 1933, he had wam«l them that 
there would be trouble because they bad w1,thcb.'a.-wn t'rcm the League, and they w 
were made to bel1eve that a cOl"dm was being drawn around Ja.pan by the west-
ern nations in order to prevent the Japanese from treeing Asians tran explo:L-
tation b)"the W'estem Powers. $9 
-
L 
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There were two schools o£ political thought in Japan in reg:'xd to 
the manner in which Vanchuria waS to be ruled. ,One group wanted. c(,J.'l,Stltution-
al and popu.lar government, the other believed. in mlitl..U"'y' C?ontrol. The former 
method was known as the ".friendship" policy, the latter as the "positive" pol .... 
icy toward ChiM. Baron SlUdehara., Japan's great jI"ore1gIl l'1in1ster, advocated 
vhe n.tr1endsh1p polieTt which wus founded on gooo. "Will and neighborliness to-
-ward China.. General Baron Ta.ua..ka, on the other h.and,. belleved :in a upositive 
polleytt. one Vhi.ch USeS lulita:r;y force to attain its ends. He was of the 0-
" 
pinion that Japan should defend its hold:inp against all who menace them.60/ 'S' 
\, 
\\' The fact· that the great powers 'Were unw1l1ing to act wh.en Japan ruth 
lessl",f took over ~ianchuria, demonstrated to all tho world the impotence ok the 
Leag1le of Nations. J&p.an's attempts at aggression bad been so eo.S!:/, so $Wif't, 
and so successful that she did not know enough to stop 'before the whole world 
ed. its ineffectiveness to pruerve peace. '1'he United St.:i.'tes declared her dis. 
approval of Japanese aggression in }1anChuria, but did nothing mol'f.t. Its fail ... 
ure to aot, gave Japan the opportunity to rush forward to catustrophe.61 The 
It.::'l.11.."I.Xl Gcwernmcnt. seeing thc.t Jap&J.n was not hindered itl her ~0.ss1cn, un-
dertook the conquest of Ethiopia. The Leaguets impotence also embolden8d Hit-
leI' t.o enter on a course ot violence in tho hope of craat,ing Q Ugreeter Qer ... 
r, .... "'v ,,62 
"'-..~ ... J. 
60 stimson.. 27. 
61 Reiscbauer, 2.h - 25. 
62 Welles. 280. 
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The decision to acquire a s(')lid footing in Asia. 'was rode b'lJ the Hi-
63 
ota. cabinet, at a Five H1r.dsters Conf8l"eooe, August 11, 19)6. They pl.."UlfttIId 
o move sout'!1.wurd slowly and quietly, so as not to arouse suspicion concern-
g their aims. A complete of£e;-:sive on China began on July 7 J 1937, oeea ... 
ioncd ~J an ineident at Pe1ping, wideh had been str.::rtcd by the Jnpooese anny. 
he C6rlgressional Camdttee describes' it thwu 
Seiz11lg upon the negligible I'larco Polo Bridge incident between 
Japt.Ulese Ilnd Chinese forces ne<1T Paiping, Japan, in July of 1937 J 
began wholesale inv'dSion of Ch:l.na. The lawloss acts o£ the Ja2~an­
ese mill kll'Y' in carrying forward the L"'l.V'asionw.,l.s a disgusting and 
d.egrading episode of rape" theft, and murder. In the outrages a.t-
tending the occupation of Nankin~h on December 13, 1937, the Ja. 
panese military wrote a particularly ignoble page in history. Yet, 
on July 21, 19.37, the Japanese PrIJmd.er, Prince Konoye, s'kted, uIn 
sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no 
otru:..r purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, thun to 
prfWerve the peace of Fast Asia." Aga.in, on October 28, 1937, the 
Japanese Foreign Office said. "Japrll1 never 1001,s lll~on the Chinese 
people as an enemy." As obse~ by Secl'e~ Hullr nJa.pan show-
ed its friendl.v £eeJ.itlg tor China by bombing Chinese civilian p0p-
ulations, by burning Chinese Cities, by mald."lg mill10ns of Chinese 
homeless and destitate, by m1stre:~t.ing and killing civlliuns, and 
by acts of' horror und eru~ty:." 64 
ion bYiVes us an idea of' W!ult the Japanese wre ini~ending to do. He says: 
1fe will not annex ChiIla, oh no, we will not do that. i'1e will 
only arrange China so we can do business \'d th Chi.'1.'1. .. •• The 
world is three parts, Euro::ie j,'or the Europeans, Araerica £;,,1' -~he 
United Stato~, Ash for Japc!.D,. 65 
---.~ .... 
64 Ibid. 
-
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i The rise of ultrano,tionalism in Jap~).n, as a result of their vietor"J 
in Hanchurj:'1, caused a feeling of insecurity in HoscoW'. The comintem inten-
si.fied its efforts to prevent war. NOZilKa, Japanese mq:>ert in foreign affai.rs 
waS called UpOn to report on conditions in ChUla. He said that the liar in Man-
churia marl<ed the commencement of a new 1m~stic campaign against the 
Chinose revolution and the U.S.S.R. and tl\.;'1t the United St.a.tes wished to sub-
ject all China to the 1\merican DolJ..ar, and therefore wanted to prwent the 
seizure of t4'mlchuria by' Ja.pan, a.nd that the doJ.1ar diplomats 11lere emeavol'1ng 
to have Japan get into war wit:!. the U. S. S. R. HO$'lka ended hU report to 
his superiors in Hoseow in a tone of' warlike oonfidenoe: 
Should the :imperialists of the whole world hurl their ch9.l1enge 
at our fatherland.. the USSR, we will ah~tlthem toot the irTorld prole-
taria t will arise in arr...s aga1nst them. We will show them, tb .. 'iL t 
nothir.g n:waita them but the grave. 
Down with Japru,lcse ~ml 
Dow11 with the international counterrevolutionary conspirators~ 
Long live the Red ~ of the Soviet Union :m.d the 1~ lrJ!1Jr;I 0, 
Soviet China:J 
Strengt,httn the revolutionary struggle of the world proletariat 
against l-lti.%' and wa,r mach.inat1onal 
Long live the Cominteml 66 
fensive ~ainst !~ussin.The conclusion of the Anti ... Canintern Pact und tbo a-
greem.ent reaohed at Osaka, in the wi:nter 'Ji: 1937, seemed to confirm this id('m.~~ 
66 Hedger SW'earingon and P;!.l.D. lilnger, Red Flag in Jarxm: Interru:r!r-
tion,::,l ComtTruniam in Action, Cnmbridgo, 1952, 49. 
67 ~., 69. 
p 
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Shortly after the fight at Peiping, July 7, 1937,. Prince KooO"lJel the 
Ja.panese Prime Hin1Bter 1 made knotm to the Diet the Government t s plim .for es-
tablishing a new ol'der in East Asia.68 An attempt to form. a military alliance 
! 
with GerI:l:my proved unsuccessful b$cause the Navy and so:::;.e o£l the politioians 
l 
opposed giving IlGermany military aid in a waX' against the Western Powere.u69 
Jap21Jl l1anted an a.11i.:mce with Germany ehi~ly as a protection against the 
Soviet Union, but Germany wo.nted better trude rel.:1l.tions than Japan wished to 
give, and abe also wanted a promise of.' military assistance in ca.se she was 
attacked by another country)O Hir~, who had recently been appointed 
Prime ~linister, 1n Konoyets place. made another attempt in ttaYJ 1939, to 
strengthen the Anti-Comint.ern Pact" but he was u.."lS\lCcesstul, because Ja;xm 
wa.s 'Wlable to promise Ocrm::Ln;y' m:U.it.:l-:t7 aid in cruse ~ Should break out. 71 
Hiranumtl continued negotiations i.."'l an effort t~ haw the J;,lpanese a.mba~wadors 
at oe;rJ..:Ln and Rome ferm an a.greement.\;,,~en on August 23, 1939, the German-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pa.ot, was signed, Jaj,J<J.n received a severo blov;.J2 
~Jhile ~ i1a.3 still at Will" with !:!llrope, Japan s.<:.w hor opportu'!'" 
nity to begin an o£fensive in the Far East. Stal.mar j the ~ er.tt.&aa.ry, 
68 Joseph 11. Ballantl.n.O, ltifukd011 to Pf).;'1r1 lfurbcr, Tho Foreign Pol ... 
icy of Japan," Foret..iB Allaire, XXVII" July 1949, 651-658. 
69 ~., 651-664. 
70 Ibid. 
-
7l Ibid. 
-
12 Ibid. 
-
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ca:ne to Tol::yo to cOfl.i'er with Foreign Birdstel' Matsuoka in ordor to perSUD.de 
Japan olio rOfJtrain til\') United StD.:Les tram enterlr.g the European war. V'iatsuoka 
waS assUl"ed th..1.t Gel."r.lal\Y would not interfere w1th Jupants pJ.<:ll'lS for a Gre~lte!" 
EaSt Asia., .o.nd that Germany W'..l,S interested only in the economic field in that 
Frt of t})O world. S1:.a.lt:'u:l.l" said that a struggle between the whole Al:lglo-Sax-
on world and Asia tics VOlS bour.d to dwelop. He eonaid~lred ·t.he German-Japanese 
AJ,li.D.nce to be a. long term pact for co-operation during tho carting struggle, 
71 and therei'orG, he ms Ll'lxious to Il'l.ake a treaty before the Europeall war ended. '" 
R1bbentrop \faS likewise a.nxi.ous to lila.l:e nn alliance wi til J.:lpa.n against D:ri tain 
ani Fl'a.."'lce. He tried to have General O$llima, the Japunese Ambassador, ally 
Tokyo lath the I~a.s1-Soviet bloc. In a. telegrr:m to Tokyo, Ribbentrop said that 
it was ir;1portant £01' Japan to quickly extend. her power in Fast ASic. 1'.01113.1'<1 the 
South before t:1e conflict between Bhgltmd a,1"ld Ger.ma.ny ccmes to n close.74 i i' 
As is well knmm., Stalmar succeeded in inducing Japan to sign the 
Tripartite Pact. Joseph ~v. Ballantine telJ.;s us that 
Sts.lmer and l'latsuokQ. drew up a d.~t of a trea.tYI which was laid 
b(!ltore the Privy Council on September 16, 1940. The Navy held h.l,ck 
its approval t4'1tiJ. some days later,., The cabinet still had to obtain 
the sanction or the I"mperor, wbo strongly reliOO upon tho advice of 
PriIlce Saionji, t1-'j!) last oor':"ivi~1g cldE4.'" aUtt.eSl1,nn. ;:cnd a bitter op-
ponent of the al1io.l"lce. Kido, who, as Icrd Privy Seal, was cherged 
\dth keeping the £I.goo and ailing Saionji informed, failed to do so .. 
a:ld the old st1ltesroa::1 ii£i.S lef~ C~;lFl(';te1.y in the dn,rk on what lias 
goi.'1g on. In this 'iJlay the 1i.blp$ror' S [j"U1Ction \'laS obta,ined and tho 
Tripartite ID.lianca was signed on September 27, 1940. Sa:tollji, upon 
73 Ibid. 
-
74 Langer .. md Gleason.. 29.3. 
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lea:rni.ng what had been dona W",J,S sorely aggrieved. becausQ he felt that th 
... the Itnperor had 'batm betl'IlYed.. '74 
,\ 'IJhen the European \'tar broke out in September 1939 J Japan sa.w an oppol' .. 
t.u,Jit.y to settle h&1'" dif.ferer..ces with Gl1.ina., witllOUt fear of interference from 
the ~{e:::tern. world, but Clrl.ang Kui-shelc" would not come to an agreement. ~i:mg 
Clli.l1g-Wei, who il.'1d turned traitor to the Chinese Nationalist Govermn«lt in 193e 
waS made Presida..."lt of u "}L:1.tional Go~ent of Clnn,,:' in 1940 by Jap,')Xl. He 
promised su.pport of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Bast Jl.sia, and the Japanese 
Government o.f'.ficiall~r recogniz.editG £reaJd,sh croo.tion.16/,r1 
estubli.!Ji1mcut of the Co ... Prosperlty Spll.ere. Early in October, the Cabinet ap.. 
1, the ~17 success£u1 settlement of the China affair; 2, tM 
negot1a ti n of a non-aggression p.r.!.ct nth the Soviet Union; 3, the 
incorporation of tho countries of Southeaat Asia and tho islD.nds of the 
the J:lalay Arcidpelago .in the s~lled uCo-Prosperity Sphere" (i.e. 
~he establishment of domination or control there)" At D. I"our 11in.tsters t 
aonference held on Septabel" 4, even India, AUstralia. and tiew Zealal"lt.i 
ll<ld beoo mArked for :t.nelua1on in Japa..'1.. s sphere of Wluence. '1'1 } C i, i 
.J I.,.. tI'_, 
, !.the cha.nce tor a sattlanent with Ch:iung • ...ai .. ahek was lost because a 
t,reaty wit'] tho puppet :regime of Wang Ching-wei was concluded. in DeoanOel' and. 
a neutrality pact with t.he Soviet Union v,;.;,s entered in:to, in P.pril of the 101-
10lr.i.ng ;rear. 78 
7, ~ntine, "l'lukden to Pearl Harbor, The Foreign Pollc:r oJ: Jap,.:m,t 
Foreign ¥£ai:rs, Xl'VII, July, 1949, 658. 
76 Chambers, 677. 
77 Ballant1ne, Itl'lukclen' to pe:.l.rl Harbor, The Foreign PoliC"",f of Japc.n, f 
Fyre!iID .U'.tairs, mn, July. 1949, 658. 
'/8 Ibid. 
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Even before tho Pact 'With Germriny- and Russia bad been COl'lCluded, .• 
baSsador Grew had informed. the authorl:tie$ at -Washington of the trend of a!-
£airs. He was later to call this message hiD ItgrGOO ligl'lt" telegram. The 
/I1IlOOSsador' reaJ.ized that Jar~e e.,ggrossicm. could not be stopped by mere 
words of disapproval. .Americnns Q$ a whole knew little of the real strength 
of the Japa.noae war ma,chine, or of the stubborn determ:i.nation ot its war 
lOrds to conquer the Far &.st. Grew felt that an embargo on essential war 
materials weulci precipitate ratilw thrr.n stop her ruce 1'or milit..al."y and. econom-
iC indep~e. 79 He roo.110OO that the mint.:rlning of th.e s;t:),tus c1uoin the 
western Pa.citic .. 8 necessary tor the survival of the llr'1tish aopir0, and for 
ourselves as welJ., since Am,erican economic securi:cy lias dependent on Britain. 
Japan needed something strl'ltlg6r tlum a poli t. expressioo of American dis~,tpprQV\ 
al to turn her from her pa.th. AJ.'ter sarious tbought, the State Depa.rt.:ment be-
gan to take vigorous action. In September, iron and steel DCrap were put undo 
---. '~1 ~"1\ embi.l.rg~.\ ~ October 8t Am~or Hori.nouchi called. at the State Depar'bnent 
to pre~t." Secretary of S~lt&, Hull, a.fter cla:iml.ns 'wt the Unit~ States 
Government had been vary patient witb the Japanese, continuoos 
It is clear now, hoWG'V'&l", tha:t; those 'Who are dol'ldmting the e1X't.er ... 
nal policies of Ja.p.'1n aX'. " •• bent on the conquest by force o£ all 
worthwhile territor.! in the Pacific Ocean area without limit as to .ex-
tent. 1."1 the South" •• and that W"l.'! and all other nations are e:x:paeted, 
as st;:l.ted, to sit perfectly quiet an.d b& cheerful .and agreeable" btlt. 
static, while most of Asia is l:krnchuria-ized. ••• " I added thu.t, of 
course, if any one oountry is suffiCiently desirous of tro'blo, it can j 
always find an,y 0;16 of innUl.'neruble occasions to ot::rt such trouble. Co (, 
------
r(9 vk'llter 11111i3, !!E:! !! P~'tX'l" Now York, 191(" 19. 
80 ~'" 20. 
~------------------~ 
;, 
, The Un1ted States GoV'erment continued to exert. eeonauie pressure. 
American aircratt sales to Japan amc:runt.ed to very little a:c the end or 1938, 
beCause :m.anuractt.t.rer1ll bad been advised by the State Depal"'tment to stop sales. 
The American-Japan... eQlll'l.8l'C1al treat,' of 1911 .. 8 not renewed in 1939, but 
trade with Japan vas placed on a daJl'-to-t:bq 'basio. The acport Control Act 
wh1ch p4ss$d C~UB in 1940 gave ·hanl1:l~.n Delano Roosevel.t authority to 
control the cport of aooda essent1aJ. tor detenae~ Qradua.J.ly .. machine ~* 
cbeldoals, and strategic metallir could not be sb1pped withoat a lie ... ;. Next 
av.LatJ..on psol:i.ne .abtu1ned. Japan reaented th1s measure alXl sa1d. that fu. 
tUX'e trade ~ the United states an:l Japan would. be verJ' ~l 1: 
such ~1fU.l"e$ con1;1nue. 8J. In the con:n:rsatlona Wh1chSecretal.y BUJ.l held 
with .Adm1ra11ion'tll'a anil MJ.-. KUl'USU, Japan tbreaten«t to Aid ~, if." w 
d:Ld not r_ogrJiz. her pol1tiaal" ltd.l1tar;r anti econanic interests in Cb1rta and 
:in ~ter &t.st AlU, 62 It Japan could get what ahe wanted by diplomacYf 
it, without go1ng to -""U"J ehe could gam her ambitions in the Far lastJ ~cm 
she would interpret her obligation to Germany and ItalT d.tenaive~~ In 
other vOl"d$" 1£ the United Stat., entend the war against ~. in ~ 
Atlantic, Japan would not feel bound by the Tripm1te Pact, to aid Ge~ 
83 by atteckina the Un:1ted Stat. in the Pac1t1c~ It Japants attaupta at dj... 
Plana;cy.faUed .. she W'OUld make a surprise attaok on u.s in the Pae1f10, us:S.na 
toree to achieve her ambitious .ohemes for oonquest. Dur:l.ng the early part 
,. j 
81 U.S. Deptt., Pearl ~, 1. 
82 Sam.u.el J"l.aig BaWl, D1~~tic lH.a1.;~ of the United. States. New York, 19$0, 668. - ..... _:;.;.;;:.a,. - - ... .. " .. 
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of 19h1, Ja.pa..'1 was :making ready tor the attack. Shol't17 alt. these .co-
nonic restrictions bad. been l.ml)06ed, Japan signed t11e Tripartite i)1l(1., with 
aermanY and Italy. Tbs Pact 
provided that GC'mailv, Italy and Ja.pm would au1st one another with 
all political, economio am l'dl1te.ry means, when one of the powers 
was attacked by a pow. not then :1nvolved 1n the European war. ctIt :1n 
the Chinese-Ja.r:anesa conflict. 8$ 
The three Powers declared tha. t the Pact was not made aga.1nst the Sari.et, t.ra;& 
vbich it follows that the Power referred to must be the United States, town.rd 
wan it was a veiled threat. The follow1ni April" Japan entered into an ~t... 
.ant with Russia. Roosevelt retal.1a.ted. b:r :t.r~ing J&pa.n$8e asaete in the 
United states, and Br1ta1n did m«t:be. Pr.anCG had agreed aft .. h* faU ia 
June, 1940, to close the pons and :ra1.lrcads of Indo.China to war materials· 
being ~ to f.ree Ch1na. and Br:1ta1n closed the !tt.a'ma Road. for three 
months, in an effort to appeaM Japan. ~ the ~ General of Indo-
China was powC"lMa to prevent Japan bam establiAlhing au 'bas_ there; pre-
sumabJ.y to be used \0 banb CMa:oa Xai .... bekt • detlllM$, newl;r _taWehed at 
Chungking. Ilu.Ji.ng 19U, Japan lnt.r:riedly prepared for: l'4U'. The National 
Mobilization Law was put into etract. The Premier, Prince Kano,ye. was try ... 
ing to make a 8ettJ.ement with the United Sta:l;.es, but the militarisw did net 
want a settltmWtt. ll.l.ready.t the Japanese were atU<ly.i.ng the maps of I>earl Har .. 
bor, and ascert.a.in1ng the number and strength of our battleships and drp'--. 
Tojo, Minister of ~h:r, warned Konoye that Uto carry on negoti:lt1ons~ tor 
which there is no possibilitY' of t.rl,d.t1on, and in the end to let slip the t1mE 
tor fighting would be a matte of the s;reatest consequence." Konoye t:Lnal.l\r 
"'* , • 1 84 Ibid.. 
-
~--' ---------, 
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:resigned in botoher fJ and Touo, 8the Razor ~ succeeded him as hood of the 
86 
_ cabinet. 
Japan continued to extend her mll1tary position in the southwest Pa 
c1f1c until the PhiJJ.;pines were almost entirely encircled# and its armed for 
_ were near enough to strike impo1:'tan.t tw..de routes. RooatWelt realised. 
tbat Japan was oce~ theBe positions .. a ~tion for a. ~t often.. 
live. In ()%'der to a:t'Oid 'fIftU:, strang $COlladO pr~ was '\m:l7 neeassar;r.87! ,tJ 
\j A Ja~ off1eer, who took part in the attaCk on Pearlliarbor re-
ported to the Joint Cor.tm1ttM, the 1"oJ.l.ow;1.ng intormation: 
On October " 1941, a meetJ.ng 'WaS called of all office pilots 
ot the carrier. aboard the .Ak.aai in Sh1buabi BaT, by the chief of statf 
of tbe ~, Rea:r Admlral ltJ,noauke Koulm.~ Abcut 100 attended. 
They ~ told verr uec.retlT that on December 1, 1941, (Japan T:1me) 
a Ja.panese naval a1r toree Vt,Nld ~irt:.r1k. the American nGet .:\t i;f,ft!~" 
Grand Admiral of the Japanese Nav,v, Isoriku. Yamamoto, a:l$O address. 
the P-C7UP saying that -Although Japan never wanted to ftght 436 the 
United stc.tea.. they were .foroed. to, because the)" would be defeated 
reaardl.ess, it the t1n1ted states continued its a1d to China. • • • 
The United States fleet," he said, ttwu Japan's atrOl'lSe6Jt enany, so 
it the,:r could strike it ~ at IiawaU, it would be 2 Ot' :3 
months before it could manCAlVV. By that time occupation of Borneo, 
the J?h1l;ippi:r.!es, Singapol"e, Java a.1'ld s-atra. would be complete. - 88 
Even the Marqu;Ls Koicbi lido, th$ Lord Privy Soal, advised the lhperor tha:!; i 
was necesSSl"y to ttght the UDited stiltes.)!J! 
\' 1'ojo wu appohlted lT~ in Octobet:' of 19h1. He WAS given plen:l. ... 
potentia.ry' powere to oanT on Wa1'. On November lS, be sent K'urwro. to .Wash-
ington to help Nanura. e.nci to bring the Ja,panese dGIwlds to Washington. The 
........ 
86 U. S. Dep ft. J Pearl !~, 14 ... 17. 
87 U .. S. Qov't., Pe~.!!!! ~t' Washington, 194.3. Doe. 220,. 699~70:3. 
68 !bid., 126-127. 
27 
Jll,Cssage dem.:md'«l that ftthe United states a.."ld Great Britail;l a'lxmdon China to 
Japan, and provide Japan with th .• materials for a Japnnese advance into 
Alllerl.can, British and Du.teh territoriel in the ra.r Fast. tl 89 
At the Atlantic Conference in August, 1941, Britain and the United 
states w,:.rned. Japan not to encroach s:trJ farther in the South Western Pacific, 
for 1£ she did, the United Sta tee a..."1d Britain would take counter :measures, 
which might lead to lItJl' with Ja.pan, and 1£ she attacked a thlrd power, the 
United Stutes would seek to aid that Power. This was reaJ.lya war ult1ma-
tUl'll. 
90 
Preparations for the attack: on Pearl Harbor, Singapore, and other 
American, British am Dutch possessions 1..'1 the Fnr East were completed b7 
November 1st. If the United. sta tesdid not aCcept. the Ja.rnnese terms by 
November 29, 1941, diplomacy would be aba.r.tdoned and J~n lrould notU'y its 
allies that it intended to open hostilities with Great Brttain and the Un,i... 
91 ted Stutes. Japan'" generals. with their $Ullply of. oU dildnishing rapid ... 
ly, and with the chance to acquire a vast empire .lowly ;fading, would not 
waste any ~ore time arbitrat1.ng.92 Iii· 
,/1 
(y. IThe following quotation reveal.a san.e of the dU't1cultiee with which 
the high au·thori.t1ea in Wuhington were faced, at this t1me. 
09 D:1$son, U. 
90 Bem1s, 868. 
91 BalJantine, ~1ukden to POi)rlAlrbor, The Foreign Policy of Japan 
For~ WUrs, XXVII, Julj" t 1949, 664. 
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The J::Lpanose were not o£fcl'ing -to negotiate u reasonable settlement 
by processes of a~entJ they were presenting cl.ema.nd.s, to be nc .... 
ceptedor rejected.. The United states h:.;,d only two choicest either 
to yield to the Japanese d~s and sacrifice pl'inciples and secu-
rity, or to dec1.ine to yield, a.nd to take the consequ.ences .. 93 
Secreta.ry of State Hull repl:1Gd on £~ovember 26, 19~1 to the Japaneso 
with the follo"W'ini; counter d$}~. '1'lrose we:re~ 1) a ~aggreasion 
Jact between Cb.i.na a.nd Ja.:,:Ja.u W;:Ul to be made; :(.) the Japanese ,,;ere to w1:thdraw 
U' forces £ran China and Indo-China; ,3) CJ:l.1n,a was to be gi"ll"ell a gtl.'arantoo 
territorial integrity; 4) Japun was to recognize the Nn.tionnliSt goverp.-
ant of Chiang Ka.1 ... shek. 
On December 1,. 1941, the!!! Jor,k T:Uri.es carried tho account ot the 
apaneso rejection of iimerican propos.a.ls. 
U. S. l'Tinciples Rejected by Japanese as nFantasticll 
Foreign 111!dster Tojo Hakes First Ofticial COMl."1tmt on 
Hash1n(.-ton Note. General Thre'lto"lS Fresh Aggression. 
B.1 otto D. Tel.1schWil. 
Tokyo, Monday" December 1. In the first o£ticic"\l stt'ltAment on 
the :\merlcan proposals for a sett1emo!1t o.t the issuea in the l'acif'ic 
au1:D1tted t.o Ja.pan, Foreign Hiniater Shiganori Tojo ~ rejected 
the principles u.nder~ thetl as nf'zmtast1clf and chantcterized the 
Anlerican attitude as u.'1l:"eallstie und reg::r."ettable. He reiterllted 
JapCtll's det,ermiru:Ltion to proceed m.th tho construction of a ltHew 
Order in East ASia.. If 94 
l'ojo, 'I:,he re..1.d.i.ng of which Wf:l.S too highlight of yesterdr;.y's 1'!l.'1SS meetil'lgs, the 
Foreign l1in1cter decl.-"lred: 
(93 ~. 
9l~ New York Times, December 1, 19h1, pt. 1, sec. 1. 
29 
The world i8 crynfronted with l.U'lp%'ecedented c11sturbances. In 
Greater East As:L1., however, close relations of Japan, lianchukuo, 
and China. must go forward tov;ard the construction of a. new order 
in East Asia on the basis of their co-ex1stence and co-prosperity. 9$ 
In our negoti:,ltions with the United. states, we have consistently 
upheld this principle. However, the United states does not understand 
the real situation in East Asia. It is tryir.g forcibly to apply to 
East Asiatic Countries fantastic principles and rules not ado.pted to 
the actual situation in the world and thereby tending to obstruct the 
Construction of the New Ord.er •. This is extr«aeJ.y regrettable. 
Opposing the slogan of "Asia for the .Asiatics under Japan' it lead-
ership" to the .American principle of' the IlOpen Door, U Japan, l'hnchukuo 
and the 1:lanking puppet regime, yosterd.ily celebrated the fust anniver-
sary of their joint deelara.tion of eo-operation with. mass meetiJ:1.trs in 
their principal cities organized by their governtttents. Sem.i-otf'ic1e.l 
org-dJlS re:\.terated the f'il"Ill. determination of these countries to "l1ber-
atefl the one thous.;mQ. million people of East Asia from the tJexplo1ta .. 
t10ntt of Europe and .1\rIler1ca by the construe"cion of the "Greater East 
ABia Co-prosperity Spher.,» as a. gujdi.';::! torch tar manldnd to crush 
all outside powers t obstruction of tbis "holy and historic mission. U 95 
, ~~","": 'l,ri.. j," -,: .L 1,' 
A week after this nGWlJJ art.icle appeaTed, ob December 7, 1941, the 
Japanese flad rn.nde their surprise attack OIl PGP...rl Harbor, followine which 'they 
made att,.'.1.cks on the Philippines, Hongl\ong, Ellalay.;" 13u:rma, the l'ietherl.ands East 
Indies and the British islands northflast of Australia. The next day (December 
8) Japr-:;.n declared 'Wa.r on too United St.;ltes a:ld GreD.t Br:l.ta1n.96 The ease with 
which the attack on Ha;'la1i was mod., enabled Japan to contulUe har work of de-
struction. American :i.'orces, greatly depleted, ",-:tthdrew to tho &.ta.rul peninSu.-
la for a l,:;l.st stand.96 . l i·'"' 
9$ Ibid. 
-
'I_.--------------------------~ 
The report ot the Congressional Committee investigating Pearl Harbor 
tolls, in a brief semtc.."lCf.!, of the ret-c'lliuti0n visited on the Jap::.nese for 
their bra~en and dastarCly attack. 
T!le Pyrrhic victoI7 of havinG executed the at tn.ek .;.d th silI"prise, 
cu.nnil1./3) and deceit belongs to tho "4l';,>;;r lords of Japan whose dreams 
of conquest were buried in the ashes or HirOB!Wna. and ~~ His-
tory will properly place responsibility tor Pearl Harbor upon the 
military clique dot'linat:i..."'1g the people of Japan a.t the time. 91 'ij 
------.-......... 
CHAPl'm II 
()n$ of the quostions which arose to trouble American st..1.tesmen, in 
tho early years of the tl/ootieth century was immigration. In 1890, there wr 
only about 2000 Jap,).nese oorl.gr:n;,ts in the United. states. By 190Q, they had 
inCreased to 24,000 and by 1910 to 72,000. Although this "'las a very small 
per cent of the total popu.l.&tion of our countr:r" nevertheless, the Japanese 
Ctll'lle into seri·'JUs competition with white l..':lbor, because oJ: his .superior indu 
try and his low stQndard of living. The San Frllnciseo Board of ~ueat1on 
brought about a crist between Japan and the United St.ates wen they decidE~ 
that Chinese, Japanese and Korean ehildre.n would not be permitted. to attend 
the public schools, but woald have to eo to the Oriental school in Chinatown •• 
The Japanese govC'l11'lleat immediatCllly issued a. protest. S1nce har victory over 
Russ 1:;; at Port Arthur" Japan had .felt Iii. new selt-confidence, and was anxious 
to maintain hel' national honor. Olle of the 'l:'oky'o pa.pers, !1ainiehi, on Octo 
21, 1906, decl.ared angrily that tIle Ja.panese should sa'ld their navy to punish 
the It"nericans for their d.iscr1minati'~n.l The European pross l:1.ke"nse criti-
cized the Unit.ed States tr.::rr willfully provoking a proud and. sensitive nation. 
Germany we.t1t so fur V.{i to ew .. :r t..lmt G, war between America and Jnp;:>.n 'W::tS immine ~ 
-_._----
1 Cldtosn1 Ya.naga, Japan Since Porry, llew Yorl-c, 1949, 434 .. 4:;.5. 
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The United states, a..mous to avoid tro1.lble, l.100.ght to have !'rl.~ rG~'tiOll8 
wit.h Ji.1.pan by S<llitl1ng th$ immigratio...'1 question to the !at,tel" t e satisfaction. 
'l'::H~ Ii gent,lemen • $ agreeM.ent" of 1907. 1..'1. which the J;:tpanooe ~~ent pranis«i 
the Uni:ted St.a.tes, eased t.he situation, SU:tIlswh;,'l;t. The foll~ ye..'U', on 
5eptSllber 29, diplomatic negotiQ.tio= wel'e be~.c1. by Foreig:l:J. !l'J...."l1ster Kanura 
and Ar1ba~v;r 'rak.:.~ in washingto..."l, cU!lnLrw.ting in the !!o~t-T~.hix'a. ~_ 
ment by ·W'hich both th~ 'Un1ted States fU1d Ja;?an prowisai to rai"rain. tram inter-
taring with oac11 other's possessions in tlle J:lacitic, to g'J.~"t..ee Chinese 
fi·wadom .. and. i-z, si.lpp~ the uOp«J. DoOI'u policy. Pr-esident Theodore F:.ooowelt .. 
wilo had bl;:sn sorioualy concerned over mtt' dispute with Japan in rsgard to .... 
tiallchuria, in :t'sturn tor ~ disavowal oJ: ~resslve intentions to"W{rd ttkO Ph!.'-
ippines.·3 Aftar' ;Jillia..lU Eow<u'd T;::;.!'t h,.''ld becom.e President J HOl'}!'levelt wrote. 
to hin, st.~,t1ng uthat thE: Adl:d ... "1iatl'ation should t.aka nQ steps t11at would make 
JalJ'3.1' .feel th.",t we are fa monaca to tlH~ir interest.D' in North Chinr,\. ,,4 
Attar j.\iOrld Uinr I had closed, t.he U"n,!:ted flt.Z'·cos,.fearful that the 
't/J.l,-impoverishad countries o£ Europe wO'uld send Vs,ifeE or ii"lt'l1igration to :N,nd 
hanes and mlployMent in our OOUfltry J began to tighten her :iztm11gl"at:tcn laWS. S 
A.t first, only tr.ree percent of t.he number of people ot eaoh mtiomlity, 
) 'l'ansUl, Baek Door, 5. 
4 Ibid. 
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1IhO resided"'1n the United States in 191O .. were permitted to immigrate to 
AlIlerica. Later, the number was reduced to two per cent, am still lu tor in 
1923, Congress introduced a bill excluding aliens ineligible tor citizenship 
The Japanese Alubassador Haniha.ra protested this bUl strengly. He wanted to 
la1CtI uwhather Japan as a. nation is (1r 1s not entitled to the proper respect 
6 
and ooneideratien of other nations?U 
Secretary HuShes wrote a letter to Representative Albert Jolmaon, 
Cha.irm.an of the House Committee on Immigration, stating that he considered 
the proposed lee1s1ation at variance with the treaty of 19l1, and that it 
would 
large3¥ undo the work of the W'ash1ngton Conterence on the Limitation 
of Arma.ment .. which so gre-'3.tl)" improved our relations nth Ja];.'lSll. He 
was certain that it was not ttvorth while thus to aftront a friendly 
nation with who .. 'I'Il ute have esta.blished the l'4Ost cordial relations •. 7 
La.ter~ Secretary Rughes and tilTIlk"lSSador Hanihal'&' m:cha.~cd notes a-
oot..-l:, ir.!m:!.zra.tiQl'l.~ H.~a sa.id. that Jtil.p;m ";JO_~ not rt~estioni .. ""l8 the sove.;r"" 
but l1e te.Ued t<:'l see the logic of a IT'.t:'.o.sure 'w'ldeh would "not only seriously 
offend the just pri..:.w o£ a f:rien.dly nntion • " '"' but would. also irr,tolvc the 
q'..letJtion of the good faith and therefore of the honor of their govarnment,," 
....... , 
o riolid 
--
~-----------, 
(2f:IJ U.8. 178) h:mded down a. deeision on November 13, 1922, to the e£,teet 
that the Japanese vet'e inelicible for citizenship by naturaliae.tion.
" 
The 
bill W'<:lS adopted on April 12, by an :L'!lll1enoe majority of 373 to 71. On l>1ay 31, 
1924, a .formal protest was lodged by the Japanese against the oxclusion law. 
I 
TokYO psl:t)el"S were~oud in their dtmuneiation of it.9 
In 1931~ the Immigration Comrdttee of the United States Chamber of 
C()llJ1lcrce favored the restoration of a. quoi':.a. system. The Cal.ifomia Council on 
oriental Rel...t:l.tions organized in 1931, was active in aiding the Immig.r.rrtion 
Com1ttee. Business men and educational 10adars ware confident. of restor1:ng 
the quota system. lht when the destruction of the :railroad track at .Hukd«l on 
Septer.1ber 18, brought about the l;Ia.nehurian Incident, all bope of repeallng the 
, 
exclusion lay was lost. a.'1d the faint rum.bliragS of war becllI!le audible. lO 
Reiscbauer seems to ~"\ke the part or the Jcq:w.nese when he S:::~YSI 
As Htm. fran the Japo.nesfI point of view, there is no l"e&son ;Jby the 
qJ.ish-9peak1ng peoples, who hoWe actually multiplied during the 
1.'UJt eentur,v and a b<11£ at a far lcss rapid rate thtla the Japanese, 
should have the right to appropriate for thet'!Sel~s most of the 
lightly popul."ted parts of the world which enjoyed a. desirable cl1,... 
mate, while the J:lr;,.1llCSe are excluded not only £ran these areas, but 
wo £I"O!il the .less desirable and still mI'll:Jty l.:l.llds of the tropics, 
simply because they became candidates for emigration u century or 
two later th:.4'1 the !i1.gl1$l1 speaking peoples. They 1l.:iturally look 
toward t.h0 great u.'1e:xpJ.orv:i i;:.1u!lds sou.th or them, such as Nml 
Guinea and Borneo, and dream of a new Jap;l.n which ld.ll redress the 
unhappy bal£!l1ce ot the old.. 11 
9 Yar'lD.g3., h42. 
10 Ibid., W~. 
11 ne!Schauer, 65..66. 
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Korea in 1910. Then because she had been one o£ the Allies in t'iorld War I .. 
she waS pexmitted to truce over the German interests in the Far East. Pree-
_ident Tart had chaJ.1enged Japan's poaition in China. by dollar d.ip~cy. 
i;J:i.lson had applied diplanat1c pressure, whon Japan bad. presented her TwentY'-
one DEmands to Chim. refusing to recognise Japa.nts action.12 ~ 1919, Japan 
md risen to the status of a great pOwer in tho Fl:ll" East; and China was 1n 
danger ot being dismembered, while very little notice was given to the tlOpen 
Door'· poliey .. 
One method which the Un1ted States used to give fina.nci.1.1 aid ~ 
Ch.in.a. was 'the establishment of a oonsOl"tium in which Br1tishl French, Ch:!.nese 
and 1\merica.ns held interests. During Taftts adm1ni:rtrat1on, cert.,.-dnAmer-
1C[J.ll banks had been bigh-prossu.red into joining a foUl" power ban...~1ng consor-
tium to aid China in building the Cbinese Hukua.l'l.g RaUways; later it became 
1C3.':l bankers, reali~ing that ther.r were deriving very little profit from their 
mcmberailip, applied to Pr.sidont It.'Uson to give tl"l.em security b"r.r asking them 
to stay in the COruJortium at the request' or the Unit,cu States GOV'~t. 
The President, however. favored abstention from :memo&rship for the r5n.so..'l 
tha:t the consort.ium might exert undue pressure, whioh would interfere ~dth 
the i'i.'1.!mC1,'l.1 and political affairs o! China. 1) Ge:t'!l'lD.1ll' and FlUlSU:.. were 
Ijmi. .. '''mted trcm the consortium by the outbre..1.k of 1forld~~r I; Britain and 
13 Ibid., ,51~ 
r;--------
vrance could ~ot pay their loans to China, but Japan came forward with an of-
ter of )20,000,00 ,J yen. Tue other members of the consortium could not but 
realize the l.."li>lications 'Which might follow because of Japan's contribution, 
and suggested that it would be wise tor the United States to re-enter the 
consortium.14 .A.tter eonsidering the srmtter and discussing it with the Pres-
ident, Secretary Lansing advised that instead of the old one, a new fOilr-pov-
er consortium should be formed. Britain, France and Japan were given a de-
taUed proposal conoerning it. The Japanese press opposed this re-arrange-
ment, stating that this would cause Japan to lose nthe fruits she had _saed 
in the last few years."l$ The Jep.anose government h:ld their financial re-
presentative, Mr. Od.!.agiri confer with the .American i'ina.'1eial representative 
Hr. Lamont, and intorm him tdlat "all rights and options held by Jap.'ln in the 
region o:t Manchuria o.nd Hongolia, where J~l")an held special intere5ts should 
be excluded :fran the ar:ra..'lgaent.16 r.lr. Thomas ~i. lamont said that Japanta 
exclusion of Manchuria. and Mongol.ia woultl be 1nadmissible. The Jap4').MSe re-
presentative took pains to explain that the safet3' of J4').pall was at stake be-
cause of the R\v.t8ia.n meDllce. J.llattera in Siberia might change aver night. 
Tho JalJal1eSe lmlted Hanchuria and Mongolia to serve as bufter eta tea against 
Rwssian encroachments. Since Japan seemed unwilling to agJ;'ee to the plan pro 
posed, the United. States 8uggeelted another plan for a. Three Paver O~ium, 
but Britain and France would not hear to it. They foored such a. course might 
14 Ibid., 55-56. 
-
15 Ib1d., 
16 TS!:'J., 
-
55. 
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].e&d Japan to fonn an alliance with~. Finally, the Chinese government 
_8 notif1ed that a new Foal" PQrer Consortium had been .tat't'tled, but China Jade 
no a,nsver to the notU1catian, then or later, probably because of the coneea-
,tons demanded by Japan. Hence, the consortium accomplished nothing. !'lation-
&liSt China scorned. it, not v1shing to 11ft up an;r of ber power to internation-
al banker •• 17 
Japan .. left tn a pa.1"U\ouut. position of milita'f'T and naval power in 
tMt Far !hat a!ter .th.$ ~fl1.ngton treaties ot 1922 1II'el"e signed, but she was ex... 
pec1ted to abstain freD f\Ir""'¥her conquests in China, to recognise the territorial 
~t7 of China, to _1n'tain the If Open Door" pol1oy, and to leave 'IlllnOlested 
the ielanda of tbe Pacit.lc.18 M she did not keep her pr~ses. In SeptEim-
bel", 19.31, the Japanese occupied the principal cities of Southern Manchus-1l.. 
This was a. violation of the Paot of Par1s, so the Uni:t.ed States sent a wa.:rning 
note to Japan ~ th.."t, she would not reeogl'd.z.e IJl'l¥ treaty ar ~ent._de 
in violation of the Paot.19 The Kellog..Mand Peace Feet (Pact of Faris) ini-
tiated by the Men after 'Wllanlt was named, liaS a solem agreement by fUt.een 
nations of the world to solve their difticu.lties by pacific means. Fifteen 
nations signed. thA pact on Auguet 'Z1, 1928. At the 1nv1ta:t1on of the Un:i ted 
states, the other nations of the 1I03:'ld 1IJ'erfJ aeted to 30m. Sixtty ... thre'. nations 
K .1 
17 Sasmel lIlag BemitJ, A pjpl~!!~ lA!tSD; 2l 'Y\e 'flmt§d Ifdrt&lb 
14ew yot'k, 1950) a6 3. 
18 !'!?if!., 121. A footnote on page 721 ~. llHunter !-lil1er inter-
IJ,ret$ jurid:tca.llYthis unique treaty in The Peace P'::lct ot Paris. A St'Udy of 
the Kellogg-Bl"iard. Tl"eaty, liew York, 1926. 
19 :f3taia, 6l.O-814. 
bad beCome tWmbers by 1949. 1ea,v:tng eight not holding lOOl1'I.bership. 20 
lanbasador Grew tells us that. he W"..1S sent to 'Toqo to keep poace 
in the East" at'ld to guard A'llerican interests in i1sia. He h:td betm. chcsen '1.'1*.1 
f';residont Hoover. who lacked the ability or the power to prevent the Japan-
ese from t..'Utl.ng lia.nc.buria in 1931 ... 193), an aggression which could have been 
1'1revented by the use of economic and f1naneial sanctions. When Franklin 
J;; 
Delano Roosevelt succeeded lioo'vw',. in 1933 .. Grew was retained in Tol-,:yo. 
Roosevelt foJ..lowed:.a pollcy of appeasem-ent toward Jar>an.t wl1Ue America. was 
b(d.~ hl.ltT13dly prep&red. fat: 'li'a.r. Grew realleed the power which the militar-
ists we1lded .. and knew that .4r1ta a.od Konoye were dominated b,y them. 21 
Tho r.dli t..ar~~.t clique 11'1 Ja.pan, who lII'ere res,?onsible for 1nstipt1ng arl<1 ex-
, 
seuting the Nanchurian incident of September, 1931 .. will; no doubt, live in 
history aa the persona who were responsible for World War II. That gigan-
tic world struggle, which ~rt.ruck us a.t Pearl Harbor, was s1mpq the cohee... 
que.."lce. of a chain at event. which began in Maneh'u.r:ta. We can now see olearl;,y 
the road over Which the JllpanU& travelled :£rom Hulden to Hiroshima and Nap .. 
saki. 22 
The policy Which the United States adopted in 1934, had a d1reet 
effect on World War II. In government recol'ds one can find evid.ence about Ja 
pan and the ei'i'ects oJ: Ja.,");3.l'lese policies upon our dealings with Cb1na.. The 
main idea in the whole Far .Eastern situat.ion is stressed by Ambaosador Grew. 
U;J •• 
20 IbM .• 
-
21 Joseph C, Grew .ll.mhassador tn Jap,c;!l writes to the Secretary 
Jan.ll, 1934, No. 640, 893.01 Manchuria / 992, Forei§! ~tions, 
t 
22 Ib14. 
-
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ia that Japan considers herself responsible for the peace and Ol.g,er of tlreat-
tJr East As1a. She thinks that she should. be consulted on UJY question of im.-
portance affecting China. 2.3 
When Secrete.ry o! State, St1mson., learned o£ JaImlIS military con-
quests in Manolluria .. he restated the principle which the united. Stat08 bas 
foll()jTed, throughout. th;e ~. lJirlCe the days of Per%7J this was that Cfd.na t S 
integrity must be preserved, and equal opportunity must be granted to all :na-
tiona t.xoadi.ng with China. This tlSt:1l:uon Doctrineu as it is now k:noWn, was 
not a new p:d.nc1p1e. :&ten the stataaent th<.lt the United States would not r 
cognize territo,ry taken 1.."1. violation of trE)£,ty promises liaS not new. It sim-
PlY rea£f1rmed the decla.r1:J. tiro presented to both China and Jar,an in 19l5, a£ 
tar Japa."l had made her Twenty-one~. The Un1ted stat., has cons1ster! 
24 1y followed th1s policy t~ the past hun.dred~. 
Std.mson sct notes to Japan and China on J~ry 1, 19)2, telling 
their respective g(W~ts that the United States reftw4l$ to recognize the 
legal1ty of any treaty forcad upon China, contrary to the Pact or 1928. He 
waged a disheartening oampaip, &8 dUJclosed b:y the documents tollow1ng the 
note of Janu.ar.v 1, 1932. Pa.rticular~ 1Illportant .".. tba trans.AtJJant1c C()l}-
ver_t1ons which Secret.ary St1nwon held wit.h the Bri tuh Pr:1me lUnistor I 
23 Joseph C. Grew, a. letter trom Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to th 
Secretary of sta.te, No lll6, tokyo, Deceaber 29, 1934, ForeMI Rel.atio:r..sof 
.!:h! United stat,eII' Di{>lanatic f,afJ,eJ:a, 19341 !h! !!£ ~, I, 1955, ~. -
2h Henry 1. Stimson, eited by ~e Endowment, American AUoe 
ation for International Conciliation, lliew ork;l§3~J >4=~. (Doc. 306-.314.) 
--
'" ~1 l~c Donald., and the Brit.ish Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, in reb-. 
~, 1932, tar it wa.s in that month that the Ja.panese array and navrJ were 111 
~ toward Sb.angh1. At the same time, the m.1lita:r;r clique in Tokyo, 
lIhicn had seized control of the Japanese government, was misleading both 
the An'mican and Drit1sh goVe1"'l)ttenta by dual diplmac;r. 25 
lief thC" t'!.lG Unit.ed States· ~Qr Britain i."rIpoaed military or econal'l.1c 
sanctions on J.~n, because of thi.8 deceit, bQ.~ both St:1.mson and S:1mon urged 
a. strong dl.ploml1t:1.c. front aga1nat the 'Obstreperous st.:lte. Sthlson was stUl 
under the illwl10n that peaoe could be obtained thr'ough the Kellogg-Briand 
Peace Pact; although 'tho tltl1tGd states still held herseU aloof fran the 
. 26 La'1gue or NatiON,. 
.A.Aer the appointment of Joseph C. C1.'rew to Japan, Juno, 1932, re-
Zl 
porta from that sUxee were more adfJQ.uate and complet,~ Intomation regard ... 
:Lng tbe collapse of parlia.mentary government and the pranotion of a popular 
war psychology by means of pr~reaohed the state Department regu.larl:y. 
But regardless of Grew's t:trele8s. efforts J Ja,.,'OaMse rels. tions gl"EM lTOl"Se. 
The Japanese considered the United states policy of conciliation to be a 
28 
sign ot ~. The United States tilled to approve Q. government loan 
.. 
25 Kenneth Colg:rave, A.ij.~. ;LV, 1949 ... 1950, 11.1 ... 148J citing .... For ..... ·~ .... 
~elations . .2£ ~ U~t~ £!tat.: -.f&l~;t.1;c P9z~9J ~, .!!!, ~ ~ ~:st, 
Department of State Publication, 3152, 3162, 'Washington, 1948. 
26 Ibid., 146. 
tI ~. 
28 Ibid. 
-
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to China, bec;:ruse Jal::6.n ~;posed it. B:US13ia, on the (rt:.her hard, ineror..lsed her 
aggressions toward Japan. During 1934, ma.rv pers()l'l8 felt t.lul.t war would 
break out. between Jar:o.n and Russia. The United states failed. to influ.ence 
Japanese policy but Russia d1.d, for litU find her (Japan) in 193;>, chs;ng:ir.lg her 
policy bacaUSfl Il:uasia had built up a military POt:l~ in .,\Sla .. and had expI'es.eed 
ncr readiness to use it if necessary. A Japanese state.sma.."1 remarl1:ed that the 
gre;ltest l'lleans for preventing W<lZ between F..ussia and Ja:pan. rod bean n1lhe 
marlted increase o£ Soviet l1liJJ.t.arJ;' st..rerlgth in the lar Fast.n29 There is a 
lesson tor us here. Japan felt that Rwls1a would. resist 19X/;xlmion to the 
north, whUe it Was not possible tor the United Stkltes to prevent Japanese 
expansion to the south, ~ or east. It the United States in 1930" hnd buil:t 
up a superior T:.a.Vi{ a.s Stanley Hornbeck had advoca:Led, .tu.ture events in the 
Far East. ndght have been vastJ.:.y diUer·ent than they are. The Hanchurim 
crisis ta.ugbt the world that tl:~ Wre,S no m..'lgic POWI' in existence which ,<1as 
a.ble to stop or control. :ruthless a.g~ess1on. 
3ecret.:·.~ of S~'lte .. Hull, tel.1s us th~.t £rom the time of the Harco 
Polo Bridge incident in 1931 uutU Ju.l7, 1941, the United Stutes bad pursued 
a policy ot self-control and pittance .. natw1thst.'mci:tng the continual viola ... 
tion of American rights by the Ja.panese, and their eontinued aggression..1 
which endanierad our ¢Ol1.rItry. Newrtheless, the American Government had 
sought to wOl'k out a. plan for continued fl"iQnd.ly rehti(Yns with Japa."rl, and to 
--
..... 29 ~ohn J. !{Ol~e" !.y. H. He. 57, 19;>1 .. 19:;~, 168, citing F()l"e;m .~lati~'1s 9.f ~ Un1t~ St-a:l\ies; ~nlOOlatic Papers" 1934. In five voJ.~" 
!ol. III, Tho F~ Fast. Department at St;'l.to Publ1cat1on" 4011. Washington: 
I.tOVCrtlmGllt: -1'..:'int:lng Orfice, 1950, PI'.. l:lco..'Vi. 
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gi ... e t,.1)e Japa~Be every opport.unity to develop peaceful poliei •• .30 
The change 1 .. 1 &1ropean cow t100s after l4u.n1ch gave the Japa.nese 
't.a.n:1 apport/unittes for tu.t.ure conquests. Now Japan was in a poSition to cut 
of! supplies ca!'li.ng to Ch1.na from the United states and lta'ope, supplies sus-
t,aj.nirlg China aga1nst the enoroachmente of her ambitious. ne:1.;hbor. China. had 
been gettLTlg her arms and war supplies tb:rougb British HongKcng, and French 
Ind.o-Ch:tna, and by way of th. Bu.ma. Road. .A:1.mollt before 'the ink was dry at 
Mwlich, Japan laid. hold of Canton and brought an arli'IY or QC(NpaUon to Sout.h 
Cb.il'la, thUs preventing China froln getting suppa_ through Hong Kong. 
When Cs<echollovakia ws taken by 111t3...- in 1939, Japan j~ at 
the chance to OCcupy the large C~ 1Bland 0£' I-Iainan, control.ling the Gul:f' 
ot Tonkin. Them, in 1940, ahe ma.de o.n agreanent with Thailand (Siam) to pro--
tect their common interests. and. tor the exebs.nge of in!~tion. By Septa-
bar, 1940 .. li'rance had fallen, so Japan occup1ed Indo-Cb1n&" 'thus sealing up 
that source of supplies tor Ch.1n&. rio 80~)ne:r bad the United states passed 
. the Lend-Lease Act, than Ja,..l».n stirred up trouble between Thailand and the 
French torcea in Indo-China; then, acting as mediator, she secur«1 a. better 
hold on Thailand in Ma.rch, 1941, !rom. which Burma could be reaohed.. 
In a. cablegram to the State Dep!l1"tm.ent, September 12, 1940, Ambas-
sador Grew told. hoW' Japan wa.s making tUte of her opportunity to pursue her 
pollcy or aggression. It reada in part: 
)0 Oordell Hull, Fore!e Relatlons of the United 5tc~tesJ Jamn. 
1931 ... '41. (Department ot state pubiICiition) J iOl.:-1, P~>=J2b."" C=titee 
exhibit No. 29, cited by U.S. Government in ?,..:l:. Harbor .fl!ve~:!it\tion, 18. 
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\~la~er may be the intentions 0:£ the present Japanese GOI7ern .... 
mont, there can be no doubt that tho l'I~ a."1d other elements in the 
coun~ see. L"1 the present world iItuaT.:IOn a IOla• xi Oii"ortWi1!l to 
f.~l iilt'O"e?Iect'tfi.err-cTreilns of expansionJ the tJerman Victories 
have gone to Uielr' headS i:tke' "siroilg wiii&; until recently they have 
believed implicitly in the defeat of Great Britain; they have ar-
gued th8 t the war will p.t'obably' (~f) in a quick Gentlall victory and 
that it is well to cn.."lSolidate Japan's positiofl in greater Fast Asia 
while Germany is still acqtdescont and bef'Ol", the eVOl'ltuaJ. hypothe-
tical strengthening 0:£ ('~ naval POl1e1" :might rob Japan of' fax-
t'1Ut'lg control in the ','ll' :tr.a.stj , the;r have discounted effective o;p-
pos1tion on the part of the United States a.lthough carefully watcb-
ingour attit>~. ~ abilltlof tlle saner hE).;1.ds in and out of the 
Governm.ent to contiOl" tilese elei'intsbis been ana: 18 ({oubtful:-. -;-. 
Dipl.oma.ey may occasionally retard but ca:nnot e!£ectively stem 
the tide. Foree or the display of force can alone prevent these 
powers .:f't"cm attai.."ling their objectiwa. Japan today is Olle of the 
predatory powers; she haS~ed .!!! !'i.eral 8:~ ethical sense ~ 
has becClllS 1":rankly and una ad Y op~)ortunistt seekIii at Gvri' turn 
to prof:.tt. by the weakness of others. Her policy of southward expan.-
sion is a. definite threat to American interests in the Pacifio and 
is a thrust at the British Em.pil"e in the east~ )1 
During the Congressional Investigation ot Pearl Harbor" it vas re-
vealed that a telegram from Toky'o t,¢ Berlin had been inta:t"Cepted on July 2, 
1941, by a United States Camnunicationa Division. It ge.ve the i.."li.'onnation 
tha.t the m111t<u:1.sts of Japan weN attempting to bring Chiang's government 
under the oontrol of the Japunese by ap.,'Jlying pressure at various places in 
t~:e South. They planned to take over ooncossions by propaganda, and if that 
failed, by fighting. At the sane time, they planxled to continue d1pl~tic 
relations, and to ~ke eVer:! possible effort to prevent the United St.atos 
!'rom entering the war. 32 
31 Joseph C. Grew, comr1ittee exhibit lJo. 1, P. 9, cited in !uvea-
~i5at1on ~ ~earl riarbor, 16. - .•. ... 
32 Cordell Hull .. CODIldttee record, pp. 11.08-1109, eitoo by U.S. 
Government, Invest1&ati~n ~ !~! Har~t., 15. 
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In 19h1, Adm1ral Toyoda W'd.S appointed Forait,"ll I{dr.tistel" to replace 
Mr. !-lllt ..suoka.. Frequent expressions of the wish ror peace were :made by the 
new r'lj.nister, as woJ.l as by the Pr:1:me Hillister and Ambassa~or NorllUl"'a. to the 
United States r~ente.t1ves. tle'V'M'theless, their actions belied their words 
£(f1: mobilization was cOD.t1nued, not o:nly ill Japan, but i:ncreas1ng numbers of 
33 the al"!f1..e4 forces m.tt"e s~mt to Manehuri;:c, Indo-China a.nd south Chi.na. 
1941, our go~ent aamed that Japan was not making i'l.n:y change in her tor ... 
eie-m poliq. and that she would ramaill faithful to the agreements of. the Tn ... 
f~tite Pact. 34 This W~:rt.ion led .tWer100n diplomat.$ to doubt the sincel"-
Finding that after stWera,l months of di'plomatic discussions, Japan 
w;.:,8 still intent on aggression" P1"e~id.ent Roosevelt, on July 26, 1941, froze 
JapDnase assets in the United St.1c1tas. The e!£oct of this order W:.1.S to bring 
in€; order, hl'(r,e Japanese forces 'Were already conce::1trn.ted in HtmChuria, Indo-
China. and south Chiu.oa. 1~~1 property in ChiMl aX'.d eve~l the !1211-erican 
l'nlbaSSy and the U. S. S. Tutul1a at Chungking had. alre.ady boer:! dam.."lged with 
bursts. 3> 
, i 
and -the loaders of other natic..ns tried to stop her in her r'-lthless campaigns, 
In the next chapter, t.:r:e Roosevelt foreign poJJ.cy will be discUS300. 
Nations had shown its :unpote~1ce by permitting Japan to rat.:1.l.n tbncburta, and 
to continue her ruthless .:a~ion. All the J,'fUl.jor powers of the world were 
rearming. .As th.e prospects tor lf01'"ld peace clintM'd J America began to p.repare· 
£or the fa tetul l1o\U!'. 
CHAl?Tl1t III 
When Franklin Delano Roosevelt was i.1U'tuguratro or;, Hareh 4.. 1933, the 
eeonctnic 11£e of' 011..1" :o.&.t10n was at a'low ebb. Duri.'16 1932 .. over 1,400 banks 
had failed, a..'ld in the last tvo l'TMks Wore Roooevolt took the oath ot ct-
lice., twenty-one SUttes and the District o£ Columbia w:ere either p~;rmitting 
their banks to run u:ndeI'specW orders.. or had c'.eclured a. h-'mkir~ hoJj.day. 
'l'he now President at once assumed the leadership of the Nation, urging con ... 
£ide~lce and couri:.ige. He told tho people that t11.& only thing they had to toar 
was :tear itself. and t~tt his most 1mportan.t 'k~sk at the momont 't'lnS to find 
\10m for the l .. u:uD.plo.red. On the day after his inaugu;r.j. tiOl'l, a nationwide bank 
moratorium was declared, and an ~go was plucod on the uithdrawal of cur ... 
Toney £ran tho banks. This act lm,s the inauguration of the IJew De.:u, and a.Tl 
effort to rest,ore prosperity to the Nation. In its effect, it was a step in 
the directit')Xl of u pl,::mnoo. economy. For the next .four ye.:;.rs, Roosevelt and 
the landers of our nn.tion st.rug~led with th3 problOttll of unemploymant., we-
CUl'"lty and powr-ty. l'lore tht:m ,;). $COl."e 01' legi!:l.:'1.tive acts Wm"a passed, giv-
ll1g the government control of, or supervision ot ec~~c lifo. l1uch criti~ 
in favor oi tho new oxperimc;xts, and telt that the New De.,l would 1(;',ao. the 
46 
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country to eeonomic stability. 
Roosevelt had ~ friends a;r,d manyanem:les. In!h!! ~1ie .9! qop. 
~ch we lenrn that the character of Roosevelt was a mixture of politieal in-
sight and enduring bigh principles. His tru.t~ was taken tor: granted, 
even b"'l those who disliked hi.."'l. He was agre.o'tt ora.tor, POBSe8sing a. b.t.'ter 
understanding of foreign aUdrs than a.n::r of the high authorities with whom 
he worked. Uo one could dony his $\U."ellGaS of vision. His death> l*pr11 12, 
194$, na.t the .!1l<ment o£ triumph and irldi.!spensibUitl" in world politiCS, W£D 
a O"ea t los~ to hia generation. tt 1 
The abovo portr~ cont;oaa;t.s ~tly with John T. P.l$lnta ~1s 
ot Roosovel.t in hie book, :£h!. riooa~t~. He telJJs us that the i'reld.dent 
exert,ed eontinuO'W,S presSUrEl to ~bange the st.rueture ot gov~~" in order 
to gain. 1110%'. ~ tor ldmself. B7 one plan af+...er another .. be inc~ th9 
powers of the President .. and. les~ those or Congr0SS and the Courts. 2 The 
1-& provided the President with $J"jOO,ooa,ooo to use tor rel.ie!' and l"ecov-
fi%"',f. The ptU."fJe strings, lMell hr:ul ton,.erly 'been held by Congress: were now in 
his hands. In the wh¢le ten years prorl.ous to 1933, the governnerrt lk1d net 
8X[JSmed suoh an enomooa sum. ) Senators and representatiws instead of g()ioi 
1 Cr.amOOrs, 611. 
2 John T. F:Qrnn .. The ~elt Myth, 1_ York, 1948, 289 • 
........... ............. 
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1IJg to Congress for appropriations, now went to the President. They hn:",l to beM 
to b;1s wishes, if thq d$B1red to get money for their dist.r1cts. Tho wieldi,.ng 
of. this new power by the PrasicWnt 'Wd in its rQulta an att.nck on the struc-
ture of gOV8l"mlent, which endeavors to koep its three br'~hes independent of 
eaCh otb.er.4 During the Roosovelt adminiatratiotl, over a hu;,dred bureaus were 
org,;.n1zed, $uch as the }itA, the oee, t11$ mu. a.nd the P't[A~ £~ bureaus were 
never giVell power to function in a legit~te l1D.'Jt, by act of Congress. but he 
their pcMet" directly :£'rom Roosevelt.!) By mea.na of b:t.anlc-check dor>.atioos and 
government rulinga) the poWers of the nation can be seized, and i! thiD plan 
15 continued, our :f'ree go~ will be changed without a vote of the people 
and OUX' Conetitution will be d4s~. 6 
In. a recent. book. Protes~ Thcnlas A. &oUey states that 
Roosevelt r.pea.t~ deCeived the American peopl.e cl.uring the 
period bat'oI'e Pearl Harbor •••• He wus faced with a terrible 
d.il.emrJa. If he ca.me out unequivocally for :1Jlt.erv$l1tion. he 'Would 
be defeated 1.,"l 1940. 7 
In a radio bro.'ldeast, JQ.ll'IlIU'Y 12, 19h1 .. Senator Bt\:rton K. \l1heeler, 
~at.ic Senator trom 11ont.>.:na, critioized the Lond.-Leo.ve Bill at ~$ngth. 
He said in part" that never before .. in tho hist.ory oi: the United St,at.es has 
the chief executive o! the nation asked Congress to act contral"J" to i.."ltCl"'ru.l.t1 
law. Never before II in the history of tllis nn.tion h',~s dupllci ty been mrident 
..... ad if .=-
5 IbW. 
-
6 Ibid. 
-
~---------------------. 
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1n its dealing ld.th other nations. At no other period has the 'United states 
given to ooe mn so gre..:.'\t Ii power, a power which could lL"liermine the fn,l'ne-
work of our Government. At no other time bas Congress been asked to surrender 
its rightful poW\'lX'S to the Chief lkecutive •••• wrbe· land-lease-give pro-
gnu:! is the Uew Deal's triplo A toreign poliCYJ it will plow under eve:r, 
fourth Ji..mericun boy. • • • ApprcMU o:f lend ... ~ means 'W'nl', open and eomplete 
warfare ... 8 
Accord.i.ng to Eliot JtIDfMs::f. Anler1qat s econom1c :reorGanization be ... 
tween the years 1939 and 194$ was 11 ttle short of miraculous. A new st.and.a.rd 
of living was given to the nation, labor, both 1'-1 the city and in the eount.ry' 
a.ssumed. a new d1gnitT and importance. There was a treaendous ~ovement in 
both the llv:tl1g ani worldng condtt1ons of the Negro. Complat.e mobilization 
of industry pcmittcd the United stat .. to conquer the Ax1s 4tld bGcCRe the 
leader in ·t,he stru.ggle against Soviet dom:i.Mtion. Roosevelt des~s the 
edit for this stupend.ou.s acccmplisbnent. He 't-ook a Cha..flC6 on the speed with 
lieh the econ~ developed to initiate .turt_ production, as !u'!)Qds for the 
effort ~ greater. 9 
Saae h1stor1a.ns, viewing the New De&! trom the standpoi.'1t of the 
present (19501 any it a,~:>ears to be a compromise. A coroplet~ controlled 
and d.irccted economy VIaS offensive to the 3\rn.m.ca.n wq of life" with its in-
cJ,ination !:or personal ~om in bu.s1nesa. Expanded gover:tJl'1ent.!l.l. control ot 
bllSi.'1.aSs was corwidered a weapon to fight the depression" but not as a rem«tr 
t<:»: all national ills. In labor legislation, {uld 1.71 aocl.al, likewise" tho 
ROOSSVe1t adrr.in;i.stration aecart.pl1she4 m~ benefit 111 a lev ye;.rs than Br1t-
ain did. in !'1i"t.y-. The United St:1tas aQUiht a compront..ise betlfOO'n ~r1cted 
compet.ition and regimented economy_ The recognition of the Soviet Union was 
o<XlSidered 't;r;J some -.n'ite1:'s" to be the most int-'Ortant diplanat10 act of thel 
Roosevelt regim.e d.ur1ng 1933. It is said that ~":1 LttYinov, Soviet delegate 
to the ~iarld Economic Conference in London (1933) st:~ted thatbis gove:ment 
was ready to ~ $1,000.000,000 'llJt)rt.b ot goode abr:"oaafl The American opinion 
concern1ng tbe Russians was ~ but cord1al. During the Bolshev:1k Rev-
olution $440,000,000 llOl:'th of ~. property had been confiscated. Bea1d .. 
this. tbe Kere.nsky g~ent had borrowed '):la .. OOO,(X)O, a debt which the ~ 
viets refu.sed to bonor.. axt Since the rise ot JtJJ;an was a. threat to both 
Ru.esia and Jm.Gr1ca, RoO$welt dN:1.d.ed to over~ past ditterences a1l:1 aent 
word to Pres1dent Kal.1n1.n, that th$ United Statu WOUld welcale a aon..t re-
presentative ttl dUiWSS <;lJleGt1ons relAting to the two COlL"1triU. Litri..noY 
came as repr~sentat1ve of the Sad.et. Af't,e:r eight dayf:.J of discussion, tomal. 
d1plomat1c :relations 'ifEJl"e ~ betveen ius1a and tbe Un1ted Sta't;.$s. 
Tho Soviet Union pledged. protection to Amen.oan citizens 1n Russia" and can-
celled all ~ £or damages done during the S1berlan expedition. It:P1"<J'11-
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tad states re.fuaed to lend the soviet a:ny more money, being deterred by the 
Johnaon Aot of 1934" which i'ol~hid$ loans to governments in default. 
The sueeessf'..u. a.ttack of Jalx~n upon Haooll"..u:1.a in 19J1, rmd the 
steady progress of Japanese control in North China durL~ 1933 to 1937, made 
it clear to the UnitedStc~too, as well as to the oth.- gre,'lt powers, that Ja-
pan aimed at m.ald.ng the entire Chinese Republic a Japanese protac:torat-e. 
'rheir plan, statod. AmOC,ssador Grew !rom Tokyo to Secretary' !till in DootDber, 
1934, 
is to obtain trade control ~nd~ntua.lly pre<icminant politic."ll influ-
ence in China. the Pr.illppines, the Straits Settlements, Siam, and t,he 
tluteh F.ast I!kiiee, the Hartt:1.me Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at 
a time, as in Korea and Uanehuria, pausl.n.g illtaIm:tttentl;r to consoli-
date and then ca."1tinuing as soon tJ.S the intervening obstaclu can be 
ove%'Cor;19 b'J' diplom.aey or force ••••• we would. be reprehensibly Scmlo-
lmlt U' we wm·e to tr'wJt to the :;;oouri ty ot treat,. :restr-.dnts or inter- 1 
nation;J.l COl1rl:ty to safeguard our interests or, indeed" our own property. 
In 1n.formal discussions with one of llllleriea ts r-opresQuts:r"ives in To-
Jll!Xm" wh¢ tlas destined to bo tho leader of the Orie..l'ltD.l civiliz,ntlon 
would in course of time be t.bs "'bose oi a grOllp comprising China, India, 
the Netherlands East Indies, etc •••• He proceeded to. say that tho 
United st.oltes 11'111 lend th£! Americas both llorth and South. Qreat Bri ... 
tain is le.'1d1ng t;:.o Eurt:tpean countries, but Great Britain is degenera ... 
ting" while the rest of Ew.."q)e is decadent. Thllretore, it "Jill end by 
the United statc;s leadinG the Occidental e1.vili~tionl while Japan lends 
the Oriental civUiution. u II 
l~ Joseph C .. Ga:-ew, }!'1C,. and!!!!:, United. ~t,<.ltes !ore~ Pollgz, 
19J.:rJ..241, U.S. Government Pril:lt:mg Ollic., vlaailillgtoo, 1943, ~S'(,:300. 
11 Cll.:1.mbers, 6OJ~. 
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In :l report to the Secretary ot S'ti:lt4,Wllliam E. Dcdd, Ambassador 
GermanY" said that th.e Dutch I'!1nister talked to him and told 'h.:im t~t the 
1)Uteh authorities lnd becme concerned abou:t. a MCMi!llct known as na.n Asu:t1c 
League or Nations.- Two gonernls ~.d bean appointed to travel about in Ch:1na, 
and to organize in &nohukuo, Hongoli;a, the Sl1a.llghai district. Indo-China and 
Siam, groups whose Fll"pOM it is t.o·bring about a close c()ooordinatlon idth 
Japa.n, and ultimately give Japan control of th. Far East. This activity has 
bet'n rather intense since the .Amsrican rec.ognition of Russia. Dodd expWncd 
the.t Ja:)ru'1 bas changed her plans 1."'l reg,'trd to Russia. Instead of ehallq1ng 
heX" at once .. she will delq, in Ol"d.er to establish a strOl"lgel" hold on the 1"'" 
gions n.a.med. The Dutch ain1$teralso deserib«l a chi.1.:nging Japanese te.ri.ti' 
policy destined to ease thG re:!.l.ltions of Japan with all the countries concern,... 
ed, but he WaS quite positive in assert~ that the ~pean countries &1-. the 
Hague held the opinion the. t the Japanese ndlitnr,r olique intends toannmc thG 
Philippines and the Dutch possessione. The Ninister sincereJ.y hoped that the 
United States would assist 1."1 bringing about beM .. er economic and pr:>l1tieal 
relat~ in the Far East .• 12 
~jith this infol."'nU.tt1o:n at hand, the United ~;.\tate$ began to t-'lke count-
er :meQJtUl'es 1n the 'ar last. Through the Reconstruction Fintmce Corp.oratioo" 
12 U.S. Govlt., Roreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic 
Papers, Vol. III, The Far East, Washington, l~O, 2-3, citing a r~port of 
Ambassador Dodd, in Germany to t.he Secretary of State, No. 401, Berlin, Jan. 
6, 19.34. 
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• loan of' &50,"'000,000 was made 'to the Chinos. Government in 14&1, 1934. The 
United S~1.tea had already reeogn:Lze<i the Sorl.et Union, in llovember, 1933, 
'fhich action was considered by Japan as a move by iiashington to oppose Tokyo t 8 
_bitions in the Pacific. When Japan denounced the \iash1ngton naval agree... 
_t of 1922, a race for naval su..urem.aC"J in the Pacific began. Internation-
al relations .tu:rther deteriorated, when Japan withdrew from the London blaval. 
eon£erenee (Decl91'8.ber, 1935 to March, 1936) because America. stood .f1rml,y a .. 
pinst .tun naval parit,l with tho Unit«1 States &nd arita:1n.13 
In the opinion of Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, .American polio;y 
was ersatz during the period tram the Mu.p.1eh criDis until tbe SUllJ:1C" of 1939. 
It was the best the President could prov.:tde tor the count.ry, since the Ameli" ... 
ican publiC were insisting on isolation. ByAprll, there was no chance 01 
appeaseaent. England and fra.nee vere trying to get allies aga.1nst Gem.a.l1Y. 
Avter1ca was in a position to help.lu:rope. it. repeal of the embargo on muni-
tions might have ste.yed Germa.ny. DurillI the spring o.f 1939, in taJ.ks to Sen-
ators and Congressmen, the President used to end. his eonvoraations with the 
idea. that he regarded the l"$~ of the tlnbargo as the greatest step that 
could be taken to guard too countryta interests, both to secure peace and to 
protect us in case war shOuld come. 14 
On February 11.. 19)9, St.-mley K. Hornbeck, adrlsOl" on Polit:teal Bel .. 
13 Chambers, 604. 
14 Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner I American Wlrl. te ~, lZev York, 1940, 39-!~2. .. , , __ 
ations" prep tired a memorandum concerning an eool1ani.c offensive aga1:nstJIlpa.n, 
which the Department of state was p::k1ll.1'ling. The record states that untU 
1900, the Japanese lfel'e considered as a. 
t'oamparativoly a;rn.iu.ble, artistic, art-loving and peaceful people, who 
needed to be taught and could be patroniac. ft But Japan'. character 
was "not .Ihat it was thought be!ore 189$ to be, It and her "strength 
is not what it has been thougl.rt.s1nee 190, to be." 15 
Since 1905, the world, through fear of Japat)., has permitted her to ruthless-
16 lY steal territory trom her neighbors. 
there are three 1t'Iqa by which nations :maY' ofter resistance to such 
injustice, first by opposing it as an ~ act, second by econald..c op... 
positicn, and thirdby' armed intervention. America. has 1001 tried economic)' 
opposit.ion; hence the onl.7 measure left to her is amed intervention. The 
conclusion is t.hat mil1tar.r force will have to be used. sooner or lat..er.17 
Rauch contellds that Prel.d.dent. Roosevelt could. and c11d hope that' 
the series of measures Which he adopted during pre-Pearl Ibrbor years might 
have averted host1l±t1es. He is exonerated from the cl:ltlrge of v4nn1na war 
or of baving violated in arq way thl\) prom1$es of peaceful int.entionhe mde 
ciurine the 1940 campaign.18 
-
1$ Tansill .. Back ~o~2,quoting a memorandum by Stanlq K. 
Hornbeck, Ad.v1s:e:r on PoiI'tt .. tiona, Febrwary 11 .. 1939. 793 / 14671 .. 
Confidential tile" }LS, Department of St.-,ite. . 
16 Ibid. 
-
11 Ibid. 
-
den'llllCia.tion of our ex1st1ng oommercial tr.o.'lty fa.i~ed to be etractive. f.m ... 
blss<.l.dor Grell dUt.:~Cld with "'0h1s policy of eeonom1cpressure. He was or the 
OIxi.nion that Jar.x:.n ba.d vast resources which she could use; that she h.'ld been 
storil1g up raw :m£i.torial for mUit.."!.rY supplies, and tmt economic pl'"essure 
might not be e!tect1ve.19 
S$cretur,v of state, Hull had no more opt:bdstic outlook than Or •• 
n. told the :members of Congress t.ha t the oonflict to ems would affect th~ 
whole world. It would be aIle at-tack by "poWerful nations armed to t..ha teeth, 
preaching the doctrine of l1','.r:-ed, f'o:..~ a.l1d practicing a philOSI)Phy of bi.rl:>al" ... 
10m. It 20 He declarM tll;}. t 
Hitler 1ntEmdato l'lUlke b:1mselt the colossus of Europe. while 
Ja.l~n pl,:\cfl'J6 her heel on Asia. If they su.oc~J we ldllhaft to 
tnmsaet. cur bua1neslS wi ~~ the rest of tho world through Tolqo 
and Berlin. W. know all this, and :yet we retain this _bargo, 
which directly e?lcourages Hitler, l1Ul1,:.:es wat" more likoly) ;mel 
threatens our own peace and safety. 21 
her in some plan 1.'!,gainst Japnuooe aggression in the Far East, in can of ~;a:r 
in Europe. She askfid that France and. Britain IllUl:rPly air and Da'\"al forces to 
def_t JO;Pa.."l,l Whil& Cltin& would aupply the army. Britain reiUs«i, sayi.ng 
that she would. 11;;.;,ve to fight the war in Europe before she could do ~ 
19 Tans:tllj 502. 
20 fi..lsop and Kintner, ,39-42. 
21 ~.) 4,3. 
in tho Far E:1st, and cr.xpresoed the hOPG thnt the pres..mce of the UnH.ed Sta 
Fleot. in the Prr,cti'ic m.ght deter Japan £.rem attacldng EIr.1ta1nt s possessions 
there. 22 \rJhile Ch.ino. wlas see~..ing aid againsh Japan. the latter was tr:r.tng 
to find some plan to prasel."Ve the peace of Europe. Japan fetared an accord 
betwen Germ;;m::r and Russia., as that would. u.:.'1d.emine Jupaneee safety. Fail. ... 
ing to eot al.l:L::ls i'U ifurope, Japun. 'turn.OO tor help to the Unitod Stntes. 23 
During an unofficial conversation w:i:lir~ the United St.lltes Ambassa-
dor, Hay 16, 1939fc by a Japanese who bad friends among the high officials of 
the COUl"t of Japan, the .fOllowing Wonnat1on lfas conveyed to .Ambass~dor 
Grewt pNSSure was being put upon Japan by ~ and Italy toward enter-
yet it could not ignore th.., fact that QRus~ia straddled Europe and 
Asia, and. that wh$the,r Japa.'1 liked it or not, its policies and 
actions tom a. bridge by which events 1."l the Far East and in 
~ act and reaot on each other. tf 24-
On 1!Je.Y' 2), dipJ.omutic convC'sations weN resumed bet wen the .Prime l>i1nister 
of Japan. Baron ~, and the .amertean Cl:1iU'ge d'.f£airs, ~ H. Dco-
man. Beron H1ranunw. expressed his horror CNer the tact that there might be 
a secood world Wi!lr. He suggested an. alliance w1th the United StG.tea, which 
liould have a I~od.~r:a. t,ing :tn.nuance in llu"ope. It 25 
- .... <,-~-"--
22 TansU1# 502. 
2.3 Ibid 
-' 
24 Ib:1p.., 507-508. 
25 Ibi!i., 506 
Doamm said that the principal d1.tt1culty in the way of mald.ng 
such an alliance was Japan's aggrese10ns 1n Chim. 1i1.ranuma respoJ.'lded b7 
SIJ.11ng that Japan vas on.'J.T endeavoring to protect ita rights in North Ch1na. 
It Secreta,ry Hull thought a settlement of t.lm Chin.:'l conflict was neeeesary 
to the making of an a] J :lanoe, then Japan could not f~ one, as she bad hoped 
to do, although she thought an ~Ja.renue all.1anee would bring about 
26 peace in lh'rope. Sec:retary HullcaYe a. cold and diecourag1..ng a~ to 
thiS proposal. It would be bett .... , b& thousht, for Japan to work s1n~ w1t..~ 
the Imropean nations With whan she had "special relations. n 'It the Japan_. 
ree.llY' want«! 'tIOrld. peace, it. was proper tor them to put an end to hostilities 
in the FlU" Fast. The foll.owing J~, without waiting for a :oeply to t~ 
conversation of H1ranuma and Ii1U, President Roosevelt gave nat'.Qe to the 
JaJXt.neGe ths:t the treaty of 19l1 would tendnate on Janua1"1 26, 1940. Tanaill 
is of the opinion that th1s note was not s1ncere" OUr go-vemment ,.1.Ye the 
reason for the t~tion of the treaty IW IIChQi;·lge.a D'lr'lY need to be made 
toward better serving ·thepurposes tor which w.eb treaties are concluded." 
'l'he real. reason tor 1 ts tcd.Mtion was that Ja~ refused to stop her ad-
vance into Ohina, and. kner1~ .... protesting the sencl1ni of war ma.ter1als 
to Ja,..ua.n. This action was the beginning ot iii. strong economic otfensive on 
27 JaFan. 
26~., 507 .. 508. 
27 ~., 508. 
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al Econanic A.t'tai:ra, that Secretary Hull sent a note to the Japanese AmbaiJlla... 
dOl', Horinouchi, te1l1ng him that the trade treaty would be tem1na.ted. 28 
n-evicnw to thi!\J tenrd.n-!ttion, se:veral events Mppen~ which made the relations 
betwen Japan and the United St!1'tes lllOlte stra!ned. The .first of these inci.-
dents WilS the bombing or Chu .. ~g.Amba.ssador Johnsm, ~ !~! ~ 
a.t£aires in Tokyo called on the M1ni~er' of Far~1 Ai'fa.irs on Jul:3' 10;, 1939, 
jected on s,CC<llnt of the bontbing of Cht4~. . The Jap~ Hinist., ex-
~J1"essed di$tress that AMerican 11 ves had been endangered.. bttt said be could 
Inot promise that ths bombings would. ceaSe. Air attack was a necessity in that 
Iregion. On the same day, JuJ.y 10, 1939, Ilooseftlt dartanded trait the Japan •• 
Pov'ormnent, a at&. tement in re.terenoe to the bmb1ngs and to the d..u1ger to 
~icane. 29 Hull delivered Roos~t's m~, and st.ated that sOl1et.h1:ng 
~ serious would haP::Jerl it the ba1~ continued, In reepoM., the Japan.. 
ese 11mbaaeador expreased the hope that tl~e Ur4.ted. st,'lwe ~t WO'Uld keep 
...;ts Mtionals am-;J" from the <::lQnger oone .. btlt Hull replied sharp~ that the 
Pnitad States Govenmtent did bot ueoncsde the right of' any other outside eoun-
1Vl'Y to a monopoly oth:lghwaya or streets or other localities in China.30 
. 28 U. 5. Dep tt... f!!r.l fIarbor, 7. 
29 Secreta.l')!' Hull to AMriC.Um !mbaStly :in Tokyo, Ju~ 10, 19)9. 
93.94!1520U, ~.a, Department of State, cited bt.l Tamdll, 616. 
)0 11ETmOrandum of C01'lVerafl tiro betveenSecretary Hu.ll and the Japan. 
SEt Ambassador, ~ 20 .. 1939. 79.3.94 I k.525.3.t }1S, Department of State,cited 
i1y Tansill, 617, 
That .,the D$partment of S~\te \faS beitlg more aggressive to\'rard Japan 
t,baIl Britain was, is shown b'.1 the Tients:L1'l Affair. DuriJ:le World ~iar I, China 
Jj.quida:t'ed Austrian t:nd Gerr.um consessions in Tientsin, and in 1920, she con-. 
fiscated the Russian consessions. The Bri:t.ish had 46 million invested 1n 
Tientsin and the French, a large amount, although less than the llt>1tish had. 
Besides this J ,50 million or Br.1.t1sh sU Vel' was in the Tiell'tsin bar.ks in the 
name of the Chinese Uational1st Government. Ja:pUll dan.andad that t.his silVt'U.' 
be turned OVeJ: to the J~ase GO'te1'Tlr.lem. \~en the Chinese rei'J.Se<i, barri-
cades and wire enta..nglemt1h'1U W'G're erected around the British and French COJl... 
cesaions. 31 
A...~er the s:t.nld.ng of the United State. gunboat Pa."lay, and the b0mb-
ing of eivUia.n populations in China, the \i<ahington authorities :L"Tiposed a 
. 32 IIIOral snbargo on airoraft going to Ja,.0an. The victories of Germany a..'1d 
Japan presented difficult problems in foreign policy, and the United states 
faced. econ(mlic losses in s<me ret;tions. ?.lblil:: op:i.n1on iII'aS contused ~_"ld in-
definite. The Washington author1Uec ~et!'d as to What policy wns beat tor 
tho United. States as a whole. The people at large opposed war and believed 
in isolationism, yet Secretary Hull, in 193$, had made knolm to the:) cmmtry, 
that isolationism had been given a trial, but it h:?,d tailed and had destroyed 
22,000,000 bUlion doJ.J.s.n' worth or foreign trade. After due consideration, 
the United States Gcvemment on ~ 1, 1938, restricted the sale ot a.irpJ.anea 
3l Tansll.1., 500. 
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aeronautical equipment to countries whose pilots were using them to attack 
he ci...r-1i.:lr:. POpulntio..'1. 33 
li.S a retru.lt of the 'l'1entsin f>£fair, Sir Rob(~:rt Craigio, the British 
,oo.s&1.dor to Japan, signed the Crtligi&-Arlta. Agreement on July 21" 1939. 
By the taxms of this £ar-re.s~ch1na fOl"mula. Great Britain consented to the 
plan tlu~t Japanese forces be: allowed to keep order a:rl protect ~y i..1'}. 
he Chinese territory where Japan was cn.n'j1.ng an. militar,r opor[~tiQ1w, and 
Britain permitted Japm to sUPp.z'eas em:::! aotions ·that would int~r.1'ere llith the 
success of these mUitOJ.'"iJ operationo. Brltrd.n wanted to protect her cances-
ions, so followed D. p~.th of .ir';:;J11Gasem.ent in signing thia a~ont. This 
ction 'Was in reality a desGrtion of the Na tiol'ul Government of China. 
eat Britain showed her vulnerability b'rJ givi:t'lg lilaY to J~pa.n not only hera 
t Tianteins but also wan under pressure by Jt\paJt she closed tho ~ P.oad. 
this latter act, the United States liaS bind~d f'rom SEm.ding su,pp,Ues and. 
11U1 terlals to China. Likewise, i'ranceelosed the route through French 
o-China, when pressure 'WruS applied ,to her 'h-j' J.:l.pan.. This vas a f'urther 
ndrnuce to the United States, who found it to h~ interest to cO~'lt1nut aid 
o Chim. 34 
When l'liol'ld War II broke out, neit,he.r lil-arleG nor Britain COIlldgiV0 
Y';Y C~.sSistanc0 '1;.0 the United States in the Far East. A report trom the ~ 
33 U. 5. Deptt.~ Poctrl Harbor, 7. 
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.A1Jlerican goocUr, cotton, wool, pulp, machinerT, 1ndust:r1al ~ipment, non-
35 ferrous metals, iron, steel and chemicals. 
In 1939, AJaba.asador Grow had warned President Roosevelt that sane-
t:1on8 on Japan might lead to wr. It an embargo we're Pdt rlpol1. _"dean oil, 
Japan mi8ht reciprocate bif taldng control ot the rich petroleum reeQUrces 
ot the Netherlands East Indies. Grew wished to prevent war with Japan. 
fansill believes that Rooaevelt had a doep..sefiLted dillike tor Japan, and 
appeared umdll1nc to recognise I'J.U'f geature of Japan for an a.greement. Grew 
did not like this attitude. The Ja.;.")QMse Foreign Min1ster bad given him to 
understand that Japan would. take __ sures to facilitate American camaeree, 
and that the1' vould not drive out Ame'rican interests in China. 
When the Japanese darlanded the recognition of a new Central GtMml-
ment for Ch1:na, beaded by WIl1l Ch11:lg.we1. Sec:re~ Hull answered t 
The Oove~t o! the United Sta.tes has ample reason for be-
lieving that the Gcwernment (of Chi.a.ng Xa.1.sbek) with capital now 
at Ch1mgklng, baa the alleg1ance a.nd support of th.e great majority 
of the Chinese people. The Gove.rnm.ent. of the United Stnt.es ot 
cour •• cont1nuesto recognise that Government as the Govenrnent oJ: 
China. 
The British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir iobert Craigie, ~fSed 
conciliation toward Japan' s nfi Central GOVernm«1t in China. a:e 11i::l.ted that 
both Britain and Japan nre 
striving for the same objective, l1<1J\'tely, a last:ing peace and ·t.he 
pres~tionot' our institutions .from. exhraneous, lulMia:'aive 
innuencos. This friendly ge~ure toward Japan was i'a:"orably 
.... 
.3S ~,621. 
)6 ~., 620. 
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r6iardect"trJ the tondon Times which spoke of the proposed eatab-
lisbment oJ: the Wang regIme as nan otfer of peace to the Chinese 
people_ fI 37 
Britain." however, looked at Japanese aggression in (4 ditterent 
J.1ght# when Japan announced that she was 
deeplT conce1'1'leCl over arq development acc~ the aggravation 
of war in kope that. ma7 affect the .tatus S!!2 ot the t{etherlands 
Indies. 38 , 
Dr. loudon .. HlJtherlands Minister to Washitlgto.n, 1mmed.1ately inf'omt1ii ' 
Jap;1n that 1118 goverr.rm.ent would not tolerate ..rr:J "preventive protection" of 
its eolon1al possaeslons.,' 
SecretarT Hull was al$o 'Vf'I.I!Y pl!'<npt in lotting Ja.pan know that the 
Unf.:ted states w<W.d not tolC"ate any intervention in the Du.tch &let lrldiea, 
and the entire hc1t1c a.na~ He then radndGd J~pan of the Roo~Takahira 
treaty of 1908. em ot the Four Power Treaty of 1921 .. 40 
Apparently, the B:r:i:tish were ready to take action against Japan 
after the Tientsin Affair" for Lord lothian of the British Foreign otflee, 
inquired about Angl~Am ... ican fleet movements in the Atlantic and FacUic .. 
and &$ked S~etal.7 au:u "whether Japan should be opposed or appeased~,"4J. 
Lothian auggested a strOl'lfJ economic _bargo be placed. on Japan" and that. 
31 London Times, Barch 29;, 1940" cited by'TanaUl, 621., 
38 Ibid/l: 
19 !bid 
--. 
40 Ihi4. 
41 Ibid. 
-, 
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battleships could be sent to' SU1gapore to dEftonstrute a ~ted policy on the 
p.1.:rt of Britai.'l and the Unitecl StatGs.42 Hull thought we ought to let, the 
aitu.:.ltion. Gtand as it t'las fO'r the pr$Sent, but whaIl J<lpal1 suceeeded in pp.,r .. 
SW!.ding Brita1n to olose the Burma. Rood far thrse months .. thus cutting of£ 
war materials f100m Chil'l..1., Hull l'/l;ade it known tbat the United States wished 
tile main. lines of trade a.."1d cc:21lmC"ce in ~ part of' the world to be kept 
open. 43 
At eo di1':tner p..arty, atte:~;doo by 11orgentl1s.u, Stin'.scn and Knox, Lord 
LotllL'lu and the il;ust:r..ui.:m minis tor.. the plan of eut ting off oil ~pplies 
fro."!l Japan \mS discussed. Lord Lothian suggested destroying the oil wells 
in the Moh East Indies, rut wben Sumner \JelJ.es heard at it, he said that 
thisproeedure wO'.J,ld C&uas Japan to aM,aek Brit·ish and Du.teh colonial pos-
seGsians~ Hmlever J the opinion of the tllt'ee Americ.:mrGpl"(,,scnt..a.ti ves pre-
VD.ilod.b4 
Thue men 1"00.11;00. tJ}"9.t Jarlall w.as not to be coerced 'tT.f threats. 
SaliS other procedure must be followed. Fina1J.y" }lorgenthau drw up an order .. 
that placed alI ldnds of oil and scrap m.etals u."lder cont:'ol. The President 
signed it, am s(!}nt 1:1:. to Uru1er-Secret,:ry Wellos £01' counter signatw:-e • 
.... .-
)-1-2 TansilllJ 624 
. 43 Herbert Faist Tlw ~ to .t~rf. I~bo: .... ~ £ond.nj.2! ~!!!;: 
Between tIle United St..'ltea andJapaZl, PiInceton. 19>0, 89-9J.. 
h4 Tansill, 624. 
~~------------------------~--------------I  
A member of the Japanese OOlOOS$Y saw "lihe !lewsp.1.par accounts of the 
tote.l embargo, and illJn~'1.tely made inquiries at vJi~ahington. "'la11es cal."llOd 
the Ja~ese represent.:'ltiv8 by say:i.ng the 0l:'dGr 8S not aimed at a.ny partic-
ular country .. and that it was onlY' motor oil, lubricants and. heavy melting 
iron whi.cn was to be QUt aU. The d$pan,$8e G&ve!'mlent prot~ ~ th.~ 
long notes to \ielles.46 Both British and Du.tch represmt'"...atlws counselled 
prudence, but Grew" who had heretofor opposoo sanctions against Japcm" sud.-
denly reversed his policy" fQ'l' he bsliewd that the time had OCll'l\e to impose 
strr-Alg economic pressure, and that if' we want«! to $UPpol~ Britain, "we must 
preserve the ::rt,atus guo in the PacU'ic, at least uutil the l~ in F.Jurope b9.d 
been won or lost. 47 itA show of taro.) and tr.e reeo1ve to tWe it, waa nec-
essary to ~p JD.P!Ul :In her place. 1I 48 
During 1940, too United states continued her poliey of a1d:ing Cl1.iwJ., 
by exertillg pressure on Japan. DiplomatiC presSUl"$ Was employOO, b'tJ of,faring 
objections to JaPQ.n's $tUzure of Chinese tem.to~" .om to Ja.panta d1sr~d 
of Am.erlcans living 1.."1 China. Econood,c px'easure was exerted. by 1oo.ning to 
China su.ms o£ 1l1oney tot.lUing $200,000,000 whioh cmabled be' to cont,in;ue her 
Iljllllu.faeturee and t(! get needed materlal$ for both civilian and. mUi~J use. 
1. 1 'If, 1 
46 Ilrl.d. 
-
41 Ibid., citing ,Pearl rJa.~! Attack, pt. 2 .. 637. 
4S ~." 625, citing Pearl Ha.rbor l~~¥~~, pt.2, 637. 
~---------------------------------. 
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l1eaides this, .America also sent munitions to be used e.p.inst Japm.49 
null reaJ.imed, aD early as the winter of 1940, that the Jap[;tnese 
mUitar=r men 'Wm!$ pl.a.nning the conquest of the Pacific 4S tar ea.st as I.nd1a. 
and to the South S •• , and as tar west as I~.50 
By the end or 1939, Japan had 5S milJiOll 'ba.r'nls of oil in reserve. 
rut a.tter that date, it had been more' d1fftcult to procure. f.'lnl.y SO,OOO,OOO 
bar:t'f.lls WC'e in reRl"Ve by SeptGnber. 19h1. Fuel oil stocke "Wtt3:'e only 
22,OOO,Ot"JO, but tho aviation gasol1ne 3Upp~ had 1ncreased from one to ttJUr 
ndllion ba.l:Tels. Japan could no longer dru suppll_ of oU £rem the United. 
States or India. Japan £$ltthe.t the sooner she atta.cked, the better chanoo 
elle bad ot w1nn1rlg. Dela.y" meant a. diminishing oU SUPP1Y.~ 
1Tesi<:U!Jnt Boos.ft'el.t so1JCb,t to haw Congress amend t.he Neutrality 
Act, so tba't w could provide Mta.i.'l and Fr&noe with a:t".mS against ~ny, 
in the event that lmr ehou.1.d 'bnmk out, but the SG'Qate Committee, on July ll, 
1939, voted to ~t .. decision untU January. 19bo. H\lll eonaidered this de-
cision as a l1~tY' DiAster,· Fle resortOO to a. m.ea.aure to ottset the 
failure ct ~ to amend the Ilfeutral1ty Act. He cmdod the ~il.ty of Com-
merce and navigation betwetm the United st,tttes and Jar-un. 52 
49 u.s. Dep't., J'oor;1; Harbor, 8 
~o ~. 
51 Herbert leis, !!!! ~ .!2 Penrl; Harbor... New Jersey, 1950, 21. 
52 Ibid. 
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;, 
After Jap;m h.:1.d signed the Tl"iparliite Pact, September 27, 1940, 
the UniiAld states began to i.~e strongereconanic sanctions on Japun. The 
Pact was made public, the three signatories a.vowi..1J.g their intention to bring 
a.bout a now order· in librope and Asia. A few days before this, Hitler had 
attacked Russia. This lett Japan tree to move into South Indo-Ch1na. She 
ma,de use ot bar opportunity, taki:og f~ Prov1nce. Here She could outflank 
Si~apore, and occupy the Malay peninsula. thus endangering strategic Singa-
pore, which was the key to As1a, l~ia., and Austftlru.d.a.53 Roosevelt re-
taliatid by placing a total Embal-go on trOll and steel to Japan. This did 
not a.t'fect Japan too ser:l.cusly', as she had buUt up a h.rge stock pile ot 
lIlQtm:-ials tor her immediate ne«ls. 54 
The J&P~. were ~ at building a new "world. empire" aided by 
Hi'l;.ler. Together th&y' plan.,~ed. to ma.ke the !&stern h~ 'their own and 
they thought ·they would be able to control and wbjupte all other ll.'lt1ons.55 
Japan felt that Russia would resist ~ion to tb.f:t north, while 
it w:us not poBsible tor the United state to prevent Japanese oxpansion to 
the south, west or east. It the United states, in 1930 .. had bu.Ut up a su-
perior navy as stanlq Horn.beck had advooated, future events in the Far East 
might haw been vastly dl£.farent,. Our policy toward Ch.1na W<iS intlwmced 
53 u.s. De~)tt ... Pe" .. rl ~~?l", 18. 
Sh Tana1ll .. 625. 
55 u.s. Deptt. PO:ll"t; ~bor, 8. 
61 
sreatly by JaPan's wishes. 56 
Japan had 4,d.gned the Tripartit.e Pact as a de.tellS& measure, £or 
l:I1tler 1s trlulllphs might lead him to the Fa:r East, and to the Dateh East 
Indies" which -.$ tbe richest archipelago in the world. The Pact conf1r.m.ed 
a ~n "new ~ in P1il'ope .. whicb :meant a G$rma..l'). conquest of the conti-
nent of Europe .. in return tor a Ja.:pansse trnew ord.er" 1n the East,which 
meant a. Japanese conquest of' tb. Far Ea$t, {Uld the qUlsion ot ocoidental 
powerfr<u uQ1'.tar' East Asia.1f 57 The alUance also resolved that if one 
party Wr8 attack«1 by a eOUttt.ry not alread;r participating in. the WU' .. ' that 
tbe otber two ~ o:f the pact would calle to the aid of the third., lU'ti-
cle .3 pointoo. a:traight at the United ~"tutes. It stated.: 
Japan, Ge~ and. I~ •• Ii l.iD1ertake to assist one another 
with all political, econatdc and military means When one ot the 
three Cont.ract.hlg PartJ.es is a. ttacked by a power at prOGent not 
1nvolved in the European 1tiar' or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict. 50 
Herbert Feis ha.s pointed out to Wi trQ"a'J;''1' bend and turn of the Road 
to Pearl ~bor. ' He Gaj"'S tbat in 19)7, the ~n PWerG had t..~ last 
chance to stop Japan short o£ a major 'War, but that this CMl'lce was lost 
'When tfthe only' coZ'..current action taken was to do nothing. 59 He thinks tl1at 
".!;ZI • 
,--" , - 22 , Heischauer, The"lL~ted states ~ J~::an, ':£lie fl~~~lforei.E. p~~ Libft1r:J" CwUidge .. 195'0, ei~ 171 Claude A. Buss in A.U.R. No ~ 19S1-J.9~, 168. 
57 Bemis, 864-865. 
58 'l'an3Ul, 626. 
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stringent action "Which might have bAd the effect of bringing abOl.1t e. Japan... 
ese atta.ck in 1940, lIl:len we ware in a greater state of um-eadin&ss, than in 
1941, and woo Japan vou.ld haw had III bet-tar chance to 4Gfeat u. S9 He 
alSo tllin.ks that Grew and Docaa.n WQl"O too hope.fu.l about the l\ol'1Oye-Rooseval:t 
meeting. 60 We are told that oil was eru(ti.a.l to Japa.'l a. t this time and that 
the EIIlbargo on it was ill. real 'Wapon., in the hands of the l'ieste:'n Powers. W. 
art) not Wormed why Japan attemp'l:ted. $0 great a. conquest, nor what caused 
the doep divisions in the Japanese go~t. 61 
Japan had a secret oral u~standin8 with stalma.rt representative 
fran :Elel'lin, %'$~ fer M,1"ael.t the right to dacdde whether a. cause tar 
war eld.sted 1n w:rI' particu.lar case. There 1$ ev1donce that Japan signed the 
Tripartite Pa.ct to hinder the United States trarJ. entering 1.nto the war. Ad-
miral N(ll'lUX'a received ir14tnctions tram the Japatm:Je Fot'"aignOtflC8, Octc;oor 
8. 1941. eta ting that Japan had signed the 'l'riparti te Pact in order to pre.. 
serve "amicable l"ohtion8 nth Ameriea.." 62 
While President ~t was ma.k:i.ng plans for n stronger economic 
o:ffe:lSive aga.1nst Jap_. Ja....na..."l was tr;y.ing to e:f'.fect peace and __ ldlling to 
saor1f'1ce her position in .~ to attain peace. In l~~r, 1940, ~iatsuo­
ka asked Bishop James E. Vla.l$h, Suparior General of tho Catholic Fore1.:.,an His-
$9 Feis,.!~ ft~ to Pearl I1ar~, 107. 
66 lbid., 274. 
61 lbid. 
62 Tatl$ill, 62;>..626. 
;, 
t.df)Q SQe1~t:;t t:l£ li.~l, UW l·t~. ~ l~d ~ K. ~ t::l the 
~ Ql~dI# to bt;'";1..~ A ~$ t>;} ttho ~t ~D ~~ _~hiatb&t 
~ ·J4~·~ll:lQtm wtJUld bit Vlllf.nl to W1~W~!"'$l the ~, 18! ~ \btQr lIOU1d 
:."~ft ~l, ~.p1~ ~ poU.t~ ~1;WfUd ,~ hU' 1dJ.1tt47 
torc- f'II~  ~ml n·,l't.Q (l.:)(\ t1:t:e J4r)4i~e l~ 1£1#0 1iisbOO. 'tt,,. ~. 
pMC0. ~ ~'l ~ "'~ ~t,. ~~ a \110 ~ OQ:tf~ .. , placed 
thO plJln. ~tft tch/J' ~,~t and. ~~i llull., ~ ~lJ 19b1. At t..'e 
coool~n at t.~ YlJdt, t.~ B1ohop d !a C~>anian ver. tn14 U~i:t tn. 
tm\l.tt« V1~ ~ t&l*1 u.r~.l.~tt .. f,6) 
~ W~ att1bo,p ~~ ~nd r,,~ ~. 1m ~«lt«1 tt. Ja-
pl~~lHe ;;~apt'q~. ~lr. l~~ had held ~ o~~t.t«. 1d.tb 
}1r'. nm,~# Mr-. l~lton a~~. ~nt.t.~. It t~ ~'Qtlld U$~ J".ar~'1 
tlal. Qi>@ door to tl"at19 i1:t the .l~ &~~ ot·~~ COIU'l:trl.. 
thl .. ~:tt tbe ~ld,n 1~~ s;m~ ~ bit ~~, to ~ out· tll~ ~ 
~Je of n~~~1r::Jn ard .l"~ oft ld.11~ t~ .flrm ~:\~ _. I~ 
beCkt • 4r~ me 4 tf~t ~tl"fl64 
It 1$ J'a'i;A'1U1, Mt tJ~ Unit$! Stat. tI~t has been tJ~ ar-~~, Ja-
~ net. ~ Ull1~ SW~, ~ ~.w law) ~lo.tod tNa~. 
klllul &'1d 1nJlB'ndl.»l'\~'1tW. c:'aated I,I:NJ!It, ~w{·tr~l zn'O!J~f ~ 
~natGd, ~tQ.t4d .... t.1ana" pil0!'il up ~fUltt: •• 1Md. 
~teer::t $Jif. ~wn.a t, ... ~, et .~ • •• • It ie Ja,.. 
;)an, not W~ Ua1~ sta:t,,,., tibat .~:liI: il'l:1Qe tt~t .. I.1ld ~ of 
~l.'. 6;) 
6) ~\-J 6~. 
(:i4 Xbi4.. 
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Bemis is of the opinion. that the Secretary oJ: St.ate iu>.d made many 
att(Op-ts to come to a pe.'i\ceful agreement w1:tl1 Ja:::an :1:n rega.ro to tho sattl ... 
mont or the Far Eastern Q~ion. Ue st.':l'tos tr.at the l4hite House even hinted 
at a n s~t$ ~ion:roe Doctrine tor Europe, As1a and the ~ca.."l::Jorld. ,,00 
He goes on to explain: 
Ii\; general Ja.1')lUles ..... American diplomatic settlement OOcallle extrane~ 
difficult mlen .. tTl" signing tho Triple AJJ.iane., Japan stepped :from 
the baok;yard ot lweriean dipl(:)lIlacy to take a place in the trout 
yard. too. 61 
By this act, Japan put herself tnto the affairs ill the Atlantic, Wh~e with 
all its m:tght, the United S~1.tes ltu struggling to keep Jiri.ta1n from being 
subme'r'~ed, and at the sa:m.e time endeavoring to unite the iUtU'llrica.s into a 
solid block against the AX1s.68 
In How £ q~, we read that Nomura. requested a meeting between 
Fresident Roosevelt z~,nd Prince Konoye as a lllea.ns of bri:n.ging about pea.ce~ 
Roosevelt waUl at the In(';Q';1snt having a 11l0oting with ChUJ:'C-ldll at whichthCl !a-
by sending a. message stating tha.t certain principles should be ;.ere&d upon 
oofore a. meeting could be arra:nged. He said that the i'oll,')Wing four poin.ts 
should DO adhered to by both rl;;1"t,1ons: 1) Territorial integrity for all na ... 
tions, 2) Non-inter£ert'Hlce in tbo affa,ire of other countries, 3) Equality 
. __ ._._-
66 New York Timeo, July 7, 1940, Sec"l, p. 1, cited by Bemis, A 
.D1plOlMtic ll!!torz!i! :tJl~, ~riitad Stut~., New York, 1950, 866. . -
67 Ibid. 
-
68 Ibid. 
-
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o£ com:n~ai opport;m1ty, 4) I'1a1ut.aioon.ce of the ata.tus quo in the Pacif'1c.6 
Six months prev10ua to the At.lantic Conference, the Amer1cm Ambu-
_or at Tokyo, telegraphed to the stat. Department sayillg that he hn.d re-
coiV$d information fran the Peruvian l&ister that in the eVel'l.t of trouble 
between the Unitod States and Japan, that Japan 1nte:ld.ed to make a ~e 
at.tack an Pearl Barbor, ua:1ng all the equipment that was a.vailable. Ne1thar 
t.ho Poruvi.'1n l1inister, nor our Di7iaion or Naval Intalllgen~e put any cre-
dence in this report.10 
vJhile Japanese a.m."bassadora were tr.{1ng to effect a peace, JapQll c0n-
tinued h..- activity in the Far tast.. By October~ 1940, ahe M.d. shown her 
power by settling it b~ldry' dispute b$tlf~ Tha:l.la.lXl md Indo-China. By a.-
~ several thousand square m.Ues ot terri tory to Tha11 a ad, Ja.pan weak ... 
ened Fre:lCh inn'ilene. in south-.stern Asia" a."1.d made Japral.$ position at ~ ... 
kale stronger. Tokyo M.."'tt sought a ten 1feU' neutrality pact with. R:wJsia, 
which lUl.S aigned on April 13, 1941. Sabu:tu X'!ll'tUJU, Japa.nese Alu'bassadol' to 
Gm:'l!la;n~", signed the document.. It 'WaS !lG who W48 taJk.tng: peace with the Uni ... 
ted states at the t_ of the Pearll!arbor attack. 71 
.Rwuia thoug'h't. that the British and Prencb Would be conquered be-
fore lUllY montb$ had elapsed. She then.tore foared that ~ vould attack 
-
288. 
69 Forrest Davis and Ehl_t I.i.ndley, ~ vlar .9!!!. 11eW" York, 1942, 
70 u.s. Dep't", Pearl Harbor, 7~1. 
72 
tl'.El Soviet G~e..YJ.t e."lt$roo into the ~aggressicn ~ct with Japan. A 
little over a mol'l.th later. G~ attacked thii Sov1et U!l1on, which usc de-
!onsivtl strategy and exsl"ted great effort to gain the help of thG United 
states. To show 1ts sincerity, it abollshed the Jlmleric.L"t ~t Party, 
and the Comrlr-mist Intenlaticnal, the Comintem, wh.ich latt.m"" organizatiozl 
;;;"\',3.1in consid.er(iJ(i to be the Holy o£ lloll.. of 'l;,oo vork:tng 010.38.72 
to S::l.t'..gapore and Bur.m.9., she became a threa.t to thG Dutch &.at Indies and the 
Philippines. The I-Ttiident a;nd the Secret..ar;y of state watched Japan's pro-
gram with Wl$S.SinC!l6S i and sought to stop ller adv.anee,. fi..rst by Wtl....""ninga, 
then by L"'Ctensiw lM.-w to ChUla. 73 Ub.en -1;.0 appease Japan, the Bu-~ Road 
waD closed i:rJ oxuer of a~t Brit&1n, the Un1t4d S~tes utterod a dissent... 
ing note. 74 During t!".i.i} next few months, American oU, sero.p iron, gasoline 
and in the end, petroleum were placed: under ~o, not against Japan alone, 
but aga1.n.st all countrios. We were res~ 'tJ"lem tor our O\m noeds. Br 
72 Wnljru:l C. BUl.11t, I!!! £:!._~ CUo~ I'tae¥, Nev York, 1946, 104. 
7.3 Bemis.. 867 t quoting Fubllc PaP!!.... and f<l.<idresses S!! J.i).oa.nkli~ 
Delano Hoosevelt, 19LO, >95, says. "March 7,1'940, theErport: filiPort 
Blmk authorized. a loan of $20,OOO,rx)Q to be repa.id Ui tin; on Se1?tem-
her 25, 1940 .. s. loan ot ~:25,ooo.ooo guaranteed by the Bank of China; 
and. in addition a $.30,000,000 purchase of ttmgsten by the !-1etal Reserve 
Corporation, a subs1d1ta.r.1 of the United states Reconstruction F':1.nance 
Corporation. 11 :i'-Yl"t,her loon of $60,000,000 was MnOUIlCIfid U'ovember 30, 
1940, in connect1on w1:th a plan o£ the 11etal Reserve Com~>any to pur-
chase a stock ai' lIoiliamite, antimony. and tin from the national .Re-
sources <kDmi$sion of Cb1na. n 
74 Ibid. t 867. See at..1.toment made by Secretary U ... tl1 to the Pross, 
July 16, 1940. DoOUl'llOnts on American Foreign Relations, III (1940-1941), 269 
73 
JulY, 19h1, <ill j!llel~icail credits in the United StatG'5 'Wer£ frozen, and . .t .... -ner-
,",can credits l:n like lrw,.'uler" in Jap .. -ul .. On Ju.ly 24, 19l~1, PN}s1da..'1t Roosevolt 
Pac:i.£ic l.'*egion, Il des~)it..e thG "bitt\\~l" CI''itic:i.snl t:l2.t n.,;,d. been leveled agail1:irt 
-r,he adr~st:z.'o.ti0l1.75 The ne::.di tlonth, August" 1941, an .'\n'tW1e.am lend...J. . e 
to mOV$ by' way of li:augooo" a.l'lU along thQ b'u:i:"ma. road. Soon aJ:ter thiu, Ja-
IAa,nese pll(.:1~S attGmptoo. to :.lQjstl"oy t.he Du:.."'ma. licad bJ bom.btng it .• 76 
Churchlll, Priu}t) ,~,:a~1ist~r of E'l1guun, SOlyo t!'!.:l t thll a.t taclz "rJIJ 
Jal?c;n Shollld lu;nre been e:;.::r~ted .. T7 Ther~ were man..,.v r~so,."1S 'Why J&~~ll ~"'n'l.1d 
Sto:tes shcald b. att.aCkfKi by Jap&ll1,t Great Britain would iliU;~ta1y come to 
7(> 
our aid.') Germa.V did not want the United Stfd"Q$ to enter the "Wur. She 
75 J03rlph C. G:rew, PGa.ce and ~Ja, Govtt Pr..i..rr!;;ing Offico, >Is.shi.ng-
ton D.C., 1943, Document 220, ()99 ... 70,3. 
76 Bemis, 867. 
74 
;, 
bUt not rJ...11.y of the AmeriOt\n posHSsions. HO'~, Japan thought it too 
g:rc.:1t a risk to attack the FI3r l!;ast, until she had cripploo. the Junerican 
Y.J.eet in l:'e.u-l lIarbor.79 In April. 1941, Natouoka received a message trOl11 
Churchill, in which the latter told bi."l'. that In;pa!l would hlCur s..nous da.n-
gel' by enteri3:lg the 1rIal". 80 Church1ll "WaS happy" however" ..men Japan final ... 
Jy attacked Pearl I-Iarbar, not beeatUte of th!3 ~0 do~ there, bat tor the 
the Al.l1es. The fate of the thr_ membens of the AXis wua sealed by that 
attack. Britain and the Un1t0d $t..g,tu tf.igErt.lwr oould oonquer the world. 81 
Through dipl<nac:y, Clm:rchill held the trier.d8h1p and gcod will ot .. 1merica.. 
He 1m_ he wns depe."1deI'lt on h(;;1):' !o:r both men and 11l'Ulti.:tion.a. 82 
Tnnsill elahns thttt the So,riot Union W"..:.s responsible fox' both tho 
wnr in !1.:trOPCl~ and :.tn the Far East,. 8) H. th..'Ll1ks tllatStalin instigated war 
so th<1l:(; be would be able to ap~c1.d Oa-II11lu ... l'lian more easily .1r;d rapidl:Y. 81&, Ja ... 
po,n W&8 a ba.rrier to Ccmmuniarn. in Asia. 1"11$ United. Statas should not waw 
---.. . 
79 Ib:i.d., 181. 
80 lb~, 189 ... 190. 
eJ. ~, 601. 
82 :ip¥. 
83 'l'ansill, 456. 
84 Ibid., 458. 
15 
11.0 U~lO 0.1so ros~;onsible for ini"J..u.eac:Llfj; Chamberlain to oppose Hit101'' i..'1 Po-
J,nn.d" tIloreby brirlGine about If'll'' in ~)jrOf.i..)e. as Hitler" if llot in:tiU".t'ered. 
ed t,:.:e Ukruil!c u-l1d lfOuld h::l;'\7C p::'ofOl"re.:l to fight. uith l:mssi!l over it, tl~ 
;d.th 2.:bGlalld and l'ra.llco.86 7anaill <iUDO blanco ~:I00drow 'di1son for int~ 
h:Lve been e:r'01;~ted in :~p$" and 'the :m1st').kes of Vemaillos 'Would Invc been 
. 87 avoided. 
have had a complet,e vlatol"Y ill liUrolle, and it might ~lnvo been a very stern 
n/~ !:J.:lstcr tow.:.trd the conquel'ed.. G~, 
be secure in :luau a sl.tuation?It~~ould it have been mer$ sooure tha..'1 it is 
~vod.a;1'"? 89 1'at.lS1ll blamGS the Cllinesa for :resistd,ng Jup:.n in l-::a.stcrn ... -\Sia, 
a.nd the United St.ttt,GS for hel;p:i.:ng China.. flis re."Uion is til,d:; Jc.p',U'). i~.;: lit 
85 ~." ;J09. 
En Ibid. 
-en Julius 1-,1. PraM" Uniwrsity of' lltff'alo, rev:Letts Tnnsill's Back 
~ ~ ~'klr. !.,li • .!!.j mIl, October, 1952, 15O-lSa. -
Ibid. 
-
;, 
bUltml"k ag<:d.turt Camm.tn1mlt. In 19141, it WD not appanmt that Conummism would 
gain contro~, 1£ the Japanese did."l ft. It ~ be that Jal'J&n was expI'$ssing 
a,l..a.I'm over Canmunim11 as an eXCiuse for pursuirlg her ~$ssiotlS in China. 
There is no. rGal proof that Ja.pan W'O'Illd have beG aa'butied nth ~hing 
less than the 1fhol.e of China, and a. China ct:lnpletely subject to her. 90 
Pratt agrees with Tansill ,that the Pacific _s the nback door" to 
the European. war, but he t4ll not agree that Roosevelt del.1berate:ly Bot.1ght, 
war. He bel1e"1mll that our tenacious u.1stance on the tJlad1iiional ~can 
policy, in v1ew of the tact that Japan .. detendned to c~uor and control 
Cbil'la pr~ a. situation, wbich could not be ove.rcome Ave by W&1... When 
war appeared il\ev1table, Ithow ... should lfWJl~ them rIne Jap~ into the 
pos1t:i.cm of £1r1.ng the tim ahet withcmt illo'Wirlg too much d.amago to ours 
selves" 1Ifa.8 a nonaal and :natural. Qultst1on.91 
In 4 lette:r to important and ~ .r.,P8l'leSO, written at the 
American ~ in 'l'okyo, s.~ 1, 1941, ~:r Grew spealcs of the 
China aflair. he sa,. thaii about twO' weeks af'tt!Ir _I" had begun, in July, 
1937, ~ Kd.-shek sent a me.Gageto Japan, otferl.ngto withdraw all Chi-
non troops it Japan would do l1km..e, and declU'e an armistice until peace 
could be negotlat«t. The: JIl$ssAg& was sent through the British lhbassy and 
delivered to l'fr. Hor1nouchi, Vice Foreign Hinister. But nothing Cmile of it. 
It appe.a.ra that the Japanese did. not ~ an armistice or pea"e. They had 
90 Ibid. 
-
91 Ibid. 
-
77 
bean .f1gl:l't1ng .for four years, atld Chiang Kal ... shek WQ.8 still th~ legitimate 
%"Iller of the Chinese. He W(':.l.$ still t1ght;1.,ng ~ave1y for his CO"W'lt,ry. 'YJ'ang 
Cll:iJlg-wei htitd. to be protected b.r Japan"_ soldiers in order t'O pr$serve his 
lif e. How could he be CC1.'lS1dered u tJ1& real ru.1.er o:t Ch1na l' ne WaS simply 
a. puppet. Japan'. difficulties with Cllina could. bave be$ll S!:llOOthed cut by 
t')OO.cd'ul 1'!1C!Nm8. 92 
'" 
In T_~,~a .. Ambasaador Qrw 'bells of h1$ a.ttcpt.s to inf'om 
the state ~nt of Japant • att1t'!lf3,$ toward the United States •• ~ 
cable aft.- cable to Seoretar.v of state, Hull, onJ.y to disc~ YOfiltrs lat .. 
that Hull bad 1'leVII1" read the MSsagH. Our S1K:tt. ~t is Bhown to be 
inept by the picture here dx'alm. The Japan ... had hop«l to avoid a. conflict 
with J..merica. Grft fOl"8atr two great traged1udUl'1ng his illetime, tbe spread 
of' ~ over Europe, and the ff~ise at't4ck" on P~1 Harbor. Had 
our diplcr.m.ts bf)en more exper.Lenced and eonc1ent1ous, Pearl Harbor might 
have been avoided. 93 
X>lr. F'ai&, 1n The Road 't!:9 Kearl I.1uroor, sbow l~ the United states 
was being goaded into wu. When J<lpanese lft.u"sbipa and troop transports be-
gan to move south in December, 1941. a.~l r~ll advised ~s1dant 
P.ooatWelt to set up a geographioallkdt beyond Which Japan. could not tree-
92 Jooe:ph C. Grewt ~~ tl'an 10&:;0: ! f~!ie 12 ~ Am.~x:1ea."l 
People, 11&w York, 1942, xvii... . :.1.. - -
93 Josepb C. (h<oew, Turbulent !m. N~ York. 1952, II, 1273. 
18 
pass, and to tell Japan t.hat we wmU.d. fight :it she overstepA:d these l1mits. 
ThiS line might have become the Ooundry between ftl" and peace, had the attack 
on Pearl lfa:rbor not occurr$d. Dec_bel', 19LJ., was 'too l.:Ate a dat() to draw 
such lines. We wonder :U' the line had been drawn. ten or even four YMl"8 
earli .. , ~ we could ba.ve made the Japanese uud. ... sta."ld that tt&q could 
gail1 their end. without war, and thus by 0'I.Ir stftightt~ declaration 
have al~ tile eo'UrSfll of h:1st<.'>l7.94 From ~ ~ ~ ~~.! ~t we 
learn how futile it is to at.t.empt. to C~8. nth aggresaton.. . FAl.ch con-
ceesion Dds by the Alliee at:S.ned the Japan •• to bolder advances. Cordell 
Hull tr.mOO. down. pxooposala to deal f~ with the Japanese,· 'because he did 
not receive public support ~ lacked adequate tdlita17 power.. IJLr. his lets 
the facts sp.uc tor ~lves, 1n order to prove that *'far from goading Ja-
pan ute war, we gave tho JaI.l3.l1eSe twioe a8 !ll'U4h rope as thcr.r needed to .harJg 
then.el'VU.,ft The Hull nate, that k:Uled \he pe.aoe, did n~ kill it, 
for the .nc.rte was too late to have had ~ effect. u~ Japanese com\rl.n.ed 
.fleet, had alx'ead.y lett ItLtckappu Bay daye before the 1htll note reached Tolqo, 
with _.led ~ to attack Pearlliarbor.R 9$ 
In !!!:! ±! p~l. we &1"8 Wormed that .A.drd.ral St.ui.( and hts ass&-
ciat.ea did not wish to ent .. the War. Neither did the Japa.."teee 111.val offi-
cers. Althollgh tho Japal:11iNJo leaders are l"$~C1ted au rea1s't.1ng war, the 
.. 94 Jerome B. Cohen, U sat. Rev • .Y:!. )).1), Oct. 21, 1950, rev1 
Herbert FeUst !!!! ~oad !2. :t:ear;t 1~;Friii.Ceton, 19$0. 
95 Ibid. 
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reason why' they final.ly l1ttaeked u.s is left, unstated... Nor does the book make 
clemI' why Adtn:1:ral Yama.tloto opposed the Tripartite Pact, and the 1mI" wi:th the 
United Stntea.96 
B:1 N~, 194:1.. the Japrmese Govel"nment bad come to the ~i ... · 
::;ion to make one more offer to the Un1ted StatAs, and if an agreGllent could 
not he reached, to use force to get . what thq d~ Thq pl.anned Ii!. su:r~ 
prisf. attack ~ extensive t~toryJ and the atta.ek vas to' be made ",a soon 
as the foX'Ce8 could. be gotten r_dy. It America refused the JapaneH d.enand.8 
Japan would attaok us at ;allpo1nts s:imultaneously.97 
11001"0 QODSidere<i ~ the beet repree.ent.;1tive thatJai~ bad ha.d. 
in tliashing'ton in the past quart.er of a century., It was tkmwra who :wanted 
Kuru~u to usia;;' him to a.ttain a peacef:'.u settllrl'Amt o£ a.fi'airs with the 
United States,.98 Kl.lJ"W'm~.ad been an Ame...""ican consul. and Uomure. knew him 
to 1>0 a d1p~C4l1at1st. and s. negoti.ate.r of ability. He did not regard him u 
a militarist... lktnura., 'While '~ign ~~ to JapG.ll. had sent I<'!lr'1lSU to 
Bel"'lln to 8ign the Mpart1te ~. 99 He beli0Vll:1 that KtU:"dSU had fi3.gxlfid 1. t 
without belier.r.lng it to be the best plan far hiD c~ry. H~.. he had 
act«i under orders tr(U the Japal1eso ~.lt. Since bie v1I1t to Berlin .. 
96 James A. Field, Jr., A.i! • .ll. 54, 1948 ... 1949, ~wer or 
T.~ !! !..e:a'l, !1!! ¥t~ !~:t!!. ~ Jak'~' tr,{ \lfalter Hillis .. !:lw York, 19 
97 Frederick 1'ioO%"$, ~ Ja£-!;n·. ~~e~, !lew York, 1942, 251. 
98 lb:l.d., 257 ... 264. 
-
99 Ibid. 
-
eo 
;, 
J[UrUSU • 8 '9'iew had altered ra.d1.caJ J7. Belide8, he came 1d.th det1.n1te ~ 
trrJl1l b1a gO'lfenaent, (l1t;terent tban the instl'UOtiont, vh1ch .t0l'Jl8l' Jap.~e 
ott1ciala bore. 100 
Moore _. ~. tbe mi.ataken idea that the Japanaee would not dare 
to make liar, and. the Un1tad States CloY«n'IIlent felt that Japan would. not be 
'0 bold Q to attack us. The Br1t~ l1kewiae, 'WfIl"e of the __ m1tvi, even 
101 thouih Japan bad g1ven. repated ~,. 
Japan was 1'8at.iy fO'r war. Jtu:rt.l$U presented his governmmt" tinaJ. 
~ on ~ .. 20, 1941. In wbatanee 1t stated. 
The Japanese Gov'erlllent etf...t to remove it. anaer1 fo%*c8$ tr. 
SoIlthern Indo-Cb.tna, tnms.t~ them. to the NC'lJ'th of that French 
poeeesa1on, t.hereby 1'el1e"l1J.t'1g 'l'hD.:1l.aDd and the lJu.tch ilast I.rstU.es of 
threat. In return. the Japanese asked .. in effect, that the American 
G«..,.ent prompt,l7 ~ the cordon, r ... e trade ftlat1.cne with Ja.-
pan «nd auppl:r: her ~1al.ly with oil. Tb:1s impl1ed that the Ja.pan. 
eM Gov'~ WCIUld not ..... to the w1thdrawal of troops trOlll liQl"tb. 
ern ~ or from ~. in Ohlrla, as the American Clorerment 
ba:l been uld,nc in retum tr:1t' ~1nc the Cordon. 102 
The Ja:panese propou.ls, if accepted, would leave China a helpl.ea$ 
v.lc:rt1m o£ Japan. art. Amer1o& could not. accept such daman.ds. It would be a 
be~ of urree Cblna" and a d.e8C"'tion of General Clwu.\tld ... '. ~ 
mente B:r ceu1ng to help Cl:d.ang Xai-.$hek, lie WO\lld peftdt Japan to defeat 
bim.10J 
100 Ibid. 
-
101 Ibid.. 
102 Ibid.. 
-
103 Ibid. 
-
61 
That the state ~ r.gard«l KUl"'U$Uta proposals with gravity 
oan be gathered fram the actions of Mr. Hull, and Pr&sident Roosevelt tol-
lowing the pr~senta,tiQn of the Ja~ dan.ands. Hull immediately called 
a. eonfs-$nOe of :t"eJ.lrMentati TN of the Bri tah, Austra.lian, Dutch and Chi-
1"~ Iloverments Wich met No~ 22, 19hJ.. During the $tWOe«11ng few 
de:ys, the ~entati,"s alao cont.-:r«l with the PrelJicla:t..104 
By Novemb.- 26, the S'tstte l'lepartment delivered a tormall'$jeet1on 
to the Japanese ~ .. in the tom of CQIL'lter-propOfJw. One of the ar-
ticles stnted that uThe ~nt of Japan w.Ul withdraw all mU1tar,r, n&-
val, air and polioeforees from Cbtne. and ~ Ir.clo-ChirJa •• 105 :professor 
T4IUl1ll says that Franklin D. Hoosevelt "gave h18 ult1xaa.tum t.o J~I N('Jt'-
_bet 26, 1941, with a canplete understanding of ir116 fact that it was a 
battle cry. ft He is 1i.1<fIW'1se critical of ~e&n e.ttort. to h1nde:r J~pa.nese 
aggression,. espeoia.lly tor the l"es.son that Jape.n was oPposing R'u#lB1a. lO6 
Moore sa,.. tMtWinst.on ClmrclUU did not bel1Em!1 tmt Japan would. 
I1ttGok :in 1941., ainee she had not done so the previous year, WIliIn she would 
ha.vo had a bet tcr c~ at success. I4kewise, the Am«1 Forces W'O'Illd have 
been on the ill out alel't at Pearl Haztbor I it they believed an attack tl'l.er& 
to be 11Im1nmt. JJ:::.7 
104 Ibid.. 
-
105 Ibid. 
-
106 Fred Ha:rv'ey ~QR, "ttid-Century }A'~u, ,a.!!.!., rio. %, 
n7.1 quot1ltg Charles Oallan ·T.auW. 
101 ~1oore, 257-264. 
82 
At Clltt1tenl'W.ll1, !1aryland .. on the morning of December 4, the Hav.v 
radio receiving st.::ltion caught a Japamse brOQdcast trom JAP in Tokyo, in 
winch there was .inserted a false watne!" report, steaR wind rain. N United 
statu communications officers were a.ble to interpret thia m~ge as Ifim-
minence of WI;\%". It This :1.ntomation alerted American .I'I..r.l'I&ed Forces radio sta-
tions to watch tor the "east w:i.nQ r&in" message. As soon as they received. 
it, the message was decoded. and handed. to Canmander Sdford, who forwarded it 
wi thout delay, to Rear Admiral Noyes J who telephoned it to the President' IS 
mv::a.l aid. lOB Satf'~ Ll'ld Lieut_~lnt Cc.mmnnder Kramer, tried for tllX'ee days 
to arouse Adm13:'al St:~ to the realization that u... . theJD.paneae were lito-
:ing to start 'Wal" on Satu:m.ay" December 6, or SUl'ld.cty, December 7, 1941.109 
On Deember 2 .. 'l'0kJt> ordered the Japanese to deFJtroy all copies of 
c<Xies" san one copy of two apeci.f1ed codes, and all fUes and secret docu-
mants at the Washington &basey. On the same ~ an important meeting was 
held at the White House, at which only Roosevelt, Stimson, K.'1OX and 'Welles 
were present.110 The President discussed each phase or the Ja.panese situ.r.t-
tion. Welles had already' eked the Japanese for w:hat purpose they had stmt 
their forces into Indo-China, and had insisted upon a quick answw. The r"'res-
108 George liorgen:srtern, P~l Harbor, The Sto!7 of the SeeretWar. 
new York, 1947. 206. . ... - -- - -
109 !b1d. Tbe t(tetimony 01 Captain Safford is given in detail. 
-
8) 
war Council" bad met on NOV«Ilber 28, the President prea1d1ng.lll When 
m.eeting adjourned, it was thought that the President would send a. wa:m-
to Japln. But the Presidri delayed send1ng the message until DecBmber $, 
t which time the Japanese Armed Forces were ah'eady' on their way to a.ttack 
.112 Hull adv1sed tbe delay. Fe1s has found no corrr1neing record, g1v:Lng 
aBons 'IIh7 the ~ delayed. Bull had been read.:1.ng and rereading the 
essag.to Congrus, vh1ch bad been drafted at the Wiu' CouncU ~ing. He, 
too, dec1ded to va1t until some aot.1on by Japan would indicate that it Was 
time to notify Congress.l13 
Oount 01an1 of Italy wrote 1n his d1ar:Y. December 3, 19h1., that 
Boosevelt bad been successful in forcing the Japanese to attack the United 
llh 
Stat08, sinee he (Roosevelt) vas prohibited trom entering the war directly. 
On the ome day, General. Mil., with the consent of <hmera.1I'1arshall, sent 
. . ll5 
word to the Ame1"1can _~ at Tok;vo to destroy our code machine th .... 
Two daye later" Au.stralia. was preparing for war /I but teared a blockade in 
the near· tllture.ll6 Ml". stimson d1d not like the tact that the Chicago Tri .... 
bune (December I 1941) revealed a. lMcret plan of the high author1t1es at 
III Ibid. 
-
U2 Feis, 33$. 
11) Ib1d. 
-
wshington, ~ raise an army' of 10,000,000 men, $,000,000 of whc:Im were to be 
sent to Europe in 1943.117 
In the mea.ntilne a. mtm\ber of the AJ'm.ed Forces vall va:tnl.y trying to 
¢n his au.periore of grave dang..-. Blake Clal."k describes it thus: 
Private Jeeeph 1.. Lockard was listening in on one of t.he detector 
units w'h1cb the A:rm:;r had recently 1n.stalled ...... an instrument so mu-... 
vel0\1811' sena1ti 1ft that it pi •• up the whir ot an airplane motor 
more than a hundred mlles away. Oft1cUJ.l7, the detector was closed 
at seven A.M. but 1n order to 1nstNct another a.old1c who was learn-
1ng bow to operate the unit, Pri:vate Lockard kept the i.nstru:ment tuned 
in. ' . 
At exactly two .minutes past seven o'clock, Lockard. sensed that 
the detector had picked up something. His hea.l't beat fast as be in ... 
terpx'eted t.he sign;:'llt "Planes.- lots of them ... - a hundred nnd thir-
ty.two miles distant." The excited private """check$d the distance. 
He re-ehecked t!le azimuth. Then he called the Artlr(f Information Cen-
~. ' . 
"rlash ... - plan....- a hundred and thirty-two miles - approach-
ing from an unusual. direction. f.f u8 
Unperoei.ved by the UD1ted Statea m.illtary men., a Ja.paneae ta$k tore 
waa coming upon 11awaii. Over 't.he flagship Akagi flew the flag, whieh bad been 
displayed on the 'battlesh1p Y.r1ka., when the Japanese attacked Port.. Arthur 
119 in 190$. At. Tul!NSh1ma S~t •• "the pl.anu W8'l"e leaving the deck:a of 
the carr1ers. Their er.rOlM, each crew bad been told, _s to dest.ro.y the 
power oZ 'Mle United. State& to cheat Japan out. 0: its deserved place on the 
~h." 120 In tit well-plAnned and sld.l.ltu.l.ly' executed. attack, )00 Japanese 
117 :tb1d. 
ll8 Feis, )>. 
ll9 ~., 34l. 
120 U. S. Dep't., ~8!lrl !I¥~ Attacfc, xi. 
pltlnes i £rcn "six aircraft oarr.1.ers 'bombed the island of o.hu, atr1king the 
American Pacific Fleet at Pearl :H'arbor, liavaU.l21 BatON 9 o.clock 188 
planea wre either lost Q1:' so badly ~ that th~ could not be recondi-
tioned. lIlgbt ~ battleships. tnr .. light c~i and tour other 
vessela were destroyed. Our cawalt1el amounted to ,,435 men. Tho Japanese 
pilots ,returned to tbe1r CUTiers w1th _1) loss., 1 .. thaD ODe hubdr'ed 
in per.ODel, twnty-n:Lne pl..anee and 4ve midget su.~inea. 122 
Abcut an hour after the attack" Japanese ambassadors deli ~ed to 
the ~ t4 stat.) an anetrrel" to the recent Ame:r1can DOte, but it con-
tained no hint of Japan·. attack.123 It stated; that Japan was try1ng to 
bring peace to the world, and S"tabU,1\t7 to China and the 1al.Imds of the Pa-o 
c1.'t.S.c, Hull tt\Ld the that the vb()le thing .. a lie and a d.ception.· Th.,. 
did not ~, but lett the Wh1te House uneaoorted, enemie. of the United 
Sto.tes. l24 
That the b1ih naval oU1cr.l.als tailed to ~t a ~ to Hono-o 
lulu .eeu unaccountable. On the Em!»'ling of Dee~ 6, the Japal'l$&$ Npq 
to the United. States note ot l'Iov~261 wa:J intereeptect. l 2$ The Pree1dent 
read the m~e to N~, then immediatelYe:c'Claimed; "This means VtU""'" 
But the Pretd.d.8nt did. not call a confel"«lCe of the .~ and Navr ottic1als; 
w U. S. Deptt., Pearl iIarbor, xi, 
122 Ibid., 65, 
l23 lb:14. 
124 Fe1a, 3bl. 
l2$ Tans1ll, 652_ 
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as would"'have been expected. S. seaned unperturbed by the nws. On Decem-
ber 7.. a.t 9.00 A.M... Lieutenant Canraander Kramer brouglrt. the laaJt part of 
the Japan$S8 orclers· to Icaura, to Admiral Stark. Its meaning was so clear 
that Stark cried out: ftItt Qoc.U This meanswarl I must get wonl to ltbnel 
at once." 126 However" he did not notify him) 1natead he tried to get Gen-
eral Ka.rshall.. who could. not be· raaehed :i.snediatel.)r beca.use he was ~ ho:f'$ 
back rit:1ina. B1e absence ~ted an alert from raloldng POU"l Harbor 1n 
time to save the American .fleet b'onl destruotion, and the lives of rJV'fJI! 
three thOURnd __ bent of the Navy and. Air" Corpa. 127 
General Mar.hall reached his office at 11.2$ that m.crn1ng. There 
was still. time to ~ HonolUlU b.r ~bl .. tel.ephone, by radio, or by m 
rad:S.9, but instead he sent the me~e BeA, and :f'.Uod to ma:rk it ftprlmi.t1" 
franaUl inq'llir •• 
tias the ~ under Presidential ordel'e to bl"eak m1l1ta'rT ~ 
tions ldth regnrd to ~ mil1tax7 infOl"tftation? 1lld. he t.b1nk 
tbat the President t , pol1t1c41 objectivea ou.tweighed cona1df4"at1orls 
of naticnal safetyl Wa. the preserve.t1on or the Brl.ttsh lIapl.re 
worth the blood, r..f.eQ.t a..."'ld tears not onl7 of the men who would die 
in the asOlV' of Pearl Harbor, b\rt. alsQ of the long roll of lw.roes, 
who periab.ed in the epio etl($uuntertJ in th.e Pacific, .. • •• 128 
President Rooseyel.t wa.s s1ttma in the CNal study of the Whi~ 
House" enjoying a quiet SundaY' attC'tlOOl.'lt when "Death stood 1n the doorwa;,. 
128 ~ 
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... 
Tbe Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. Anlsrica ha.d suddenly' been tlU"ttst into 
• " tl 129 
-v.J.l .... • • 
__ M __ - ___ _
129 Ibid. 
-
A concu.:rrent reso1utio.'1 cill:i.ng :tor an 1.nvutiga tiOXl of the Pearl 
Harbor disaster was sul:mittecl on Sept~ 6J 1945, by the Senate majority 
leader, .Alben r'i. Barkley. Section 2, o:t the resolution,. deserib0$ the pur-
j,'he oanmittee shall make e fUll ru:ld canpl.ete ~:igation of 
t.he tacta :relating to tOO events and o:irc'l.'llUtanees leading up to or 
followinl the attack made by the Japanese amed :torces upon Pearl 
Harbor 1n tbe TelTitOl7' of H.awa1i on D~ 7, 1941, ed shall re-
port to the SeI:w.te and the House of Rep:resentatiws not later than 
Ja.nuar.r 3" 1946, t.he result. of its investigation together with such 
l"(tcomme."l.datiorus as it may de_ advisal)le.. 1 
The spirit and int«1tions supposed to animate the 1nqui17 were 
described by Sana toi* Barkley 1n his address. He aaid tl:k'1t reports 
of previous investigations uare cor.l.fusing and ca:d'l1.ct1ng, wh~n com. 
pa;L"ed to one another, tild to some enent contain contndictions and 
i:neonsistencies within the'mselves. 1f He 1"$~ to the ttlddesprcad 
coni'uaion a:od suepieionkf tlU!.t ~$d "~ the American pt;I()ple 
and amo~ the manDers o£ Congress. II 2 
Senator Barkley said that the Congressional itlvestigr:t1cn 
15hould !":i.x responsil):U1t.y nupon an llldividual, or a group of indi-
'Vidualst.l or upon III system under which they operata<! or co-operated 
or £ailed to do either .. "and that it should d.eterm1n.e what correc-
tive action .,t tend to prevent a recurrence of tho disaster." ). 
-,-----
The inquiry, Barkley said, should be conducted without part1san-
ship or favorltiSlll toward any responsible o!'ficial, m1l:Ltary, :naval, 
or civ:tlian, high or low, living or d_d. • • • Congr ... itaeJ..t 
should make its own thorough. impartial, and fear-leu inquiry into 
the facts and c~es and conditions prevailing prier to and 
at the t:t.e of' tIw Pearl Harbor attack, nom.atter how far back it 
may be neceuary to go in ordc' to appraise the .:1tuation Wld.ch 
existed. prior to and at the time o£ tho Pearl Harbor attack. 4 
The resolution passed both Hou.ae. of C~ on September 11. By 
as8~ $1x out of trm placos on the camm.1ttM to Democra.ts, and .b;r appoin 
1ng Alben 1-1. lldkley, &mate majority lead", chairman. the ednt1n1stration 
demoutnted the partisan nat'l1l"O of the: project. P.res1dGl'lt Ha,1'l7 S. Tru.-
mnnts executive order thus daied minority ecm.dt1:.eGmen the powr to ~ 
inc the g~nt files·. But neither Senator ~, nor S~tor Drew... 
stex' were to be deterr$d by these at tempts to hinder justice !rom t..ald.ng 
it. course. When the cca;d;t;.tee tina~ made ita report on Jul3 20, 1946, 
three di~t opil-J.oos w.re $Ilbn;1tted.5 
Throughout the period dur:lng wldoh the 1nveatigat1ons were b;Jing 
made, ~U8 and persistent ef'forte lfet'$ made to silence minority man ... 
'bertl. U they wre honest in describing :?,resident Rooeevelt'. methods and 
moUvee, they would. be declared del'enders of HitlQ> and Taja. If the"J cri-
ticised All'lorlean of't1e1ala. they wuJd be ~pres«lt«i a.s bla.rning their 01lll 
cClun:b~J forsturt:tng the war. 6 
4 ~'JI c1t:ing 90PW"e8~1ona1; Recol~, p. 8lt'\O, sept. 6. 1945 
$ 1iorgGruStwn, x-
6 Ibid. 
-
.., 
In the weeks a.nd months following' Pearl Harbor, Presid.c\m't. Roose-
velt and the high au.thorities at Washington, attempted to ~ the 
cause of the catastX'ophe. The de.te:at at Hawaii was, at the ou:tset.. blamed 
on Japa.fl. The Japanese bad not otlly .tirGd the first shot, bu;t the;( bad k&pt 
on dropping b..7il'bs UlltU our battleships and aircra.tt. were d«nol1shed., and 
over two -chOWland men 0: our Armed Forces lay dead. When it .. found that. 
Japan _8 not wholly at tault, Roosevelt a."ld the high ~ POI.ate4 tha 
fingGlr of guUt at Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Socr~ Knox blamed 
them for not being watchM, for not 51gh'ting the .n~ 1n t1me.1 "!'he 
President, although he baA' call-eel no witnesses, found Kimmel a.nd Short guilt-
y, and diad saed them ~ their Commands.8 Roos.-velt then appo1nt.ed a COIl-
tnUs100 headed by Justice Roberts, to investigate the matt... The ccm1!d.asion 
£0\tXJd K1mmel and Bho;rt IUilt," of dol'ellcticn of duty. Tlw,y ~told that 
they would. be wbject to eou:rt martial at some future date. UndC" the cir-
cumatan.ces, bot.b men had. to keep .Ueac.. the t~t of un.juIt punishment 
hung 't:WfIJl thed.r beads for the next f'ou.:r ~. Sf 
The Roberts r~, which was given to Roosevelt em. Jam.tary 24, 
1942, made ma.ny errore in important matten. It 18 ve:r;r much to be ~ted 
that the Roberta Report was' made sc hw:".rte<il;y, and that it wu so 1ua.ceumte 
and incaaplete. The Roberts Camnission knew' about the 1ntercepi;«l messages 
1 J;bitl., 311. 
S Ibid. 
-
9 Ibid. 
-' 
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aM. the eraclmd code J but it did not inqu1re about. the ll1essa.ges J or find out 
1£ Kimmel. and Short had beon Wormed about tlleSf4 lO Gtmer41 &:rshltll, after 
a.<ivUling Short not to NSign. If took naps in secret to pt r1d of him.tr 11 
Admiral Stark hoped that Kitnmel would resign also. Feeling that th~ high-
er otf'1c1als want«! it, both men resigrud, but thq knew they- h;"d been 
treated unfairl;:r. Kimmel felt t.bathe 'Wa.s .singled out as t.h1J scapegoat tor 
the tragedy of P.u:-l Harbor., free1dent Rooeevelt, and b1s war cab:l.ntllt and 
councU concealed their own taiJ.ureto into1'l1l Kimmel and Short. Thus ~ 
Pearl Harbor commo.ndera were deprivec1 o.f thei4* posta. Dissraced in the 81SS 
of the public, who thought they Weft to b~ tor 'earl Harbor, they could 
do nothing in their own defense.. 'because the threat of court .. martial :b.ung 
over t.hc.12 Tn. President and the Wa.r Ca.binat advised. poa~t. ot a 
tr:1.al.. in ~r to prevent certa.1n m:1l1tary secreta £rom being known. 13 
F1na.l.q. in 19l.t4. there vas a strong demand for an inve&tigation 
of Pearl Harbor.. To l:'Tes1dMt, __ :Lng that Congress was deter.m1ned. te 
make a thorough ~tionj decided to haft the adm.i.nistration control the 
work. Secre1:.ar7 ~ a.nd Secret.al7 St~n arranged for a 1lavy Court, and 
an M:m:;r Board. Kimmel _$ daelared not gu.Uty. 1'11 .. report. ~ in po.rt.: 
H&sed UI>otl tho facts et!ftabllsbed, thecf'AU't 18 ·of the opinion that no of ... 
fE'..nses Mve been com.r.d.tted., nor se:dous blame 'inour.recl on the part of an::! 
-
~ 
10 ~~.I 47. 
11 Ib¥., 1.6. 
12 lb1d., t'k 13 opmi., • 
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person or perSons in the naval seniee. U 14 
Kimmel. testified that it Was more than two ,.ears: alter 'the Roberts 
Conmd.asion bad aiven its l'Gport before he (~) 'W'&$ al.lowed to l<J.'lGw what 
accusation the Camdssion had brought a.ga:i.nst him. The UaYy Court vas the 
onJ.y one in 'Which the rights of an American CiUsen 1le1"e grant.$d ldm.15 Al-
though E1mmel had :requested & report, of 1WJ trial, the Secretary of the Navy 
refused to grant his request. Six m.on.ths late'; on August 28, 1945. the 
.t1.n.d1ngs or the tlaval Court appeared 1n the ~s, and l1mmelleaft1ed tar the 
!1rst t.ime that he had 'been judge« ttnot guUty of any dereliction of duty « 
. 16 er~ of jud,pent.. tt 
. The report o£ the kI/fq' BeaN. was no mare pl.-sing to the .A.dm1ld.titra'; 
tion than thai; of the If#.v;y Court., 'fhe ArrIt:I ~II named ~ ot ~ 
Pres:1dentt. cabinet, and of the b!gh oaasand gullt)"., These were ~tal"Y' of 
State, ltull, Cbtef." of .St&tf" Barsball, and Chief of War Plana Gerow, in a,d... 
di tiM to G~ $lua1'..' President Trunlan and s.creta.ry Stimaontried to 
overrule the ~ 'board. Stirmlon said that the 'orit.io1sm of Hull was .. ~ 
called for'" and that that of ~hall was unfair, and t'unjustified." 17 
"Tl"UlIlan endeavored to court m.art1al the ~ people. • 
MTbe countl7,.... he Aid, "was not ready for preparednus • 
. " " . 
14 ~., )12. 
1, Ibid. 
-
16 Ibid. 
-
11 Ibid' _. 
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I think the country 1s as much to blame as a.n;r 1nd.ividual in th1a .final sit-
uation. that developed :1n Pearl Harbor .... 18 Adia:Ln.l Ki:og, C~er-1n-ch1et 
of the Fleet, and Secreta17 of the NaV'1' .. 'ot'l'eet.al, d1dn t t think it would 
look: just :right Wore the public to free I1mmel of all guilt, eo he said 
that the A4m1ra.l would not be allowed, in Mure, to oCcnlpT &nT pos1tian 1n 
the NaYy "'Wh1ch r~ the exerca. of ~ ju.dpent." 19 That their 
rul.1ng might not appear too preJu.diceO., they ga". the same order' to A4m1ra.l 
20 Stark as well. Judge Advocate Qener'4l Cramer IlI&de. e£tOll'te to ha:ve turther 
inVo$t1gation. and he ~'ted that the work be put into the han.ds of a "se-
lected· 1nd1v1dual.2l Colonel Clausen waa given the task. Two day's after 
his report was wtrdtted, ar~ brought up the verdict or unot guUty." 22 
The general question which tho Joint ~ttee took upon itself to 
Did all the c1'9'i1, m1l1tal7, and naftl auth.orities of the Un1ted 
states charged with l"espone1b1l1t7 tor the conduct of d!plcaatic 
negotiations with the· Japanese Ooverment and. tor preparec!nesa 
and det ... at Pearllhl"b4# eomp¢Ct:q, eff1cient17 and with pr0p-
er: rosaX'd tor the tl"WJt 1eposed in th«n .fultUl the duties of 
their reapeetive atticaa under the Constitution and lan o! the 
Untted Statea1 23 
18 ~., 3ll. 
19 Ibid.) )12. 
20 IbW.. 
2l Ibtd. 
-
22 Ibid. 
-
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'rhe subsidiar"J and st)eo1.£1e questions were: 
1. Did the h.igh e1vU, mil:itary, and naval autb.o%'ities 1n 
vlalllhington secure in advw...'1ce of 10 o'clock a.~ (& •. s. t.) Decem-
ber 1. 1941, ird'ol'tlation :res-;;>eeting J&pan.oae and 1nten-
tiona sufficient to oo.'1vince thm beyond all reaaonable doubt 
tr-.at war with Japan __ 8 imediatelJr ~? 
2. If SO~ did they gift to Goneral Walter C. Short and 
A~ Husband I.. Kimmel, the c~ at Pearl llarbor, clear 
and de£inite orders, immediately prior to the Japanese attack, 
~ing them to be fu11;Jr alert tel!' detenae ~ such an 
a.ttack'! ' 
). Was Hawaii a4equate~  for its defense ~ 
a Japanese attack 4"l accordance with 'the known eUC'UfIl$tancd? 
4. D1dthe commanders at Ptm.r1 Harbor take the aPPl'opriate 
measure. required by the orders iseu.ed to t.1U!1tl from. Waahington, 
by the duties of their respective offices, and by th$ infonta ... 
tion in their possession a.."1d the resourcee at their disposal, 
to me.i."rttat.q the security o£ the poaaes:sions of the United State. 
as tar as that %"$sporud.hili ty was invested i..'1 them? 2k 
t:lons gift!'" to the connd ttee.. Such at q:u.~tio.n would requ.1.re the study' or 
history ~ back t.:l.tty yean 01" I!I.O.re. However we can get some clues 
to the truth, by at~ our d_l.ings with Japan, and the negot.iations 
le.adil'lg up to December 7 J 1941. 2S 
After all thEa tost~ vas presmted, the Jo1nt Camd.tteo fOfl."ld 
tho r .ecord o£ Pe:.'1.l"l Harbor in.canplete. Fra.nkl1n D. RoosGVelt and Secret.u:y 
Knox were dead.. Hany Hop~ an intimate and official aJJsistant of the 
President died ahortl¥ after the 1nTenigat1on began. m health kept Sec-
X"crtary of State, Cordell Hull, and Secretary of \rId', Stimson frorn. giving 
2S Ibid. 
-
intornw.ti~ which would have been valuable~ 26 
Th. C~ss1ona.l Investigating Camdttee found the Roberts 
Report unsatisfactory. It was made hastily, and. vas pr~ to be inadequate 
and i..'1.complete. It d,id not inv68tiga to the int..aepted "witlda a.-agu" 
sent early in Deeem.beJr, 1941, prior to the a.ttack on Pearl He:rbor. Neither 
did it find out who accepted the .. sages and to whom they were sent. 27 
The fact that Wull1ngton failed to tran:mr1t the tltdnde messageslt 
to the canmandws at lla;wall bee .. an important piece of avldence during 
the Congressional. Investigation ot Pearl H~. It General Short and Ad-
mi:ral Ki:rrnel had not received the vital int.elligence tranamitted 'by'tile 
ftwinds mes6age", tbey could not have been elq)ected to act upon it. Hr. 
Justice Roberts test.ified that he would not hav. read it (the winds message) 
aV" if' it had been shown to him.. '.Uhe Iriwstigat1ng Camda810n sa.ys. 
rt should be noted, however, that Justice Robe%'ta bad su.tfi ... 
cient legal e~porience to knoW tM proper method of eollecti.~ 
and preeerri.ng evidence wh1\lh 1.."1. this case involved the highest 
interests o£ tbe Nation.. The .fa-cts were then .fresh in the :minds 
of key witnesses in WdhingtM. They oould not then halve been 
ignorant ot their whereabouts at 1mporta..'1.t ti.tnes or have forgot... 
ten the details of events a.nd operat1ons:,. No tUes would have 
been "lost" and no W<)l'r.lation would hav~ beM distorted by the 
passage of tim;e. 'Ihe laUuxe to observe t.hue obvious necessi-
ties is al.'11ost as tr~gic to the cause ot truth as the attack on 
Pearl. Harbor itseU was for the nation .• 
Theae difficulties were su:,")plemented lry even greater ones 
stemm.1ni trom. P..residential restraints Of the Conn1tte. and from 
the pa.rlisAn character of the Comnittee itself. 28 
26 Ibid., 497. 
-
2Y Ibid.. 
-
28 Ib1d. 
-
on August 28, 1945, curtailing their POWEll' to gaL'1- tun access to official 
documents .fran which they could learn the facts. It is true that the Pres-
ident reJ.axed the order of August 28.. by a nw one leao stringent J on Octo-
ber 23, 19h5~ but 1ndiv1dual menbers oJ: the Comldtt •• were not permitt.ed to 
search the records. The majorii:ly party mEll'1Oer& continued to hold control 
over papers, records and other intomation.29 Sane of the mjority nembers 
of tbe Committee tried to have the r.atr1ctions l'E.I11lCVOO, however, when by til 
tmjority vote ot the Comnl1ttee. the minori.ty muibers were forbidden accoeUJ 
to go~nt t:Ues and other ""~~ the ~ty inferred. tt>.at there was 
a d.elib .... ate attozn.pt being mtlde by the majority to r..id.e the truth. 30 
'l'hese rostr1ctiou were opposed to tho usual pr;;J.ct.ice as evidenced 
assisted in t.he inwotigo:t.ion of the Teapot Dome Se~l; being e. minority 
member o£ the eornmittoe. He test.ified that no one m~ ot tbe ccmrJ1ttee 
ho.d ever betm hind~d £rom searching the flles in 1A1'o.y' dermrtmEmt or govern-
ment. During the Coolidge admi.."li&tration, Attorney Genoral Daugherty Was 
a.sked to res~ because he roi\tsed '&0 give the f"llM fran his depurlme.'1t. J1 
President ~ lla.S weU v$rsed in'the rights o! oomm1ttee mem-
bers, ha"'T.lng been bead of the Truman Commit-tee {late- the Mead Comm1tt.>. 
During the tour years of its e::.d.stenoe, no memher of the eomm1ttee, whether 
29 ~'t 498. 
30 Ibie" 497. 
3l Ib1? 
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o! the I3&jor1ty or minoritY' was eve:" refused access to any Wol'tla.tion th...1.t 
a :member thought relevant or useful. At thE! time the Cartrdttee waa £omoo.. 
t.ho methods which had proved ver::r successful. in the ~1 Committee were 
b.:mned to the Senate inveat1g::diors or Pearl llarbor. 32 linen st:L'11Son declined 
to appear before the Com:1ittee, he offered the excuse ot ill-health. He did 
not answr the 116 questiona submitted b.Y Sertator Ferguson, on R,~ch6J 1946, 
but he did suhnit written a.nwers to 61 subnitted to him l-~ter IT,r the same 
.33 Senator. 
Secret<:ll'j!' Hull. teet1tied. before the C(l1llllittee three timeEt, neverthe_ 
less tho Republican meniben at' the Committee were not illO'b"Od to c1'oss-wram-
ine him. They had no ~ oJ: sectu'ing L~Ol"l!lation £1'011 him, When the questions 
sent to hiln remained un&nswared,34 
.Ambe. •• ador Grew' B diarJ had ~ given to persons who were prepar .. 
i..'1,g it i:ar canmereial publication. but it Vias d«ded examination by the .CoJn.,. 
mittee. Excerpts of the diaries tiere printed in the record, and the rest or 
the documents were withheld. American law denn,nds that t,he court have &Coes. 
to the wholG document, incatJes where a part ot the docUJll$1'!t is used by a per-
son in his own d~£ense • .35 H1ss Orace Tully, ~sident Rooawelt t 8 8ecret~ 
was allowed to suect the offioial letters of the la"to PNS.1dent., pertaining 
to Pearl Harbor.. The ConmittM and the eount~J had be satistied th.:lt her se-
....... ., 
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l4Ction was correct, but it was hardly a satis£a.ctor.r one tor those wt-..o were 
responsible for learning the tr'J.th and producing the evidence. 36 
The delays in bIlUd1ng up defenses, such as air fields and radar 
installations at Halfa.1i, '!Im.S an irlportant question bc.t'ore the Committee, but 
,they were not permitted to question Colonel Theodore Wym..'U1, Jr. 37 
Navy and War authorities' strongly advised a modus vivendi for tll:l."'e 
rJlonths beginning in November" 1941, in order to give our armed forces t1.'11e! 
to prepare for war. Secretary Stimson and Secrtrt.ttr"Jr Knox examined tho docu-
ment a.nd told Secrektry Hull that this procedure would be a 8&le one.)8 
Nwertheless, shortly after this, the modus vivendi was suddenly dropped 
:!'rom the 4genda, and til .... wa$ substituted the Hull message which was 
followed shortly by the attack on Peurl Harbor • .39 Genenl George Harshull 
testii'1ed that Ja~ :might have doc1ded not to attack 115, had we succooded 
in delaying ber attack tl.."lti1 !1oScov had defeated the Gel'ml'.m8 in Deeember, 
1941.40 
Because the Camm1ttee was unable to get all the facts reg~g 
the Pearl Harbor attack, it worked under a handicap; however, it SUCC$eded 
in collecting a vast amount of :lnformation in a short time, enough to point 
36 ~., 501. 
31 Ibid. 
-
38 ~., 501-502. 
39 ~., $02. 
40 Ibid. 
-
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out those who "were responsible tor the destruction of Pearl Harbor. A study 
of the material collected makes this clear. 41 
The following conclusions lter. drawn .from thG evidence whioh was 
collected by the ~tt .. : 
In the months 'before Pearl fkaobor attack. there was a grow1.ng ten.-
sion with Japan, and aft.er !~ovember 26, war seemed imminent. B;r November 7, 
19h1,· the t~_t of war had bocOl~ so strong that RoosC!lVelt and his cabinet 
felt that one or three courses Would have to be pursued: either .Amenca's 
leaders would maneuver the Japanese into firing the first shot, or the Pres-
ident could ordco an attack upon Ja!-'\~Ul. or he could ask Congress to decide 
between war and peace.42 But the Pru1dent of' tbe United Sih'ltes did none 
of these things. He waited for Japan to tire the first shot. 43 
The Washington high aut.horities, eapec:1.&lly' the War· Council. and 
the vlar Cabinet, had a very good chance to send identical and precise in-
stl'UCtions to the canmtmders at Ravall, 'btlt they did nothing. The WAr C0un-
cil lll.Drlbered 1'1 ve I'll_bars. nam.~.. the Secretaries of Btl.\. te, War and Navy, 
and the Chief. of stat! and of naval Operations, whUe the War C.billet was 
CompoBee1 of these same men, ioge:ther with the President, and lanetl.tltes the 
commanding general of the Air Force, Otmera.l Arnold.. l44 It .seems atrange 
41 "IfWI., 502. 
42 ~. 
43 Ibid. 
-
44 Ibid., $l3. 
-
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thn.t the nax.;u nWar Council and "lvar Ca.binet" were give to Roosevelt a.nd 
his colleagues during peace ti."Ile, it indicates that the leaders w ... think-
ing in terms of war rather than olpeaee. In thiD ca.se they should have 
notified those in cblrge of our defenses at Hawaii, ani given th_ orders 
to reconnoiter.4, The "War Cabinet" and the tt\'Jar COUl'lCUft discuased their 
policies togethf)J" so that all might have the necessary in£ol'r!l&tion to make 
proper decisions i..1'I. -.eh one'" own sph.... They met weekly' or more frequent 
ly, and it was the President'. work to coordinate the civil a.nd militar,y 
branChes.46 }f..a.ny intercepted messages were decoded by the A.rmy s1gtm1 C~ 
or l:r<J the Uavy Office of Communication4ll,. and sent directly to the 'It~il.r Co\m.. 
cU" and the flWar Ca.binet.1t47 
It waa the President'. du:t.y to see that his cabi.n&t and council 
transmitted important information to the COlll!:landers of Hawaii and elsewhere. 
The two groups, HWar Cabinet" and Will' Councllrl could, without difficulty or 
inconvenienoe, uve seut neCesBal"'J and. exact 1nItruction$ to the Hawaiian 
COlllluu¥lers concerning the danger of a sudden attack. NeTertholess this 148.S 
not done. These groups knew: that the Japanese were going to attaok very 
soon, especially after l~ovember 26 ~ 1941. They bad l_rned this through 
decoded secret messageD V'hich had been intercepted. 48 
-
. 
45 ~., 514. 
46 Ibid. 
-
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
-
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The high offioials in ~fashington, 1.nclud1n.g the President, expect-
ed a Japanese attack '*perhaps ne,tt Hondaytl that is 'the l'londay follO'Wing Nov-
ember 25.. 1941. The intercepted Japanese messages go.ve them this advance 
inf'o:rm.ation, and the !rk.r Cabinet knew that Novmoor29, was the time-limit 
fixed b:; Japan tor a ~lomatic agreement with the United Stattosl' One of 
the decoded messages read: nThe fate of our Empire hangs by the alender 
thread of a £e1l1 da.ysJ we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this 
die. It Japa..."'1 considerOCl. our diplom.a.tic note of Novemb~..r 26, 1941, a. "humil_ 
iating proposal" as revealed by an intercepted me.ssage.49 
On September 24, 19la. .. the Japanese consul at Hawidi received d ... 
tailed inatntotions fpom the Japanese OoV8nmt.ent in regard to the vay he 
was to roport, about United states T&88e18 in and around. Pearl Harbor. 50 The 
Japanese Government wanted to know where the craft were located, hOW'm:;my 
were in eacb place.. and wha. t kind of vessels. For more exact pla.cflIcumt .. 
51 
the harbor was divided into five areas, A, B, C, n, and E. On SeptEmiber 
29, 1941, the Japanese conaul in }lawaii, in .answer to the "bomb plot" mes-
sage, sent a system of s,ymbols which could be used to show the position of 
United States VEissels.52 Tbia dispatcb was decoded and translated in ~falb.. 
ington on October 10, 1941 .. _Several other messages were sent from Japan 
49 ~., 515. 
50 IbSd., 517. 
51 Ibid .. 
-
52 Ibid., S18. 
102 
roquesting the positicn, number and movements of ahips in Pearl Harbor. 
These nessagea were intercepted and decoded. All indic.utionn pointed to .an 
t') 
attack on Pe:.!l"l Harbor./ 
On November 1$, 1941, the Japanese corJSul in Honolulu was asked to 
give his Itahips in harbor report" about twice a week. During the fortnight 
fran November 15 to 29, four I!1t\Seages asking for the location of ships in 
Pea.rl Harbor were sent to the Japanese coruml, vho forwarded the inf'or.nation 
to'1'okyo on Uovember 18, telling the number of ships, where loca'l;,ed, desi£-
na.:M.ng the subareas of Pearl Harbor I and reporting the movements of destroy ... 
ers.54 These messages were inttlrcepWd, sent to Washington by the Cemuni ... 
cations depar-tment before Doeanber 6, 1941, and were decoded and translated 
there. 55 
Japan had never sought 1nt()l."Bl.ation about location of vessels in 
any other ~ tha.'"1 Pearl Harbor, a.lthough she had endeavored at different 
ti:mes to learn the position of the United States Fleet. The ttbomb plot" 
:rtl&s$age and the requests for inf'orma:tion about Pe:u-l Harbor indicated tl'.at 
Jupc~ was going to attack there.56 
Lieutenant Canmander Kr.am.er of the Navlal IntelJ.igtmee in '¥lashing-
ton sent to the President,' the Secretary of the Nav.:t, the Chief of Na.val 
Opera.tions, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval Communications" the Dir&etor 
5.3 Ibid. 
-
54 Ibid. 
-
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01 ~~u. ~t~,t.be DUteotor of w.~l" PlAna, end the ~tor of l~ 
xntell.:1geno. the ~l ~ ttbtnb plot" ~,tGd 1l_-ae.57 ~ men 
~tMd the .~ plot,» ~ tb~, ~ of it .. 4\ pL!W for an. aU' 
attack on :y;b1P8 1n ~l. HaJt~, fMy t1:tOUSht. it we aW'~ of t1me for the 
J~~~ to get all th1a ~1cul~ WOl'tb.t~n. U t~ h&d ~~ .~ 
~ about tho ~ •• act1v1~. t.be:f abould baft d:htc~ t.hat U Japm 
s:1mP __ wanted ~ kOflg 1a wuch _,it 1lil. ~ or .~ fltM". iQOh ~ 
woiWi not haft ~ nec...,..SS ~, th$ ~ to ~ ~ 
Tolqtt". .. Uwa~ sent back ~ 1ndloat1nc that tbe tt'bc:.llib plot" ~ d.wel--
op:1ng ~. and. 'tlOUld 'bo pat. Sate ~1«l t~ th .... >9 The ~ of tM 
kUOI4t4ge about. Ii~~ta 1tl the ~ lid th&'t the fllhips ~ 'be 
i:£; ~, 1# ~ .. &t~ by _~ or tv dDrGOt. l.'lft8:1on... f~ ..... 
~~. tbe ~~. of thU3 JapaM" ~,''i;I_ and. ~ tbfl 
l~f.i@ ~., Pt:k:ar1 I~ .~ baye becm. saved, .. at leaatJ lAS;g 
~. voul4 b&_ bien .... 61 
1dld:ral ~1 VilLa at th~ t~ ~'\~ of tb. tl.atr AM C~~ 
l4:tb ltt s.t_t,-. Oenwal ~J ~~ of t.r~ ft;~Y.f.l bu:., •. $ ~.~ble 
tQ'4" tile nMt wb1J.o "to, h:ia b&d", Th .. ~ m.,. WQ.attcn ~1~ danger 
to iJl$ tl$Ot .. ~aic and ~ mft ~ ttivoa. th$ ~ldcmt, h1s ¥u 
:n ,~1fl. 
~ ~,t 519. 
59 ~ • 
.. t1. .: 
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Cabinet a.."ld. nus ~¥'ar Cou..'lCU had received vital Wormo.tion:J the tfbonlb plot" 
messages, long before the P~.rl Harbor attack. These messages intercepted 
by' t.he ArsJr:r Signal Corp. and the Navy Office of N.'1V'<l1 Ccmmun1ca tiona concern 
the neet and. the protection of the lla'Val base at P.awall. Admiral K1mmel and 
General Stort did not have acoess to this Wormation. It was therefore the 
obligation or the :President and his colleagues to see that thes. men re-
ceived th.1$ vital in£ormation which directly concerned the neet and the na-
val baa.,62 The 'Washlngtona1,l.thorlties were guUty of neglecting an :1mpcrt... 
ant c1ut:r toward Kimmel and Short. 6) 
'£he "Pilot Dlt'Ssage" .from J_pan to her mabasGadors in \iashil'\gton an-
nounced the o~ of t,he Japanes. reply to the United St~!te8 note of Novem-
ber 26. It va.. to be in fourteen part. J the last of wh1ch was to be htmded 
to the s.cr~ or State on December 7, 191a..64 Long before December 1, a 
great mass of information bad been collected and deliwred to thetofaar.J.ngton 
aut.ho:rit:1es. They should have been abl. to judp the intentions ot the Ja-
panue from this intormation, and the commanclera at Hawaii should have been 
inf'cm.ed, oot the ~on high authorities d.1d not Worn th_, although 
the information was very neceaAJ'y' for the defense ot Pearl Harbor. 65 
62 Ibid. 
-
63 ll:aii.4. 
64 Ibid., 520. 
65 Ib1d.. 
-
10$ 
The!' men at Washington responsible for preparedness, received mes-
sagea showi.."lg 1:.110 United States waa fac1.ng great. da..'l;er. These men were the 
President I the Secretaries ot state, 'War and lJavy, 4nd the 0b1et of SWf 
and Chief at liaval Operations. The ''maaic .. " that a t11e reports from the 
~1s of Japanese code messages WI not SeDt to GemIral Short (:Jr to 
Admiral Kimlnel, and much general intoma:ti1on fr::r>l othezo sources was also 
withheld. 66 
If a I'm. of the history of Japan be made, it becomes evident 
that Japan haa on more than one oceasion used the strategy of su.rpriae. Tho 
Unit.ed. states should have 'l.»tm ready tor a sneak attack, because the high 
authontiu at li&4hi.ngtQn hid plenty of information concerning the 1~';'In'd.nene. 
at war. seeret~ Bull, at a meeting with these authorltie6 on tlovember 2$, 
and again on I~OTember 26, elq)rused the opinion that the Japa.nese would make 
a surprise attack, perhaps at several points at once. Ambas.dor Grew also 
felt that the Japanose would atti':l.ck suddenly a..."1d. without Warning.67 
President Roosevelt vas in ill probabUity ex:pectL"lg a..'l attack by 
Japtln_e :CONes. Therefore, he and h10 ·war Council were not warranted in 
keeping this knowledge trata the comr!ta.nders at llawall. A lllesage from Amba,s;.. 
adoI' \'lin.ant in London at 10,40 A.Ii. December 6, 1941 (Wa.shington t1m.e) in-
famed Booaevelt that two large Japanese forces were sa.1l.i.ng toward the Kn. 
PeninsulA. Still the President tO~'fk no steps to alert Hawaii. 66 
66 Ibid. 
-
67 ~., 521. 
68 
Athiral Kilmilel received a message on November 24, 1941, stating 
that the J.apanese might make Q. surprise attack in any direction including 
the Philippines or Guam. He was told to inform the senior 0.£'£1cer8, but 
that utmost secrecy was necessary" so as not to arouse the Japanese. The 
next message announced th4t negot1a.t1ons with Japan were ended, and to ex ... 
pect an aggressive move aga:ioot the Philippines, Thai or !ra, a"ld that the 
number of the Japanese forces was l.arge.69 The high authoI'it1ea in Washing-
too failed to estimate the danger in regard to Japanese plans, and to noti-
fy Hawaiian camnanders of perils they might meet. In this respect the high 
authorities were negl1,gent. They did not act promptly in ew,luIating Worm-
ation they bad received, nar did they send aI>propriate directions. 70 
Five months prior to thiS, in a memorandum dated May 26, 1941, 
A<biral Kimmel requeatedtb.at he be turn1shed with information, as soon as 
it would become avail...able, bearing on Japanese movements Which m.1aht affect 
the base at Ii:wa11.11 Ue said tha.t his was a d.i.fficult position. Located 
far from Washington, he is not Wormed as to ~ pollet •• ot govern-
ment. Hence, he cannot determine 'What course of action is best, and .~ 
times does not know what taree he will be pe:nnitted to use. The uncertdnty 
created by lack of necossal'"y Wo:t'l'!lAtion intorferes with the proper execu.... 
tion of naviiil operations.12 Adm1ral Stark and G«neral :HarsluU.l also sent a 
69 Ibid. 
-
70 Ibid .. 
-
71 Ibid., 90. 
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memorandum tb the President. in Wb.1cb they informed him. that Japan' s fieet 
was superior to that of the United Stat .. and that our Amed Forces would 
not be able to und.ertake an offensive without withdra:w1ng all naval vessels 
f':ran. the European theatre. Sea-ides this, a great quant1t7 01' merchant ton-. 
lk'lge would be required 1Ihich would have to be withdrawn from the Atlantic, 
leaving Britain without the necessary aid in her fight against Ciermany'. The 
Pearl Harbor cmma.nders thought that by the middle of December, 191a.., enough 
air and subnarine strength could be aceumuJ.ated to deter the Japanese a-
gainst a"l'r'-J action south or west of the Philippine8.73 
An at.tack on Pearl Harbor va.. a necessary part or Jm.pan3Se strat .... 
gic plazmina;, and. thertt is evidence that thtt President was considering that 
probability" Roosevelt bad stationed the neet at Pearl Harbor I to det.er 
the Japanese 1.'roa ma.ld.rlg an attack du.ring the diplonatic conferences I and 
to make a show of power ~ Which might make the Japanese yield to to the wish 
of the United Statu.14 AdJUru PJ.c~onj then Camnander in Chief of the 
Unit&d States Fleet .. advised against atatiol"ling the neet there, and was "1' 
moved. because of protest on that lsoue. lt 7$ Admiral WUli..-uu D. ~, fcmn 
Chie.f e£ Naval Open.tiona .. of the aame opinion as Adm1ral aicha:tderon, in 
th1a rega.rd.. The fleet would be effective only it 1t moved to strike Japan .. 
ese forces, which m1gb.t be too near .Alaerice.n, D!.ttch. or Brl:t1sh terr1toX7. 
13 Ibid. 
-
74 lbid.. 
-
15 Ib1d., 522. 
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United states n"t at their left, and to destroy it, 1£ possible, otherwise 
tlley could not hope to be successful in theirconquut of .. t At.d.a.16 
P.rime H1n1ster Churchill forSd that the United states Fleet would 
be attacked tor he reasoned that JaPl n would not attack the Malay Pen1nsu.la, 
Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies w:Lth the A.mer1~m n.et at its rear. 77 
Colonel otis Sadtler testified before the ItJ:JrtS' Pearl lJarbor BrJud 
that GI. Japanese message had. been caught b.Y the Un1ted State, senice men 
wbich t.cld that L"1 important muaqe was coming, which· would announce war 
with a certa1n countl7'. A talse we&thel'" report would give the menage. !he 
A:I:rt1y' Pearl Harbor board intercepted this second meeusag~ which gave the in-
format.ion Ueaat wind rain" Wb1ch meant that Je.pmi Would. go to war w1th the 
United Stat_, but that it would preserve peace witb Russia.76 This origin-
al message baa die&ppeared .fron the IiaV7 filos. It was taken £rom the .fUes 
and. sent with other papers to the Rebert. COIIdssion. Copiu of it were in 
79 
varioua places. ~ haft all disappeared. 
The Joint COl'lgr.sional CClltUm1ttee, alter conducting :tm;reet1gations 
for OV'f!f1t two ll1C.I'1ths, rendered. II Feport of the :majority party. The tollow1.ng 
~ler. the concluaicns with ~d to ruparudb1l1t:tes: 
1. The lhp1re of Japan attacked Pearl Harbor without being 1'1'\ .. ,.............-
76 ppA. 
77 ~. 
78 fiaA., 526. 
79 !bid. 
-
to perform tids act of a.ggression. The treacherousness ot the atta.ek is 
shown by the tact tho.t Japanese ambassadors were kept at 'II'!asbingtOl'l, con ... 
farring with the govomnent officials and pretending to seek peaca, while 
actuaJ.ly' their ndllta:ry tore" were alftady moving across the Pacific to 
80 
attack Pearl Uu-bor. 
2. Japan is responsible to'/!' the at tack on Pearl Harbor,. The Ja-
panna used astrikL'tlg terce of great power and executed their attaok f'r<a 
a great distanoe. They were much more poWertul. tMn our c~ers suspeo-
3. The foreign nlations of the United States ldth Japan were 
such that there was no just reason for than to attack us. Tho Secretal'1' 
ot Strate bad make known to the War 4..'I'ld Ua:r.r Departments the orlticu con ... 
ditions that 'N'er'e developing, and that diplomat1e relatiens had ceased.. 
it wa.$ therefore time tor the milit..u'y' to tcL~e centrol. 
4. No ev!cIenee was found 'to prove that the President and. his 
secretaries coerced or tl'icked Je.p;m into war,. 
5. The Prendal1t and the high uu.thorities at ~'1z:.8h1nston tri~ in 
evsry way possible, to avart w.r with Japan. 
6.. The ~ and Navy taUed to avert the disaster at Pearl liar-
bar, because they did not establish reeonaissance partios to watch the meve-
men't$ o.f the Japanese. If they had had a lorce reconnt.>1terl.ag, they would 
have discovered the hostUe torces a.pproaching and could bave fought them 
110 
off, and thu& 8&V"ed Pearl Harbor. 
7. That the J~,r..aru:t6e struck at Pearl lL:.rbor was a surprise to 
eV~Jono. Yet the Washington high authorities knew that there was danger 
of an attaelt by air. The Hawa:Uan ot£icers knew of the imminence of \:1'.3.%'. 
6. Tho Command.$rs a.t Pearl Barbo,%' tilled; 
a) To perform their duty; they had been warned of the imd-
nence of war) they had other WOl"'ml'ltiOIlJ the A'rm.J! a.."1d liavy should have 
coordinated the~ war dc.fens$ p).at>.a.81 
b) '1'0 alert their men, atter receiving _mingo .fran the 
\Jashington high authort t1. bet~ Novan.ber 21 and December 7, 1941. 
e) To exchange all war 1ntormat1on, and to plan their defence 
aircraft. 
e) To, •• that the Jl.rmy and tktV'J had their equi'pment ready. 
r) To use the forces and supplies under their control to 
repel the Japanese raiders. 
g) To properly interpret the message. sent to the. 
9. The mistaku made by' the e~ers at Hawaii were mistakes of 
j lldif4'&nt concerning tn.e information they possessed. 
10. The ~/ar Pla.ns Division of the ~Snr Department, £aUed. to in-
:tom the Hawaiian CotnMand, tha. t they bad not alerted their department out-
ficientl¥. 
---....,.e"""l-~. 
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Depa.rtment failed, 
a) To consider oarei'u.l.ly tM illteroepted messages £rt::lm Tol\:Y'o 
to Honolulu or Sept«nber 24, tiOVE¥llbw 1$, and NovGIlib.. 20, (the bcrnb plot 
plan) • The, rJ4waUtm COL1!namera should have been Wormed of these 111ter-
cept.ed. messages, as they directly c~ the Pearl Harbor base~ 
b) To be properly on the alert 'to take the "one o'clock mea ... 
sase." Ifth1s message had bean con"ectly interpreted, the oOl'l1l.l1iaJki would. 
mVG been able to alart all the outposts or the Pacific as General 11arsball 
tried. to do as .$Oon as he race V'0d the in.f'omat1ol1.82 
12, The Comt:'ittee is ot the opinion that the Arm::! t4"ld Navy Depart.-
ments dj"d not receive sutticient infonnat.ion to put than on the alert £Of' 
war. 
Bn.sed on the CCIlUldtteets investigation, the :following recamnenda ... 
tiona were presented to the Senate, 
l~ Unity o£ cOll'WUld should be e.;t;'lbl1ahed immediately at all 
United Stat. military &ltd naval otatiOl'l3. 
2. Arrq and :N~rv.t intellig~nce agencies should work ver:r clooely 
togethQl>~ Of.f1cers who haV6 an apti:tud.e tor this work should be caretullT 
chosen and kept 1.."1 the position for a long time in order that they may know 
~1r field thoroughly and become competent in 1nterprethlg Wo:t'm.a ticn re-
ceived. Those p.ppo1nted sbould be eleg1hle for promotions, just a.s tlllY' other 
82 Ibid. 
-
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person 1n tlu .. s~.. Etficient intolllge."lc:e service is :important in 
p*S.c .... t:UntD a8 well as in war. 
3. The COllmittee wished the activities of Theodore Wym;::"''l, Jr., 
distriot qineGr in the Hawaiian Depart.m&mt, invest.ip.t:ed.83 
SeQ.1.tora Ferguson and BrustG' of t110 minority would not accept 
the ~jor1t;y report, calling it "illogical and unsupported by the preponder 
ance of evi.det.lce." 64 They ga.ve a separa.te report. It st;;;.ted that the 
Pruiden:t of the United states .tailed to secure cooperation among the War 
Cabinet 111 deterr.d.ning what course to follow. The President should have 
insisted that clear and eract directions be sent to Kimmel and Short at 
Hawaii. The Constitution andaws of the United st.<ltes grant the preIJident 
power to en1'orce oooperation .• 65 The CcImuu'lder-in-chief of the a.rmed :torcea 
a: the United States appo1."ts the chief officers iL'ld tinal responsibility 
rests on him. There.tora K1Jmne1 and Short could not be bw!ed.. The Presi-
dent·a decision to .:litiait tM Japaneae attack made it a more urgent duty for 
him to Worm the lI,aw~ CQ'l1m&nd.ers, and order than to !'.1lly alert their 
fore .. for defense against a JapaWHle attack.86 President Roosevelt and 
the h1gh autbontie. tailed to do their dut,y. They neglected to inform 
Admiral Kimmel. and General Short of the im.m1nence of war ~ and tM7 faUed. 
to give them the inf'onnution obta::L"ed. by "l'lla.gic." A few men were attempt .. 
8) ~., 251-253. 
84 Horgenstern, 318. 
aSIbi~., 318 .. 325. 
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ing to pre~re for war by the cont'erence method. They were trying to do the 
work 1ih1oh should have been aasiSned to the leaders ot the am.ed forces. To 
neglect to make the proper preparations for WoU' Was the gl'FJa test failure ot 
the President and his War Cabinet. Sane powerful individun.ls ~ making 
decillions 1nd.ependently of the reat of the Cabinet, and even of Congreaa. 87 
PlrHident Truman t til claim that 'the eountl"7 a8 a whole was to blame 
as much as an:r single individual. cannot. be ac:cepted because the &"1lerican peo-
ple had not been informed of the imminence of war II or of the messages learned 
through th~ comm.un1catiou department. 88 
The minQ:rity coounitteo of the Congressional Investigatit'lg Committee 
believed that the tragedy at Pearl Harbor was clue to the failure of the h1gh 
o.tficialJl in our govarnm.ent. Using the rodence that had been coll~ed, 
they dr .. up twnty-one conclusions stating who was respon.1Jible tor the Pearl 
llu'bor tragEidy. Tbs twentieth conclusion stateas 
In the final irul'tanee of crucial 81gnificance for: alerting Ameri~ 
can outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6, and SW:Jday m0rn-
ing, December 7 J the President of the United Stat't'!8 failed to take 
that quick and irurtant executive action which was required by the 
occasion and 'btJ the responsibility tor watch£u.l.ness and guardianship 
rightly uaooi.at«l in Jaw and pra.ctice with his high ottice fran the 
establisbment o£ the Republic to our own t:1mes. 89 
It is the .fixed policy of the government of the United. St..'1tes to 
preserve our country and its pos •• ssions tram attack. This polley ill a. per-
lnanent one which has been reaffirmed by Congress many times" When war loaned 
87 Ibid. , 325 
99 U:,413. 
.. 
large in Europe t# Asia. The execut.ion of that fixed pelie,. is the dut l ot 
the President, r~ he 1s O<xn.mander""in-<:hi.ef of the armed forces. It is he 
vho is bound \0 decide what 1s beat tor the country. The reapanalbillty o£ 
n:uudJlg plans far its detenae rests with him. It is true, that he is ably 
assisted by competent advisers, bJrt. in tbe end, it is the Pr_ident who 
makes the !ina.l decision. 90 
Hav.t.ng made an analys1a of the respotl$ibility tor tbe war between 
the United States and Ja.pan, by sta.ting the opinion:a of the mere r.pu~1.ble 
hiGtorians on the subject, the aut.hQr of this thuis finda that writers do 
not agree. Sme put the responsibility tar the Pea.rl Harbor diaaetet' on 
president Roose"l'elt, a.nd his War Cabinet, WhUeothers bJane the vhr Lords 
. 
It 18 the .... 5.tet!e opinion, that both the United States and Ja::).:,\n 
boa a. share of the CUllt. The Japanese, 'b:Y" their open acts of ag!'P'flssion 
and irJuatice, performed :1n complete violation of treaties and :L."1tel"na.tion ... 
al agreements are responsible. Wa.shir-Gton officials ~qr their sh,u'c o.f t:!1e 
bJ.A.l1'le also. They foreaw th.'1t war i.11nS inevit,:,tble, yet they failed. to Mamo 
their responsibilities, when the country" 14$,$ in grave &..~etr. !t is true, 
tilAt they tried to delay the war by a thX'ee-.fo~d pressure, .first diplct'l.l2.tic 
then econOMic, and £irkilly by act1 vely aiding Brl ta:tn and China IT.1 sanding 
supplies, a.."1.d. mu.."lit1ons in ).,:trge quantities, and at the sane time, ~~inderlng 
Jap1;l.:1 by u total embargo on dsentio.1 w:::;r mterinls. In this wc.::; tM United 
90 Cl1arlcs A. w,%'d, Amcrj,can Fm;:e~ Pol' ~ in iJ.lil U1ld.ni, 19.32.-
lSUl, l~ew Haven, 1947, 567. 
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States hoped to delay the Jap:.tnese long enough to enable the country to p:re-
pare tor war. In the J.1.nal months, when Roosevelt and his War Cabinet knew 
of the hlrl.nence or war ~ they .failed to t~ke the steps aeeded tor the sat .. 
tyof our navy and ail'" force. The h.igh authorities .at Waa~ made dec1 .. 
SiOM which ehould have been made b.r oftiC«t's trained in n&v.aJ., air ,and mil-
it<.4Jr affairs. In the crucial hours, wbe.nlimagic lt L"lfQl"'ro.ed the War Cabinet 
0:£ the c~ty of attack, they failed to alert Admira.llthtnel and General 
Short~ the two lll~l who could have prevented disaster had tha;r received the 
infonnation, ~ the high authorities, to which they were ent1tlAJd. 
In future" we 1!l'tvst secure our country". satcat'tJ, 'b7 el.edtina men, 
w110 ldll accept the high :respcnsibilities entrua.td to than b't.r the people 
ot the Un! ted St.at.es I and who will be lllindtu.l of their dr.1ty and will sarve 
A!l1Gtica 'flith ~ion.able loyal.ty. 
h 
tV1J.liam E Dodd, Ju. &nd Marttha Dodd~ ed., Ambassador Dodd t IJI ~l\l' 
New Y(1.I;"k, 1941. r,~. Dodd was appointed ambassador to ~'"by lTest· 
Roosevelt in 19)). Char1_ A. Beard wrote a pre.face to this book in which he 
says. "As a dossier of evidence bearing on policies, methods, and labors, l-Ir. 
Dodd ha$ left th1s journal covering atta1rs !rom the beginning to the end of 
hi. RdS$ion. But it is mOl.'e than that. To use a mfltaphor, it cast. a flood 
of li&ht into the dark passages of the time now past in wh1eh Adolf' Hitler va 
solidifying and ~ hb dal1nion in~, from Ju4r, 1933, to the 
clon of 1931. • to • the training and apel"ience in historical study a.bd 
writing vh1ch Hr. Dodd brought to bear upon his j<mrn:J.l are cleo.rly rewaled. 
in it and d1st:ingu1sh it from whole libra.r1es of diplaBatic memoirs eompUed 
by professional gos.s1ps~ (P. xv-xvi ) 
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Joseph C. Grmr, Ten Years In Japan .. N'ew York, 19W4." i. a contemporary record 
drawn trom his dIiiies, ini:rprrft~ and of.f1cial papers, In writing this boek 
the author "sought to prcmote not only tIlt-. drive tor the uncond1tional sur-
r0nd.er of Ja.pan, but also the reconstruction of peace at the end of hostili-
ties. Toward the ultimate end, one of the purposes of the boQk, in the words 
ot Ainbassador Gr .. _s to tell the .Americans that ·there a.re man:.r Japanese 
today" who did not want val' J who realised the stupid! ty of at U\cldng the 
United Stat.N, Great Britain, .lUld the other United Nations, who did every-
thing in their power to restrain the miJ.ital"y extrem:1sta from their headl.ol1s 
and suicidal aggrusionaJ'. cited by Kenneth Colgrove, !.!!. !." LI, 1945-1946, 
316. JOSeph. C. Grew, Report from ~~~o. New York, 1942, was written !fto &s-
sist the war eft ort in the'11n!tEii sta . es by impressing the American people, 
with the tom.1dable chal."acter, the brutality .. and the fanatical determination 
of the Japanese mUi:tary machine. ff (P'o1"Ward x.) Joseph C. Grew, Turbalent 
Era"llIew York, 1952, tells same ot the reasOO$ why Pearl Harbor was attaCked. 
Heglect al'.l.d ~unconscientioume$$' of our state Department officials are shown 
by' the auth,~ to be partly responsible for the "surprise 1 .. t.t4Ck~tt Cordell 
Hull, ~ H._irs ~ Cordell Hull, 2 vol., New York, 1948, oonta.1n8 extensive 
quotations Nam mtiiO.fii2i at ~tions which Hull bad with ~senta.tives 
of 'otltv eeVel':l1m.eIlts. He gives the main pointe of the conversations ratber 
'-han t!~u elCaot wol"'de. Tile book is not desirable tor research, on this account 
but iteontaw interesting h1storJ.cal material. Arthur H. Vandenberg, .h-., 
~ ~l!!!. Pap ... ot ~eM.toJ" 'and~, Boston, 1952, is an absorbing book. 
It 18 a political biography, be!iii a ten-year narrative of Vandenbere; .. and a 
portio~~ of the American people or his time. In Januar,r, 19$0, he wrote to a 
constituentt"To me 'Bipartisan foreign policyt mea.ns a mutual effort, under 
our ind,1$pensible two-Party STSt., to u..."l1te our o.ff1cial voice at the water's 
edp, 40 that. America. spooks wiiih ma.x1mum authority against those who would . 
div1de &nd conquer us and the fre.e world. It d¢es 1\Ot involve the r_otest 
~er 0:£' free debate in dete~ our position. tf (p.552) His son and 
editor statesf "It was hiD dedication to b1part1&~noh1p that dadnated the 
last years of hU li:t'e, and brought into sharp locus a gerle.ral.l;r unrecognised 
spiritual side of his nature.· (P. xix) 
C POtICm 
Charles A. Beard, American Foreif! Poll! in the I~kirnb ~9!t1940 
New Haven, 1947, is a study in respwibUr e's. ; Chose-the thesis " . F 
the United states was to blame for World War II. He said that the country 
wanted the President and the State Departm.exit to. pursue a policy ot isolation 
during the yoars 1933 to 1940. The world would have remained at peaCe, if 
the high authorities at Washington had been permitted to pursue a. ditterent 
policy. The isolationists would not allow a. preparedness program, and so 
lnl.lSt ~ the blame for a.lloldng aggression in lhrope and Asia, which tinal.ly' 
rNulted in "the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Beard saYl that in order 
to test the truth concernina the people'. responsibility tor t~ poliCY'. 
W$ should det~ who innuenoed tbe people toward isolationism, peace and 
neutralit;y d1lll'1ng tbe rear. 1933 to 1940. Did .Roosevelt and Hull contim1-
ou.sJJr oppose the iaolation1sts<{ When and where and. in what speeches and 
radio broa.d.casts was this done? Bes.rd s;qa that Roose"Nl.t adhered to an 
isolation1at policy fr~ 1933 to 1937. In his quarant1.nespfKJCh in October, 
of that ~. he broke away frem uolatior.d-t a!Jd. in its phce put the id_ 
o! collective security. (p. 117, 1$6 and 184) Gharles A. Be;:J.rd, President 
Roosevelt and the ~ or the 1;lar" 1941: A Stu~ in !e2earancea iii{ Ii;;! 
it!&, WiW'1G:viii';l9lilr.""ThIs 'volume is a seqUel· to AiirIT l~~~uer 
hi ~a' ~-~940. It is based upon the documentat~on pro iii ' he 
Joint ~.. on {,he :ti!.ve:stigation 01 Pearl Harbor Attaok. "Th& ar;ument 
of this book .ia epitom.:ized ;Ln the wOl"da taken ham its concluding chapter" It 
declares e.c. tlr1:ttin, who reviewed the book :in !.!.! .. , Janua.ry, 19h9, 382 ... 
386. He quotes Beard.'. titQ%'dAn "U the preoedenta set by President Roose-
velt in conducting foreign. aftdns, as reported in the record.$ of the Con ... 
gressioDal Committee on Pearl Harbor, am other 4ocuments, are to stand un ... 
iPJpeaf.:bed ,~nd be accepted hmoeforth as valid in law and morals, then ••• 
the Pras1den.t ot the United. States ••• may, e.tter publie:b" announcing one 
foreign policy" eecret17 ptWsue the opposite and so conduct foreign and mil-
1t::.17 affairs as to maneuver a delignated fore1p power into firing the first 
ahot in an attack on the United States and thus avoid the neo .. :Lty of oall-
ing on ~ess in advance to ~e its constitu.tional power to deliber-
ate upon a d.eclaration or WI:U"." (p. ,82 ... $83) Qr:U.'fin continues: u~ 
who knew the o~ of the late distinguished historian on foreign pollcy 
expecter:' this book to be hoBtUe to the Roosevelt administration, but ma.:D7 
would baTe welcotned /,t. treatltent in a vein as relatively sober a.e that of 
Beardts earlier volume, ~er1cart lore!e ~oUm:- 1:: 2 Mak~ .. fPi-19!iO, 
wb1ch a.,o1o.-.1 $'tII'eep:1ng con.olUiiIons unwarraniid by the record.. . 3 ;regret-
·t&ble ~toH that hi. last work should have ~ so largely an tt.XUlp1e 
of p&rtilJ&Mh1p on a subject 80 deepl)"a part of the _otional ~e!l.Ce 
ot the author. as tbe events Which preceded the recent world war.fI(Charlet! 
C. 0r1f'f1n, A.B.;!., vol. W, JanuaX"y', 1949, 382-)86. Herbert. Feis, .D!! 
Road to pea;"I f.1ai:bo%' t The ~ of the War Bet.lIeen the United states and 
.TaPin;-PirDCetOll" I9$0. '""'""fn '"'"'th!'S viiUiie; 1eI1 'il!iS show us fINer] tWIst and 
turn 01 the road which 1«1 t.b.. Unit.ed stat_ into 'W'&r with JaPlUl 1n 1941. 
liThe decade since this road was traveled. has laid bare most of its secrets. 
Hr. Fela had. access to the State Depa.rtment archives, the stimson, Morgen-
tbau, and Clrew diari.es, and seleotions fran the Roosevelt papers, and had 
the opportunity to talk at ~h with ~ of the Ame1"1cans involved in the 
negotiations which preceded the outbreak of the war w:1. til Japan. on the Jap-
anese aid., he had the :records of th. International MUita.ry 'l'ribuivU at To-
kyo, t.b& records of the 8~ tribunals at Nuremberg, and the ~ reveal-
.1ngl1do and Saionji ..... Harnda diaries, as well a.s other documents and studies. rt 
(mWin c. Re18obau .. makes thea. comments 1.\1. his review of The Road to Pearl 
Harbor, A-li.!., LVI, October, 1950 to July, 19$1, 617...618.)- - -
t 
.., 
~i1Jli'k'1'l L. Langer and S. Everellt Gl_son .. ·.~ ~ge 12 Isola"fl. 
tion, New York, 1950, is a study of Ameri.can foreign policy d'lU"ing the years· 
19)7 to 1940. Ianger aM Gleaaon wel'$ 1nvJ.ted. by the councU or Foreign 
.Relations to undertake the talk of writ'1n8 a h1st~ of .American foreign pol-
icy of the period prior to the Seoom. World War, and contim1:1ng through 1940. 
The project was financed b'rJ a substantial fund. fran the Rockerleller Founda-
tion. The book na turCi1l..1.1' supports Rooaevelt and. -lihe h1gb. a.uthorl. ties in . 
Washington, .!.nee the authors have had p~l. flontact and couns~l f'roa 
these men. Charles Austin Beard' c.riticdzed the Roekerf(llllw Fomdati= ..,-.. 
ing that it did not ltwant jou.:rr.t.alista C1r &n7 other persona to ~e too 
elosel:1 and critiCue the offieial propaganda and of't1c1al statements nth .. 
t1ve to our haLlic. a1nus and activit1ea, during World War II •••• Instead 
of pr(:mot1ngthe liberty of reseU'Ch and writing tha:t winnow f&ew ~ t1.c--
tioms, su.ba1d1Md histories of th.ie 1dnd pr9part)d to strve a purpose fixed-
in advance,' a:re more Ul~ely to perpetuat$ errors than eliminate then ••• , 
otticialareh1veB m.ust be open to all e1t1sens on equal tenu, with special 
priv1l1g •• tor none," \1a1t.-lti.ll1s, Tb,u Ie Pearl: The Un1ted States and 
"'Pti.n, l2k:l~ Hew York, 1947 _ The a.uthor :treats' ;;t "theTeai pre<ied.liii Peari i~, '""jI""'ving an aCCQunt of the Japanese preparations for var,and our own 
pn,p.u-ations. fIe tells of i¥he meetings of ambassadors of too two countries, 
in an ef'torttd seek a solution ot their diffioulties. 'Mr. M1ll1s draws on . 
the government )."ecords, purticuJ.arly the Pearl Harbor investigation for his 
Wormation~ He sides with the RoOlltCiWelt adm1nistrat1on, taking the stand ... 
po1nt that war wa.$- unP."otdable, that thwe was no other .if, even though u. s. 
polic1es brought VBl" tc our countrj. This I. ' •. '\1"1 1. . important IlS it tell.:J 
oJ: t,h. Q1.r1~oI1S vJ: l>listakee 'Wh~ch le4 tc '1Jii &.~ 'Of' Pearl llarbor II It 
leads up to tn. of the ereatest ~11ta%":r feats ot bisirory, the v1~ that 
lost the TAr tor the Axia power.~ (James A. F1.eld, Jr. reviewed the above 
book 1ntlle !.H-!!., LIV, Oct., 1948 to May, 1949, 17;;"'17,.) Basll Bauch, 
rt.OO~t frOm ~IUn:1~to Pearl Harbor, A ,sai:nthe Creation of a r2!:~ PolIcy, I. 'rorIi, r -:- hucii -~la!U thnt . - '0 •. Roosevelt"We.s ~
ternatiooallst, and he Gndeavors to prove it 1n this book. A.tter the eur-
re.4der ot theWestfa"n Power. a.t Hlm1ch,_ Roosevelt turned from preoccupation 
with ~$i;.ie -pt'obl.ls to the task of cl'uulg:tng: American foreign poliey fran 
"1,aola.t.ionJ.sm." to "hiterna..ticnal1sm"lfaqeanp11sb1ng tld.$ bit tv bit as b1s 
apeechu and acts edu.cated the American ·people. 
Charl_ C. Qrit.t1n, reviewing this book in !-!!.,ll" LVI, Oct., 19;)0$ 
110, says tha.t~cb adm1:t.a Roosev$lt'. involvement of the Unit«! States . 
a t11m1ted undeclared wart in the Atlantic Ocean, during tho autumn of 19141. 
He argues stl"~ that the Prea1dent did not seek an. all out conflict there 
and took only min1mum ~t.o bolster the now of lend-leaSe to Britain ' 
He cannot, h01i8'lel", conti.nu.es Rauch,conceal the tact th.a t these steps wre' 
accompa.n1ed by a great deal of presid.ent.ial verbal lege:rdaua1n in order to 
grasp one hom of the J.end.,.l.ease dilemma (all-cut support tor Britain ahort 
of war),)and at the 8:lme time grasp the other horn (lend-lease was a ~"c"" . measure~ " ' !: ... "" 
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Ori.tfin continues! "In dealing with the Japanese problem, Rauch 
.forcefully' ••• and suecess.tUl.lT dem.olishes the Beardf10rgenstern thesis, 
though he does not expl.a1n why the imposition of embargoea~ so long res1st-
Ed by the adldn1strat1on, as likely to bring war, unleu lindtecl to non-
essentials was resorted to in the summer of 1941, without .full recognition. 
of ita aJ..moat 1neri:table consequences. ;< •• Idwin o. ne:t.schaueZ', The 
United State. a.nd Japan, Cambridge, 1950 .. is reviewed by Claude A. Biiie in 
X.E.!., LVn, OCt"o5el', 19~ 1;(> July, 1952, 169 .. 112. He teJ.la U8 that hurtor-
Ieal writing at ita best is .fourJd in this book:. 14r. Reitschauer speaks b:'om 
experience. He studies the problems of Japan, a.s well as our own, a.nd points 
out the eoonan1c aspects of each. He. say'8 that we do not knOW' the Japsn.ese 
culture well enough to understand the Japanese cilal"actel"S hence 80me th1ngs, 
which seem to be contradictions in Japanese character, a:re not really so a.t 
all, "The awak~ of Japan preceded that of other countries of Asia. The 
st~le between democracy and totall ta.r.tanism was not .a passing phase of 
Japan&ae histOl'7." (p.20l) It ha.s continued until this t~ under Japanese 
occupation. Our objeotivesare to "rea.djU8t the bala.nce so that in the f't1-
ture .. peaceful and democratic forces within Ja.pa.nese societr will graduaJ.,4r 
win ou.t ever t.he mili~u:1.st and authoritarian forces." (237) Mr. Reisehauer 
draW$ this sage conclusion I "upon the .tat. or Japan b.anga t.he tate of the 
world. Japan is merely one elemont, in tbe world order as a wole.. By help-
ing Japan to beome a £:reG c1emoerat:J.c nation, we are helping to create a dem-
ocratic, peace-10'V'ing world. 1f id.1Iard R. stettini:u.8" ao.,.~t .. the .a.u... 
~l the Yalta Contarenee, Oa.rdcm01ty, New 10*, 190. A~to~ 
t ua.J"""1':res1den~ noosiiiilt eould bave uJ.. no other agreements than he d1d 
e at Yalt.a. St~t1n1U$ does not say whether the President'a action Wd 
right or wrong. The President MUft'8d that weshoulcl build the peace on a 
tim unity between our count.ry-, ltusia and az.e.at Britain. 1'td.s:1dea influ-
enced a.nd pre-d.etC"mined tQ agreaent that was made at Ialta. Charlos Oa.l-
lan Tansill, Back Door to w.r .. The Mot:tevelt r..ore!p Pol1gz. 19n-19~. Writ-
ing in a.g.!." oct:;l9'$'2',~No. 1, 23 .. JiiD:us il.Pratt,lliirver ty of 
. falo sarIn nrto the work of World War II trm.iord.sts t such d the late 
Ch.~lea A. .Beard, George liorgenetem, ~1il1iam R. ~lln, Frederic R. San-
, and &:rry Elmer Barnes, Professor Tans1ll now adds a much more weighty 
eumented V01Ull1e. In addition to the p:rintedsources, he has made abu.ndant 
uae· of :num.erou.s collections of peraonal papers and a walth of mat~l frOl"t 
state Department arch:Lves. 
l'l."he basic thesis of the book can be stated in a few sentences. The 
!Viet Union, in ord .. to promote it. own program was the 1nst1gatorof war 
. both the Far East and Eu:rope •••• Japan was the natural ba.:r:r1er to the 
praad of C~ in Asia; ~ in h-ope. The United States wae 
, ilty of a f0. tal error in opposing Ja;t:anJ the a..ocracies eim:llm.rly erred 
• backing PolAnd against H1tlti". Roosevelt bear. the ma:in guilt, for he 
ot ~ 'ma.netlY'ered' Japan into w.a.r in the Pacific, thus enten.-:Ig the Iiu"o-
war through the 'back door'; he had already tneedled t Cb.amberlain into 
1""""'~''6 a t1rm stand against Hitler in Poland, thereby pla.ying a key role in 
, 
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precipi"k:.t1ng"'var in!brope. Had Hitler been permitted paae~ to have 
his way in Pola.nd, he would have turned east tor he t1t'OU1d have pref'erred 
conflict with Ru.ssia ·over the U'.k:raine' to war with ~. and France over 
Poland. ff w:1Jliam 1,. N.utIlaM~the Peaoe. ~ .... 1945: Tho D~lcma9Z 
of the Wartime Confwencea 1. n,~. lietmla.ncr-ucribea r course 
or iIiganatIons &itween 2tain, the United Statu and Buuia d.url.n.i the 
interval between August" 1941, (The litJ.a.ntic Conterence), and F.'br.u:ay 1945 
(Ya.lta). His ~ 18 objective and shtnm good ju.dgment. ae 83.1'8 that 
tIle peacemakers ha vesuceeed.ed no better tlwl those who tried to plan a last ... 
ing peace at the end ot World War I. (See revies by Leland M.Goodrich in 
J\.1!.j •• LVI, Oct. 19~, to July, 19$1, p. 168.) 
W1nston CburebUl, The ~ ~I Eft ~co~ World War Vol. 
ill, Boston" 1950, bas been rmWed W fr.tcm Sloe.on Iii !.n.;:, iT,' oct.., 
1949 to July 1950, 876 ... 818. nesa.ytl that ChurChUl carries the stor".r o£ 
ilorld -War n from tbe beginning of 19h1, to the Japanese attack on ~ 
and Brit1ab possessions, at 'the end of that~. American poUcY. is diS:" ~ 
cussed and ~ tributes are paid to lTaaident Roosevelt and bis .4:ris ...... 
CburchUl tells us that the ,l)ri.tish int.ervened in Greece in order 
to deJ.;.4Y the Geman o!'fensive against Ruas1a, and to 1nt':!~t~ with the plans 
for the Russian campaign. (p.29) The first air-borne attack by the ~ADIJ 
was l'!i\:lde against Crete. (1'. 284) This used up v.aluable men that might have 
been placed to greater a.dvantage somewhere else. t'The forces or Goring ex .. 
pended there 1llisht eaaiq have Siverl him ~8, Ira.q.Syria,t a.nd even per-
haps Pertda. ff (302) Buaia, altboughrep_tedly v.arned by Britain, thought 
G~ 1IOulJ;.i .not attack bero .!or a long tbte. The be$t ~l"Y of the work 
in the opinion of .Pre8ton Sl.san 1a vila t Churchill said in an address to 
Parliament in 19411 ":!"At us not forget that the ~ has difficulties of 
his own •.•• and that the struggles of history have been von by superior will 
power wresting Y10t0r;y in the teeth of odde or upon the nanowut ot mrg1ns.ff 
(P. 1.$$). Samuel B. MOl"iIonJ ~th!'~. Battier, ~. J.~212 ~.19ldt.:I Bos1ion, 19h9. The~ Oct. 19>0 to July, 1951;-m .. ' .'. 30, 
carrliI'ti" review of Moruon'a book ii Gordon W. Prange. 'l"he Bismarcka 'Bar-
rier wus a eomb1na.tlon land"..so.a..air roa.dbloek ot ~ong Japalle$8 bases ,cen-
tered. around. the powerful and pivotal t~8 of Rabaul at the northern tip 
of H_ B.r:1ta1n Islam.. 1tThe h1si;.olY.of the eighteen months of bitter land, 
sea, and a1r fighting which he so expertlg describe' presented. no great fleets 
maving into treme:OO.ous and epooll-mcld.ng battle such as l¥1idwa,- or I.eyt.e. Gul£ • 
• .. .. Morison was forced to deal with a series of relatively' small and isola ... 
ted actions. tf George· B.&msOl'l, The W .. terIn World and Jam' A B~ in the 
~t.erQ.ct1on of liu'o~ and Asiafu euI£ures~ YOrk, 1 . 3. 'Saiien, an--= ~ent lUstorIin 'ol apan, has ma.de a stU7:& elf t.he affect o£ the ~J_tern world 
~ Jl!l~n before 1900. Japan adopted ~ie:stern culture more quiCkly than did 
r 
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other eountiies~ She formed a. strong centralized state, a national eon-
script army, a system of uni.venml education, and a. centrallzed. ba.nld.ng 
structure. Sanson saY'S1 "To OV~$st1:mate the part pl.ay'ed b-/'Western 
influe:lCe is to misunderstend mOdern Japanese history, and 1n consequence 
to £om an unbaJ.aneed. 1£ not :mistaken Ti_ of the relation between East 
and \iest." (p, 22) This book points out the wq Japan has eontinuousq 
resisted the introduction o£ Western idoaG. In All probabU1ty, it wlll 
tal:e ~~S to develop a democratic wa:y of lUe in Japan. George B. Sanson, 
JAR!!! in World Bi8t~. New York, 1951. This book contains two serlea of 
leetUl"'u aellvered ~npan to the Japanese by its author, ~ B. Stan-
SOlh The specialist in Japanese h1story' w:U1 read this smo.ll volume w1th 
pro.fit and interest. Chltoshi'L'Ulap ... W-an Since ~ New York, 1949, 
The author ducribes Jap('m' s emergence .. ail feliaa:!:fiiit:;thr\!7Uih the ef'£oria 
~ her leadera, who followed a ver"3' definite p1a.n. He pictures the riae 
and fall of Japan as a world pOlf$r and ends nth the JapM.eH being trained. 
by the United Staws. Ianaga do_ not ecmment or attempt to justifY Japan' 
foreign policy', bttt lets the nader draw his own oonelU$iOlls, Ue aayat 
"Japan was lFaciua.1l:' working heraell toward the .tta.~t c£ heg.ony in 
East .A.sia~ 11 (P. 369), !;Itt hQ alDo write~n ftl)ual diplMaoy' .. • .. gave nee 
to inconsistencies, contxadict1ons. .. .. • TM right hand did not always 
know what the lett. h",nd _s doing." ( 8ee rEPtiew by' Harc>ld S. Quigley, a.!!. 
!i" LV, AprU, 195o, Nc~ ), 
E.. POLITICAL MID rootroMIC mSfacr 
Aaron DnniGl, ecL., A:mer.lca in Crisis. 7~ 0n1c1al ~cd.ee 
in American tJist.g£l, New York,' !9~. ""In tIiIi volUme $~! reeens" 
are treat«t: Ii'Q&ii the Banks Closed" b7 Walton H. HamUton, Paul B. Sea;.rs" 
uToo Black BlislardsltJ M(lIl"ris Janowitz, "Black Legions on the Ha:tchfn 
Norman fIolm.es Pearaon, "The lfa~ov1et Pact and. the End of a Dram", In 
theae essays the a.u.thO%"$ mve told ot the issues at s~'\ke and the ef£'ecte 
of the crises on the peal>l. of our United States. They huve bequ.~ 
r_ponded with cOUl~age aoobave shown a willingness t.Q work topther when 
public need demanded it. Eliot Janew...,.,! Chron1c:t.~ of Jf'.ccmt&ic ltobi,JiZ;!-
Uon in World \Sr. +.L ChrorJ1cles or Am.eriCa ~., 'vO!. ~J, Viii miven, 
~. is ~ewed by Paul 'Fanter :in A.H. B.. , LVII, No_l, AprU, 1952, 758. 
Those ue Hr. 'arm.'s words. ttAm~rei'l. ·oooncmie mobU1aation between 
1939 and 191.6 C()DBt!tuted a veritable miracle ae Eliot 'ia.newa.y believ~1 
vh1ch raised the st.tuxlard of living of the nation, gave labor. both urban 
and rural - & new SenDe of dignity, and importance, and tremendously im.-
proved t.he position of the l~egro, while a1,mu.ltaneously pem1tt1ng the Uni-
t~ . sta~e5 to vanquish the Axis and usume 0. position of lead...-ab1p in the 
poat-war struggle against Soviet tOtalita.rtaniSlll. ft Henry L. st1msbn, 
!)"elude to Invasion, An Account Baaed u~ Official Reports, Washington, 
, 
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D.C.~ 1944. sth180n tells U8 ol the success of the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, and hoW that a.ttack assured .tu.rt.her sueeoasses ~'1 the Philippines. 
ff~1ith the balance or naval power in the PacWc llOif in their favor, the 
Japanese were relatively tree to send mass reinforcemom..s to their in'Iasion 
troops in the PhUipp1nea, lIhUe the PJ"Oblem of strengthening our out.numbared 
gurison t~ was under the circumstances, an insoluble ODe. Fb1lipp1ne 
and .Amer1~ torces hopelessly out-numbered, were .torcGd to witbd.raw to the 
Batun pen1nsula" (a mountainous r~on north of 1Jle ent.raAce to l-1anila Bay)". 
for a l.:uJt ditQh stand." {p.4} N1cholAs 11u.n'q Bl&tlC', .Ap1er:i;oa F.aces the 
~, Beaton, 1932. The author bel.ients that we tnUst bift sme Bii.! O't""a. 
planned econcay.. He saY'S' "What I ask for, gentl_en~ is a plan, a plan of 
int.ernational cooperation to solve the WOblcs that have b«:~ internation,.. 
a.l - not to sit and wait -- not to $tand and WP..1t - not m.erely to abuse the 
people with a plan: but to present a. bet~ plan and to tutU)' for our time 
and for the time that shall come alter UG that all tbe sacri.ticen that have 
been made tor three hundred ~ all over this world to build institutions 
of llbc't;r,ot ~da.u, of pollticaland economic ~ubity, to build them 
into g<>VC'l:lm.rt.a and social ~. - that all that has net been wasted. 
We have not ~ on a tal.$e track, bu.t we B~q na.ve been incouequent in 
a.ppreo1at.ing and in meet.1ng the gravest lId.tuation with which ou.r system of 
l1bc'ty has ever been faced. Let. the W01".ld w..'ike up. Let it dema.ndot its 
JllEDl in public office that t'Mt7 e1thfJr take constructive lCtaflor make way tor 
thm3e 'Who can .....am w1lll 11 George Morgenstern, Pearl Har~, !!1! StS!,Z.2! 
til! ~ee war. Now York, ;?41. Cbar~s .4... :I3eal"d says: "!he catastrophe at 
p~ 4 or on Dec~ 7, 1941, it. s~ance and .1ta issue. is now and 
un.do1.itJt,~ wUl long oont~e to b. an ~bl. cent .. vi jntell~ual 
and moral 1nterest. Having ~tin1Hd the :more than ten thousand pages of 
~ tes~ and oft1c1al papers bearing on this disaster be~or. I read 
the prQot sheets c£ ]orr, l'iora«C"~t~'a boalt. I can .Y' Q1t of sane knowledge 
of the. sub3Mt t.l:1at btl volume 18 a powertul work based on primary and ;1r.. 
reducible facta 1n the caM, ca.re.tu.l.ly gat.l.i.ered and buttressed by ~c .. t e1 ... 
tat10na of the sources. For his own interenees and. conclusi~l he gives 
~tarr contexts," Wbat tho h\ar Cabinet and the War Councu d1d in their 
frequent mMt:t.ng, befoh Pearl Harbor 18 desCZ'iJ)&j in }lorgenaternts book. 
rrhe &eCl"et plans of the Japanese govemnent al"e disclosed by the intereepted 
code wtdch the CQmmmicationa ~t dtlooded shortly before the attack. 
United states Depart.wmt of State, )?Wa and liur, United. Stat·ea Fore!f:n 
?olicY. ~1 ... 1941. Wa.s~t.~, 1942. . ~ok'Pl'eients·"<l· :record of 1'o11;.1e;3 ~ aQts ~ the til' J.ts<" states sought to pl:"'Omote conditions o£ peace 
and vo;'ld order. 
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One lIDe 
• , t 
? PACInC OCEAN 
.L-__________ ---.-.---.--,--------------~" 
I.)earl Harbor J shOW'.i.ng bert.hings of the Pacific Floet whan the 
Japanese att.acked on Dee_her 1. 194J.. Wl&t'$b1ps indicated in black 
were sum" those in black and white dama,ged but aJ.'loat. 
This map vas cop1ed b"om George Morgensters !l:! B!2!l 9! t!l! ~ Wa;r 
New York, 1947, with the perm:Lssion of the Devin-Adair c~:uv. 
l'iAP OF OAHU ISLAND 
RAWAIIJ.N lSLANnS 
') 
. tr . 
DiamGrict l~~.·~ 
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,. 
The island of Oahu" Territory of Hawaii, shOlf'lng objectives of 
the Japanese attack or Decaaber 7, 1941, which brought the United 
S't.:1.tu into iiorld. War II. This drawing was taken fran Pearl Ha.rbor, 
The story of the Secret lia2:", by George Morgenstern, with ptrm1ssion 
of The Devin ... Adair Canpany, New York, 1947. 
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This world map is on Denoyer's Semi.elliptical Projection. ~he 
elements of scale •. area and shape are adjusted 5C? ilS 10 combine 
useful and mslructlvefeatures m the greatest poSSible degree. 
~h~~~~i~:n~~~~r~£~~,!~~~:at~~~~= 
presentalion to the globe-the onty true world map. 
This r:nap presents a unified picture ofthew:orld. There are no 
~~~I~~ke~~~e~~V1~: ~'=~~hr:S~~8~:tl~e~~ 
countriesandlocalilies. 
The.SCilleis true on the central meridl3n, the equaror, and in 
. AreasaooshapesaretJueonand 
map provides approximate equal area 
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The most important single ography is the fact that the 
earth is arotating sphere. Semi-Elliptical projection 
used for this map;--- shape of the earth, due 
to the proportions of the increasing curvature of the 
meridian lines as you way from the center of the map. 
Land masses near the the map have to a surprising degree 
the appearance you s you rotate a globe and view the 
curved-away areas in oe:!1S1)eC:U"e 
Polar insets in the lower corners of the map add measurably to its 
usefulness. These are on the equatorial scale of the main map and 
show these polar areas in their true size. Truly a world map for 
education in this air age. 
map is chiefly valuable for showing world re 
,HiiUUrL<llli that neither land nor water areas be penal 
the other. In this map the same scale is USel 
water areas. This has been insured by beg1nn: 
, network of meridians and parallels on which tJ 
plotted. All area on the earth's surface is accounted' 
scale. The scale is 400 miles to an inch, all that can be ac~ 
on a 64 inch map, since the 25,000 mile equator then need, 
of 62 1/2 inches. 
Note how the map vividly contrasts the much narrowe: 
Ocean with the huge expanse of the Pacific. Check it on' 
If a world map fails to show this, and relations between A 
Siberia, and between Labrador and northern Europe, it f: 
in showing important relations a world map should brin! 
Clearness in this way has been heightened by omitting e' 
deemed non-essential in a simple political map of I 
Relative importance is shown by the size, style and b 
type. Continents are in a bold type of great dominance and 
Country names are in capital letters. Cities are name 
letters. Names of oceans, rivers and lakes are in itali, 
Unity in the Map Proje 
Since the equator is a full circumference of the eartlh,lll 
tance from pole to pole is approximately half as long 
uses an equator line twice the length of its central meri 
proportions of the map are essentially correct. In anJ 
type of projection the meridians that are further from: 
must bend toward the pole, unless the map is "interrupte( 
clefts, sometimes done so as to make all continents I 
up-and-down position. That sacrifices unity in the map,: 
relations obscure; for example, Siberia may be pulie( 
from Alaska, altho it is actually very close. Unity is an 
virtue in a world map. 
Land Masses I 
Denoyer-Geppert offers a variety of world maps, in sOUl 
the Americas are centered throwing the Atlantic and pad 
into sharp contrast. In other maps, as in the one on tIh 
the projection is centered on the prime meridian, keepiJ 
masses undivided. This arrangement is preferred by mOl 
for use in the lower grades. The continents are th 
identified and learned. The old world may be considerec 
in the right half ofthe map, while the new world appears 
The political units making up each of the great land D 
clearly colored and distinctly named. 
roller and board, dustproof . . . $17.00 Mtg.-15 In new octagon steel case ... $20.00 Mtg.-1D Folded, with eyelets. 
-wo:r~ld~m:a~p~~Iti~Inp~1;e network of meridians and 
~b These are the in<lis;perlsa of reference that you 
li:ry good school globe, and that the map maker 
idabout transferring the surface of the sphere to a 
dtThis network does not merely identify ection; 
Ih,ery means of plotting a world map, locating 
f~eir true position and the relation of one place to 
~o of this network we can really understand and 
Isap, thru comparison with the globe itself. 
[ian lines are 150 apart, so that intervals between these 
Ir'esent one twenty-fourth of the earth's Circumference, 
~r of time. 
~l 
ia 
g 
globe and on any map is determined by the mer-
s, and should be so taught. North is toward the 
along meridian lines. East and west are along parallels. 
'dther reason it is vitally important that a world map have 
,network. Children should practice reading direction 
)~ projection of this map, check it on a globe, and also 
'.tion in the polar insets at the bottom of the map. In this 
lCm gain a real understanding of direction in maps they 
,eled upon to use. 
, at map of the world can combine all desirable features 
'ile,but the Denoyer Semi-Elliptical projection achieves 
r mpromise for school use. It gives us equal area for the 
tlrtant part of the earth - 600 N. to 600 S. Note that 
dbears a fairly correct ratio of size to South America; 
I with a globe and also with the polar inset in lower left 
lIap. At the south pole, Antarctic is exaggerated and to 
lis a polar inset is provided, as is done also for the north 
I, A measure of polar exaggeration in the map relieves 
s somewhat around the sides of the projection, and 
e best compromise between equal area on the one hand 
nality (true land shapes) on the other. 
_s map the "language" is consistent with all other D-G 
naps of continents and similar areas. Political entities 
sI areally in pleasing, distance-carrying shades of red, 
Il!n, orange, etc. The oceans are in a clear, light blue, 
I: of meridians and parallels in a dark blue. All names 
fp, legible black. Standard D-G city symbols are used 
ocities as to size. Post-war political boundaries are 
ned in distinct red lines. 
,is of Map S9a WORLD (handmounted on mUSlin): 
Straight Parallels 
Parallels represented by straight (east-west) _ 
arcs or curves are a distinct advantage oi this' 
relations, such as relative distance north or south 
are easily observed and explained. When parallels are 
a point farther than another from the equator on the 
represented on the world map by a point nearer the 
the Denoyer Semi - Elliptical projection, with its 
parallels, comparisons of latitude are at their simplest. 
Map S9a 
A synopsis of the principal features of the map is contained in the 
legend, insuring a maximum of use by both student and teacher. An 
explanation of various abbreviations used on the map is included. 
Distinct city symbols are graded according to size. 
Mtg.-l0 Plain wood rods, top and bottom ... $12.25 Mtg.-14 On 
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A s A 
Area Area 
Australia Sq. Miles Population ~ Great Britain Sq. Miles 
New Guinea Terr. 93,000 690,613 Br. Cameroons 34,081 
8. Bismarck Arch. Tanganyika 360,000 
Belgium 
Ruanda Urundi 
France 
Fr .. Cameroons 
Fr. Togoland, 
New Zealand 
W'estern Samoa 
Br. Togoland 
19,536 3,390,205 Nauru (admin. by Australia) 
166,489 2,819,981 mn United States 
21,893 918,638 Pacific Is.: Caroline, 
Marshall, & Mariana Is. 
1,133 59,306 (minus Guam) 
Ed. by Norman J. Padelford, Ph.D.,LL.D., Prof. of Internat'l Relations 
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
13,041 
8 
846 
c 
Area 
~ Palestine Sq. Miles Populo Population Former Br. Mandate. 10,429 1,912, 
857,675 Israel now State. 
5,250,000 lIZ] Italian Colonies 341,254 ...... Br. occupied. 
3,383 Eritrea 15,754 1,500, 
Ital. Somali land 194,000 1,021, 
48,000 
Libya 679,358 1,000, 
b:~::::::J S. W. Africa 
Union So. Africa ITlandate. 317,725 357 
Pub. by Denoyer-Geppert Co., Chicago 40, Ill. MIT3r TBUSTEESHIP A 
Printed in U. S. A. 
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